

Manifesto of the Mountain

The Mountain

November 16, 2016



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§3 Our Demands

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Preface

We are a group of Leftists unattached to traditional Left organizations, and without any real power of our own. This manifesto is not the justification of an organization that already is, but an inspiration—and a premonition—of one to come. We are Marxists and communists. It would be possible for us to write treatises defending this, but that would be a waste of our time; furthermore, many have been written already. We guarantee some

of us will indeed write some in the future. Similarly, we do not intend to waste pages here as the defense-lawyer of the Soviet Union, modern China, Hoxha's Albania, &c &c. Our audience in this manifesto are also Marxists, or ought to be.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* it is said:

Since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within his breast, he is finished and done with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of humanity. For it is in the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds.

There is a particular poison in Leftist circles that has been called "selective purity enforcement", which is a method to avoid *any* engagement *whatsoever* (including a critical engagement) with thinkers deemed "problematic". "Better to loudly disavow any and all claims made by them, and never speak again, than to critically engage" is the watchword of this tendency—it is very much tied with *folk-politics* and *petty-moralism*. This is used to delegitimize certain projects whose theories rely on the works of a "problematic" thinker. One very good example here is Foucault. TERFs such as Sheila Jefferys claim that he was secretly a paedophile, and thus his entire work must be in defense of that, and thus any work that relies on him must also be in service of that. This is used to remove Butler, Sedgwick, Halperin, Warner, Bersani, Rubin &c from critical consideration. Never mind that Simone de Beauvoir, whose work founded second-wave feminism, also signed the same petition that's used as "evidence" that Foucault was a paedophile—she's not the target of this. (Similarly, never mind that, supposedly at least, Plato wrote a book defending pederasty, or Heidegger was a Nazi, or Arendt was in love with a Nazi, or Kant was a racist, or Marx was anti-Semitic¹, or Frege was a Nazi, or Althusser murdered his wife, or Wittgenstein beat children &c &c). Importantly here, unlike Gilles Dauvé or Germaine Greer, Foucault never wrote a theoretical defense of paedophilia. Furthermore, upon closer examination, the evidence used to claim Foucault was a paedophile does not show this. Indeed, the petition was not to lower the age of consent as has been charged, but to avoid lumping paedophilia with homosexuality, sex work, alcoholism, tuberculosis, and cancer. Foucault did indeed comment on this particular issue, but his position was to replace such laws with a sort of therapeutic nuanced situational analysis which would supposedly put children in a safe position where people trust and believe them—as opposed to a blunt application of criminal law which leads to victim-blaming. This is something that can certainly be critiqued—indeed, from a cursory look, often victims of paedophilia find it hard to identify the violence done to them as abuse even when adults and free from the power of the abuser, the solution doesn't take trauma into account &c &c. But this has been quote-mined and taken out of context such that Foucault and his project can be portrayed as the advancement of paedophilia, an accusation made easier for homophobes given that he was a gay man who died of AIDS. This is not to say that Foucault or any other

¹ This is based on intentional misreadings of Marx's satire of Bruno Bauer--*Zur Judenfrage* is best translated as "On 'The Jewish Question'" not, "On The Jewish Question" as it is a response to Bauer's anti-Semitic screed "The Jewish Question"--the quotes often lifted from this work were usually satirizations of statements made by Bruno Bauer. Marx himself was of Jewish heritage and well aware of it.

thinker should not be *critically examined* (indeed, while writing this we have come across and incorporated the insightful criticisms made by Weheliye in *Habeas Viscus*). But, to repeat ourselves, *that is not what “selective purity enforcement” wants*, what it wants is a total disengagement—*performative moral outrage*. We must instead champion *critical examination*—these problems should not lead to a disengagement and performative moral outrage, but rather expose the limitations of a work and how it can be changed for the better. *Issues like those mentioned above should be based more on the theoretical and political defense of reprehensible acts and beliefs and how they inform the rest of the associated theory and politics*—thus, we must shun Bakunin, for his anti-Semitism informed his brand of anarchism, and Dauvé, who has, as mentioned before, written a *theoretical* ode to pædophilia, which, unlike what is being claimed about Foucault, does not appear markedly inconsistent with his politics and philosophy as a whole.

We acknowledge that this manifesto is written in fairly academic terms. Hopefully, this will be addressed with a series of handbooks for those who might not be familiar with the theories discussed here. But some will denounce us merely for writing this—merely for writing in an academic tone at all—and will thus denounce our philosophy as bullshit. The perfect response to this demagoguery can be found, interestingly, in the following quote from a review of *One-Dimensional Woman*²:

Accusations of elitism are not only the last but also, invariably, the immediate resort of those who have accepted the capitalist injunction to “live without ideas” (as Badiou puts it). No further argument will ever be produced. Elitists are those whose thought is abstract because it is concerned with the deadly abstractions which dominate our lives, and because it aims at a future incompatible with our dominated present.

On the other hand, many academics will be infuriated by the lack of academic rigour of this paper, as if it were addressed only to academics. This is not an academic paper, and we are not interested in metaphysical speculation here, nor are we interested in funneling our work, our energy, and our time through the ouroboros of the academic ISA, full of opportunists and charlatans. This is not a formalistic exercise in meaningless, onanistic rigour as much as it is a collection of readings of theorists and of history to be in service to and to inform a liberatory political action. It is a call to action. Indeed, we encourage young radicals to rife through our bibliography as a reading list. We reject the “Frankfurtian spirit” of what Nick Land calls “transcendental miserablism”—the following memorable quote introducing his essay “Critique of Transcendental Miserablism” (an echo of Lukács’ remark on the Grand Hotel Abyss) should provide the right frame of mind:

There is a gathering trend among neomarxists to finally bury all aspiration to positive economism (‘freeing the forces of production from capitalist relations of production’) and install a limitless cosmic despair in its place. Who still remembers Khrushchev’s threat to the semicapitalist West - “we’ll bury you”? Or Mao’s promise that the Great Leap Forward would ensure the Chinese economy leapt past that of the UK within 15 years? The Frankfurtian spirit now rules: Admit that capitalism will outperform its competitors under almost any imaginable circumstances, while turning that very admission into a

²found here: <http://www.zero-books.net/books/one-dimensional-woman>

new kind of curse ("we never wanted growth anyway, it just spells alienation, besides, haven't you heard that the polar bears are drowning...?").

The outcome of the "Frankfurtian spirit" is what Nietzsche would term *slave morality*—unable to overthrow the oppressors, slave morality merely attempts to shame them by reversing their values through *ressentiment*—as argued in Moufawad-Paul (2015)³ this also undergirds *nihilist communism* (how aptly named!) by Monsieur Dupont. This is not to say that Adorno's project is not important or useful—it is, and indeed our discussion of aesthetics relies upon his insightful essays on *the culture industry*. What we are merely hoping to say is that this project should not constrain us to merely learn how to die. If we accept all the claims advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer (which, after all, rely on a humanistic reading of Marx focused on alienation and reification, derived from Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*—Althusser criticises this in *Marxism and Humanism*)—if mass enlightenment (and thus, mass politics and culture) is inherently mass deception, if subversion is impossible, &c, then we have no leg to stand on and must withdraw from politics to learn to die. But if we reject the broader claims of enlightenment as mass deception and of instrumental reason as corrupting and totalitarian, and merely acknowledge that everything is corrupted by capital and everything is dangerous (not bad), then we come to the conclusion that nothing is sacred (or harmless) and everything is possible. Rather than constraining us by ideological purity into the forbidding halls of high modernism as the works of the Frankfurt School are typically (and with textual justification—indeed, this is how Adorno and Horkheimer saw it, as they had accepted the conclusion that the postwar social-democratic 'compromise' had suspended the contradiction between the relations of production and the material productive forces of society) interpreted, the critical spirit should free us.

For similar reasons, we oppose the idealist nonsense of some of the French intellectuals. This is not to be made equal to "postmodernists", because many postmodernists are useful—Foucault, Butler, and (if used tastefully) Deleuze and Guattari among them. But anyone who says "even signs must burn" for the liberation of the people should, as praxis, shut up and go away. This school of idealists, being infused with the despair that they cannot "do over" Mai 68 (much like how the Frankfurt School is infused with the despair that they cannot "do over" the Spartakus Revolt—but at least the Frankfurt School developed some important insights into late capitalism), begins to formulate a set of increasingly nonsensical doctrines as "the most radical", to the point where "the most radical" is now to drop out and do nothing—if you devote your emotional labour to the Revolution, you're just a stooge of an evil authoritarian clique that will fail to abolish whatever bugbear they carry. One wonders when the semiotic bullshit-machine will fall apart, collapsing under the weight of its own nihilism.

If this document is treated as we suspect it might, (as the foundation of a new leftist tendency) it would be useful to give it a name. We humbly suggest "Mountainism" and "Montagnard".

§1 The Eighteen Points

1. Our goal is to destroy the multiple interlocking oppressive systems of capitalism (which are really a unitary system) through revolutionary Marxism and to usher in

³Theoretical Ressentiment

a communist society.

2. Capitalism, being based on a set of antagonistic contradictions, must be destroyed. As capitalism is the root of most, if not all, other oppressive systems that we find today—and as it is in itself oppressive, it becomes imperative to insist upon capitalism's destruction by any means necessary.
3. Socialism is the expropriation of the expropriators, the vengeance of the proletarian avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of the downtrodden. It will be achieved through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Class struggle will intensify under socialism, then all classes (and implicitly class struggle) will be dissolved. For the first time, difference will not mean oppression.
4. Imperialism is a necessary consequence of capitalism, even if it does not exist as nakedly as it did in the late 19th century (and as it can be used to comprehend the oppression of people of colour in core countries and settler-colonialism). Imperialism is inherently oppressive, as it creates a core and a periphery and subjects the periphery to oppression on behalf of the core. It must be destroyed by any means necessary.
5. Racism is a necessary consequence of imperialism—it is the superstructure of the imperialist base, and thus too participates in the intense, brutal violence of imperialism. It must be abolished by any means necessary, and this will abolish the false classificatory system of race.
6. Sexism is a necessary consequence of capitalism—it is the creation of *sex* and *gender* which are false binaries in a dialectical relationship with one another, and which permit the primitive accumulation of reproductive and emotional labour through the normalization of the bourgeois nuclear family, the exploitation of women, and the subjection of women to intense violence. Sexism—and the system of sex/gender which structures it—must be destroyed by any means necessary.
7. Homophobia is a necessary consequence of sexism—as sex/gender has historically implied a normative heterosexuality to facilitate sexism as described above, gay people disrupt this structure and are thus punished by capitalist patriarchy, often in brutal ways, such that they are erased from existence. Homophobia must be abolished by any means necessary.
8. Transphobia is a necessary consequence of sexism, as the existence of trans people challenges the naturalization and essentialism that sex/gender relies upon, and, much like gayness, the existence of trans people is a threat to the methods by which misogyny functions. Trans people, especially trans women, are thus brutally punished by capitalist patriarchy through transphobia, which works to abuse them and erase them from existence. Transphobia must be destroyed by any means necessary.
9. Interphobia is a necessary consequence of sexism, as intersex people, like trans people, by their very existence challenge the naturalization and essentialism that sex/gender relies upon—and for this, intersex people are punished by mutilation at birth and a whole host of social consequences throughout the rest of their lives.

We thus oppose interphobia and decree that it must be destroyed by any means necessary.

10. Ableism is a necessary consequence of capitalism, where disabled people are oppressed (through denial of resources, eugenics &c) because their impairments interfere with the extraction of surplus value and because disabled people require different resources than the norm in order to meet their needs. Ableism must be destroyed by any means necessary.
11. In order for human life to persist, the environment must be preserved. Industrial production under late capitalism has posed an existential threat to the environment and thus humanity because it cannot deal with what are referred to as negative externalities. However, we reject primitivism, for one cannot put the cat back in the bag, and because primitivism relies on a reactionary, idealist appeal to an imaginary “nature” upon which their calls for eugenics targeting trans people, disabled people &c depend. We instead call for the maintenance of vital resources (and access to said resources) through central planning, and the replacement of “dirty” technologies with “clean” technologies (which are being developed but not nearly quickly enough, and certainly not distributed on a large enough scale under late capitalism) on a mass scale.
12. Eugenics is a tool of capitalist oppression which must be abolished, born of racialized ableism which has been used as a tool to subdue women, people of colour, gay people, trans people, intersex people, and disabled people. It has no place in a socialist or communist society and must be ended, relegated to memory as a horrific capitalist crime as the Inquisition is remembered as a horrific feudal crime.
13. We find technology to be an ambiguous force—one which, in capitalism, is primarily used to heighten the exploitation of the proletariat and other oppressed peoples, but one which, under socialism, will allow for a world with very minimal work and the meeting of everyone’s needs.
14. We understand the necessity for organization and oppose prefigurative, horizontalist politics obsessed with small-scales, referred to as “folk-politics”.
15. The police and prisons are part of the repressive state apparatus of capitalism, and while a repressive apparatus will be needed in the dictatorship of the proletariat to defeat counter-revolution, the police and prisons must be struggled against and in the end destroyed.
16. In the future, massive urbanization will be a necessity, yet urban policy will need to be overhauled radically to be at all conducive to liberation. We call for an urban policy that centres the needs of the downtrodden.
17. The post-war social-democratic compromise will not resolve the antagonistic contradictions underlying capitalism, and itself relies upon imperialism, racism, and sexism. It cannot be our goal to revive this, whether in the form of a petro-state or

not. We must seek and implement another, more radical, programme for socialism—and we cannot remain complacent with any compromise, which, by its nature, must be temporary, not permanent like fascists and social-democrats would hope.

18. Our Great Work shall be done through a programme of dual power and counter-hegemony followed by a violent revolution, the expropriation of the expropriators, and the withering away of the state.

§2 Our Beliefs

§2.1 Theory

§2.1.1 Against Capitalism

The existence of this sub-sub-section may be surprising. After all, we have decided not to waste time on this manifesto defending our Marxism. This sub-sub-section is not for that: instead, it attempts to answer the question: *on what grounds do we hold to Marxism?* That is to say, not *why Marxism* but rather, perhaps, do we emphasize a humanistic, utopian socialism or an anti-humanistic, scientific (or at least, methodical) socialism. This is a question worth answering, for it has been a point of dispute since the beginning of socialist movements. We specifically would like to frame it in the terms of humanism and anti-humanism—and by these terms, we subscribe to *theoretical anti-humanism* in the vein of Althusser. This is to avoid the problems of *petty-moralism*, which petrify and split radical groups.

Rosa Luxemburg, in Luxemburg (1915)⁴, laid out many, but not all, of the grounds by which we oppose capitalism:

Friedrich Engels once said: “Bourgeois society stands at the crossroads, either transition to socialism or regression into barbarism.” What does “regression into barbarism” mean to our lofty European civilization? Until now, we have all probably read and repeated these words thoughtlessly, without suspecting their fearsome seriousness. A look around us at this moment shows what the regression of bourgeois society into barbarism means. This world war is a regression into barbarism. The triumph of imperialism leads to the annihilation of civilization. At first, this happens sporadically for the duration of a modern war, but then when the period of unlimited wars begins it progresses toward its inevitable consequences. Today, we face the choice exactly as Friedrich Engels foresaw it a generation ago: either the triumph of imperialism and the collapse of all civilization as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration – a great cemetery. Or the victory of socialism, that means the conscious active struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism and its method of war. This is a dilemma of world history, an either/or; the scales are wavering before the decision of the class-conscious proletariat. The future of civilization and humanity depends on whether or not the proletariat resolves manfully to throw its revolutionary broadsword into the scales. In this war imperialism has won. Its bloody sword of genocide

⁴The Junius Pamphlet

has brutally tilted the scale toward the abyss of misery. The only compensation for all the misery and all the shame would be if we learn from the war how the proletariat can seize mastery of its own destiny and escape the role of the lackey to the ruling classes.

We would also like to note one point of departure from Marx and Engels. Following from Luxemburg (1913)⁵, we hold that *primitive accumulation* did not end long ago, but must be provided as a constant stream to maintain capitalism. Federici (2001)⁶ makes a convincing case that this underlies much of patriarchy, and Harvey (2005)⁷ argues that a new form of primitive accumulation, termed *accumulation by dispossession*, can be seen in the privatization of natural resources, the liberalization in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries (such as Dengist China), and the destruction of the social-democratic welfare state in core countries.

§2.1.1.1 For a Neo-Marxian Economics For too long, the Left—and here I mean the *proper* Left—has ignored political economy. This is understandable in light of the narrowness of the field of economics, its rigid, slavish adherence to neoliberal orthodoxy, and other features which make it seem akin to a modern astrology. Yet this forgets that, until the 1960s, economics was a fairly pluralistic discipline, and it was only through massive political pressure that the field homogenized, under the guise of science. Indeed, many seem to forget the Cambridge capital controversy, which challenged the very heart of neoliberal economics (specifically, the neoclassical definition of capital, which was shown by Sraffa to break down)—and which the Neo-Marxians and Sraffians are admitted to have won, when the neoliberals care to talk about it at all (they prefer now to just evade it). This is a mistake, for despite all appearances and propaganda to the contrary, Neo-Marxian economics is indeed a vital field. Indeed, we must not forget that, being a critique of political economy, *Capital* is a work of economics—one which engages with the original liberals on their own field.

Of course, just as there is no one Marxism, there is no one Marxian economics, and they don't all cohere with one another. This is especially true as many concepts, especially from *Capital, Volume II* and *Capital, Volume III*, are ambiguous and can be interpreted in very different ways. For example, there are several main theories of capitalist crisis: underconsumption/overproduction, profit squeeze, falling rate of profit, and disproportionality. Here, we are pressing Marxist academics in the humanities to understand and engage with Marxian and Neo-Marxian economics. Good introductions to Marx's economics can be found in Marx (1865)⁸ and then Marx (1847a)⁹. Though Marx's works have been criticised by marginalists, we can find a response to the main line (advanced by Böhm-Bawerk) in Hilferding (1904)¹⁰. We then recommend reading Hilferding (1910)¹¹ and Sweezy and Baran (1966)¹². Indeed, we would like to emphasize the latter work and its use of the concept of surplus.

⁵The Accumulation of Capital

⁶Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation

⁷A Brief History of Neoliberalism

⁸Value, Price, and Profit

⁹Wage Labour and Capital

¹⁰Böhm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx

¹¹Finance Capital

¹²Monopoly Capital

Neo-Marxian economics, though building from Marxian economics (itself working from Marx (1858)¹³, Marx (1867/1885/1894)¹⁴, and Marx (1863)¹⁵), is not merely Marxian economics after an arbitrary cut-off date (perhaps the publication of Sweezy and Baran (1966)?). It incorporates the insights found in Post-Keynesian economics and Neo-Ricardian/Sraffian economics to sharpen itself theoretically and to sharpen its critiques of neo-classical economics. Thus, we recommend reading Keynes (1936)¹⁶ as well as Kalecki (1943)¹⁷ and the other works of the Post-Keynesians. The Neo-Marxian refusal of dogma also leads us to a point we must emphasize: openness to outside criticism and to tools and theories not typically associated with Marx or Marxists.

We would also like to encourage others to consider how a future socialist society would function. It is true that Marx held the writers of the “cookbooks of the future” in contempt, yet we must have some idea of how to structure the society after the revolution, so as not to merely reproduce capitalism. While (for example) Mondragon Corporation is certainly a step forward, being worker-owned (though not officially worker-managed—and indeed, the criticism levelled is that worker-owners are a much smaller group than workers of Mondragon in general), it is not the solution—by virtue of being embedded in a capitalist system that relies on profits, it is *compelled* to exploit Latin American workers and ignore externalities. It is not enough to form coöperatives—as long as the base structures of profit, capitalist incentives, &c exists, the basis of capitalism will remain.

§2.1.1.2 On Dialectics When we say that we are Marxists, one natural question that arises is: *how do we conceive of dialectics?* This is a question that is more important than it may at first appear: different Marxist sects have different interpretations of dialectics. Our interpretation, contrary to the Trotskyite interpretation (which rejects formal logic wholesale and starts from mistakes made in the later works of Engels, especially *Dialectics of Nature* which he refused to publish, exemplified by a return to Hegel), is derived from Mao (1937b)¹⁸, Mao (1937d)¹⁹, and the third chapter of Althusser (1965)²⁰ (which introduces the concepts of *overdetermination* and the displacement, fusion, and condensation of contradictions) among others, and privilege the *law of contradiction* (represented by Moufawad-Paul (2016)²¹ in the language of formal logic as $(A \wedge \neg A) \wedge (A \vee \neg A)$) as its core. We recommend Moufawad-Paul (ibid.) as a guide to dialectical materialism for beginners, and then the four works we have cited above.

§2.1.2 Against Imperialism

For the native, life can only spring up
again out of the rotting corpse of the
settler

Les Damnés de la Terre
FRANTZ FANON

¹³Grundrisse

¹⁴Capital: Critique of Political Economy

¹⁵Theories of Surplus Value

¹⁶The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money

¹⁷Political Aspects of Full Employment

¹⁸On Contradiction

¹⁹On Practice

²⁰Contradiction and Overdetermination

²¹Torsion & Tension: Mini-Manual for Dialectical Materialism

What is imperialism, and how is it connected to capitalism? Imperialism is the subjugation of one country to another. In the modern era, we can denote three main stages to it, as tools by which we may understand how it has functioned: settler-colonialism, which began in the infancy of capitalism in the 15th and 16th centuries and continues to this day, high imperialism of the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries; and neo-colonialism which has become the dominant form of imperialism in the post-war period. As argued in Lenin (1917a)²², imperialism stems out of capitalism's need for constant growth in the form of new markets, new resources, and new labourers among others. While the form of high imperialism that Lenin was referring to has largely disappeared, the analyses of continuing settler-colonialism and neo-colonialism show that it has been re-invented along similar lines, though in a different form.

Some might argue that, as we are in the Global North, and especially given our theories about a labour aristocracy, would it not be quixotic and, *a fortiori*, inherently chauvinistic to believe that we could be anything but the tail-end of world revolution? To this, we refer to Che Guevara's exhortation for North Americans to fight, for they have the enviable position of living "in the belly of the beast".

§2.1.2.1 Against Neo-Colonialism Neo-colonialism is the dominant form of imperialism in the 21st century. It is defined in Nkrumah (1965)²³, a development of the theory of 19th century imperialism in Lenin (1917a), as thus:

In place of colonialism, as the main instrument of imperialism, we have today neo-colonialism...[which] like colonialism, is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries...

The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment, under neo-colonialism, increases, rather than decreases, the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. The struggle against neo-colonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from operating in less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the financial power of the developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed.

But this was (more narrowly defined as merely the banana republics, though) earlier articulated by no other than Che in Guevara (1961a)²⁴:

We, politely referred to as "underdeveloped", in truth, are colonial, semi-colonial or dependent countries. We are countries whose economies have been distorted by imperialism, which has abnormally developed those branches of industry or agriculture needed to complement its complex economy. "Underdevelopment", or distorted development, brings a dangerous specialization in raw materials, inherent in which is the threat of hunger for all our peoples.

²²Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism

²³Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism

²⁴Cuba: Historical Exception or Vanguard in the Anticolonial Struggle?

We, the "underdeveloped", are also those with the single crop, the single product, the single market. A single product whose uncertain sale depends on a single market imposing and fixing conditions. That is the great formula for imperialist economic domination.

Our view of neo-colonialism is deeply rooted in *dependency theory* and *world-systems theory*, specifically as articulated by Samir Amin in Amin (1974)²⁵, Amin (1976)²⁶, Amin (1977)²⁷, Amin (1990)²⁸, and Amin (2004)²⁹ among others: that is, the world can broadly be divided into a 'developed' *core* and an 'underdeveloped' *periphery*: but rather than being merely primitive forms of the core, the "underdevelopment" of the periphery is shaped by the same forces that produced "development" in the core: economic growth in the periphery does not contribute to development, and its surplus is expropriated by the core. The core largely makes produced goods while the periphery relies on agriculture and mining (which itself is distorted towards exports), which are sold to the core at levels beneath their values. Wages in core countries are by and large higher—and more likely to rise—than in periphery countries, which also tend to more openly suppress social movements to increase wages. This implies a distorted market: where workers of similar productivity and skills earning vastly divergent wages based on in what country—or indeed, considering internal colonies, *region*—they live. Commodities and capital but not labour are integrated into the global market; indeed, barriers to migration are often steep. In peripheral countries, the local bourgeoisie becomes dependent on foreign capital, and a local elite 'comprador' class enforces global power, receiving payoffs for this service. The periphery is, relative to 'primitive' forms of the core, distorted due to the effects of the global market: urbanising ever more rapidly, relying on foreign aid, and developing corruption where incomes largely flow towards the comprador class and the bureaucracy. Peripheral countries cannot, despite "economic miracles" smoothly transition to core countries: they can enter the *semi-periphery* (explained below; depressed core countries can also enter the semi-periphery), but only through the creation or intensification of other peripheries. These forces hollow out politics, (referred to by Amin as 'low-intensity democracy'), which no longer has effective sovereignty due to the dictates of global capital, especially when disciplined by institutions such as the World Bank or IMF. The poor of the periphery are not merely poor: they are *pauperised*, for their situation is one of ever more immiseration. Even the proposed "solutions" of globalist institutions in DC, Manhattan, and Brussels are used to pauperise the periphery: take, for example the "philanthropic" neoliberal project of micro-credit and micro-finance, so lauded by DC financial institutions as a solution to Third World poverty, which really function as the payday loan sharks of the global periphery, setting vultures upon what in business circles is referred to as "the market at the bottom of the pyramid".

Now, with the rise of what's called outsourcing, some might take umbrage with the claim that the core produces goods and the periphery produces raw materials: after all, what about China, India, or Vietnam (which export manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and minerals)? There are two responses to this. The first is the postulation of

²⁵Accumulation on a World Scale

²⁶Unequal Development. An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism

²⁷Imperialism and Unequal Development. Essays by Samir Amin

²⁸Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure

²⁹The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World

a third category: *semi-periphery*, which is industrialised but without significant finance (maintaining characteristics of underdevelopment despite industrialization), and which forms an important interface between the core and the periphery, simultaneously exploiting the periphery while being exploited by the core. The second is to note that despite producing industrialized goods, the periphery (and semi-periphery) remains saddled with all the other problems of “underdevelopment”—indeed, industrialization is a contingent, not a defining, feature of the core-periphery system.

Following Fanon (1961)³⁰, we argue that in a revolution in the “Third World” (largely formally independent from the old High Imperialism but economically yoked by neo-colonialism) must rely on the peasantry and other oppressed class elements that are not necessarily involved in urban industrial production (Fanon uses the traditional Marxist term *lumpenproletariat* to refer to these strata, we do not). Fanon anticipates (based on his observation of then-newly independent countries in Africa and Latin America) that the local bourgeoisie will attempt to take the place of the haute bourgeoisie of the core, and will frame questions of national liberation in the context of its ability to take on the role of the old core haute bourgeoisie, not the liberation of the oppressed classes—but will eventually become, yet again, the agents of the Western bourgeoisie: becoming what was above called the comprador class. The earlier line of unity among the Third World (and similar ideas, such as Pan-Africanism) begins to fall apart as the local bourgeoisie cannot resolve class contradictions, and disintegrates into ethnic and civic nationalisms and religious warfare. It has been 55 years, and all of this has come to pass.

§2.1.2.2 Against Settler-Colonialism Settler-colonialism is the other continuation of imperialism. This includes the maintenance of well-established colonies, such as the White colonies of the United States of America and Canada upon Turtle Island (North America), South Africa, Australia, New Zealand &c &c and the creation of relatively new ones, such as the colony of Israel upon Palestine (following Liberation of Palestine (1969))³¹, we support the creation of a “democratic national state in Palestine in which both Arabs and Jews will live as citizens with equal rights and obligations and which will constitute an integral part of the progressive democratic Arab national presence living peacefully with all forces of progress in the world”—which, however, will require the rejection of Zionism—defined as “an aggressive racial movement connected with imperialism which has exploited the sufferings of the Jews as a stepping stone for the promotion of its interests and the interests of imperialism in this part of the world which possesses rich resources and provides a bridgehead into the countries of Africa and Asia”—and the *state of Israel* “as a military, political and economic establishment which rests on aggression, expansion and organic connection with imperialist interests”). Settler-colonialism creates three categories: indigenous, arrivant (which denotes a person of colour who is not indigenous—thus, one who inhabits stolen indigenous land while experiencing racial and colonial subjugation), and settler. Our understanding of settler-colonialism builds from Sakai (1986)³². We also recommend, to understand more of its relationship to gender,

³⁰The Wretched of the Earth

³¹Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine

³²Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat

Lugones (2008)³³, Lugones (2010)³⁴, and Lee and Rover (1998)³⁵. Hostile reviewers (and, to be frank, some adherents: these adherents are generally referred to as *Maoist (Third-Worldists)*: their error is elaborated upon in the next section) have claimed Sakai (1986) chooses race instead of class as its basis for organization, but this is a crude distortion: Sakai (ibid.) often goes out of its way to make the point that class is fundamental, not race, and that, yes, white workers *can* be revolutionary, but settler-colonialism has, by making them into a labour-aristocracy, distorted their class composition and thus produced a petty-bourgeois class-consciousness that could not transcend reformism. Lee and Rover (1998) draws on Sakai (1986), and extends its analysis towards gender.

Our response to settler-colonialism politically is outlined in *Liberation of Palestine* (1969) as well as Kaypakkaya (1972)³⁶, PCR-RCP (2014)³⁷ and eventually Stalin (1913)³⁸ (though we do not condone the Soviet Union's population transfers; this pamphlet was written in 1913, before its creation and before the adoption of those policies which can be considered deviations from it), itself derivative of Lenin (1913)³⁹. We insist upon the right of self-determination for oppressed and colonized nations, and struggle against the nationalism and chauvinism of the colonizers. We oppose nationalism and national *fragmentation* of the worker's movement. Unification, coalition, and internationalism are the solution, not nationalism, separatism, and fragmentation.

§2.1.2.2.1 The Error of Maoism (Third-Worldism) Maoism (Third-Worldism) takes decolonial theory and smashes it with idealism, removing any nuance or class-base it may have. It takes material critiques of settler-colonialism and their distorting effects on the consciousness of the settler proletariat and then claims that this justifies the abandonment of class-analysis and Marxism: that because the settler proletariat has historically been unable to achieve a revolutionary consciousness—and because of its material power over people of colour—the proletariat must be abandoned as a theoretical construct. Clearly, this is a viewpoint we cannot endorse. Third-Worldism correctly maintains that racism is not mere ideology, but then acts as if material oppression is mutually exclusive with ideology—a viewpoint which Althusser (1970)⁴⁰ undermines by noting that ideology is material. The settler-proletariat's marriage to a petty-bourgeois consciousness is not because it is petty-bourgeois, but through capitalist ideology, which does, again, have a material base. National liberation will not magically eliminate racism and white supremacist ideology, and cannot be done without the material resources and support of the settler proletariat (given the violence it will inevitably entail), whose consciousness must be raised.

We would like to take the time here to remind our readers to keep this in mind when reading works such as Sakai (1986) and Lee and Rover (1998).

§2.1.2.3 For Diasporas We believe that the world ought to be made safer for diasporas, especially as people in diaspora have often been moved, relocated, or cast out. Rromany people, for example, were exiled, and their diaspora is thus necessary. Diaspora is nec-

³³The Coloniality of Gender

³⁴Toward a Decolonial Feminism

³⁵Night-Vision: Illuminating War & Class on the Neo-Colonial Terrain

³⁶The National Question in Turkey

³⁷What is 'Canada'?

³⁸Marxism and the National Question

³⁹Theses on the National Question

⁴⁰Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

essary to combat the settler-colonialism of Israel, as arguments against the diaspora are contingent upon saying that diaspora weakens Jewish identity. The safety and maintenance of diasporas are thus, especially in these cases, where the diasporas face a stream of violence that has been largely unbroken since the Middle Ages, an oft-unspoken priority.

§2.1.2.4 Against Racism Racism was born of imperialism and slavery, and still undergirds these phenomena. Indeed, race itself, as argued in Baldwin (1984)⁴¹, Sakai (1986), and Lee and Rover (1998) among others, was *constructed* by these phenomena. As noted in Lee and Rover (ibid.) capitalism created race from different peoples, fashioned communities for them, used them in the colonial-imperialist system, and then claimed this creation, division, and exploitation was all a matter of biological difference—it is not: race is *made* by capitalism:

Think about it. The entire Western Hemisphere is populated with new races that didn't exist before colonialism. Unconsciously, we know all that in the back of our minds, but we should put the meaning together.

It's easiest to start with Latinos [Latinx], the supposed "Brown" race. There wasn't a single one on the face of the earth before 1492. Before colonialism wiped out many of the different native societies of Central & South America, raped and en-slaved the survivors, then forced them to adopt a common euro-language & euro-religion. Physically, what amerikkka calls a race ranges from those of purely Afrikan ancestry and those of purely european ancestry, to those of Indigenous or Indian [First Nation] ancestry and all points in between. So how can this race be about genetics?

Nor was there a Black race before 1492. It isn't true that New Afrikans in the u.s. are like the Afrikans they used to be. How could they be? Colonialism took Afrikans of many different tribes, peoples & empires, who had different cultures, looked different, and spoke different languages, and transported them to capitalism's New World across the Atlantic. Here they were forced to fuse into one people, with european, Indian and Latin infusions, intermarry, adopt the English language & religion, forge a new culture for themselves, and take on new class and gender roles as an internal colony within a european settler empire. Capitalism defines them as a race, as a biological and "ethnic" group, because they don't want to concede that in the historical process a new society, a Black Nation was formed, with all the human rights to self-rule and sovereignty that implies.

The necessities of the colonial system pushed for the invention of the white race. Not merely as master race propaganda to justify colonialism, but as constructed social reality. Liberals have always said that people took something natural—the white race—and made up stereotypes about its being superior. That's missing it. Capitalism *made* the white race, constructed it socially, economically, culturally & even biologically. Artificial but real. Dr. Frankenstein is a metaphor in lit for something that really happened.

⁴¹On Being 'White'...And Other Lies

For amerikkka, capitalism needed to recruit every person who was vaguely european to their settler occupation force, so as to keep the Indian Nations [First Nations] and the en-slaved Black Nation under guard. So starting with the English colonies, where the master race was defined as the so-called “Anglo-Saxon” race from England, the growth of amerikkka into a settler-colonial empire dictated an equal growth in the master race to include more & more europeans and semi-europeans of different nationalities. The criminal society that they created to enforce colonialism was code-named the white race (aka “America”).

Just as—to put it in perspective—the German nazis insisted on calling their rival criminal society the “Aryan race”. In both cases, genocidal national empires led by capitalism created race as a mass class structure for maximum criminal solidarity, to hold territory, to conquer rivals. As Adolph Hitler remarked: “What does it matter that the communists want to nationalize a few factories? I will nationalize the entire People!”

That millions of Germans were willing to kill & kill for this so-called Aryan race (the whiter-than-white detergent race that biologically doesn’t exist) made it into a powerful social reality in the world. [...] And isn’t it the same with amerikkka’s white race? If you left it to a white majority there would be a Fuhrer [*sic*] in Louisiana right now.

Nations, like races & genders, have been created in capitalist history to carry out roles, to have class functions. Under colonialism, “Nations became almost as classes”. The New Afrikan Nation was created to be a proletarian colony, wholly [*sic*] owned by but *alien* to parasitic amerikkka. The New Afrikan Nation was put together to be like a class itself, a captive nation of producers.

Thus, many of the effects of racism will seem like mere extensions or repetitions of the effects of neo-colonialism and settler-colonialism, and capitalism as a whole. Race involves the expropriation of the labour of people of colour at a greater rate than of White people: as this benefits the white proletariat, they frequently side with the forces of reaction (as detailed in Sakai (1986)) and must have their consciousness raised to a revolutionary level due to their material power over people of colour and the obscuring effects of ideology. Race also relies on the transformation of human beings into commodities and their dehumanization (which not only renders them disposable via necropolitics as argued in Mbembe (2003)⁴², but also has profound psychological effects on people of colour as argued in Fanon (1952)⁴³, Fanon (1961) among others).

Through race (and especially through readings of the œuvre of Sylvia Wynter (whose project is to “liberate different genres of humanity outside of the genre of Man”, where various forms of oppression are not isolatable from one another and from which a different meaning of what humanity means must be produced to avoid maintaining the power of “Man”—“Man”, which claims to encompass all humanity, must be abolished) and Spillers (1987)⁴⁴, following Weheliye (2014)⁴⁵, we can ground what Weheliye terms “bare life and

⁴²Necropolitics

⁴³Black Faces, White Masks

⁴⁴‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’: An American Grammar Book

⁴⁵Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human

biopolitics discourse” (Agamben and late Foucault). Let us, then, outline Weheliye’s critiques and introduce his argument. First, Agamben uses the figure of the Nazi concentration camps as the defining moment of contemporary uses of *homo sacer* and thus the core of contemporary politics (as Agamben in Agamben (1995)⁴⁶ argues that we are all *homines sacri*)—but Weheliye notes that the Nazi concentration camp is derivative of similar structures as part of colonialism (Weheliye names the following examples, which I shall recount in reverse chronological order—the camps used to detain the Herero and Namaqua peoples in *Deutsch-Südwestafrika* in 1907, the American encampment in Batangas during the Philippine–American War in 1901, the British camps during the Boer War in 1900, the Spanish concentration camps in Cuba in 1895, the “contraband camps” in the US South during the US Civil War from 1861–5, the US camp on Pike Island during the Dakota War of 1862, and earliest, the camps used in the 1830s during the genocidal “Indian removal” campaign to move the Cherokee). These antecedents are indeed perhaps more central given that they were crucial to settler-colonialism in the US and high imperialism in Africa (and thus integral in the creation of early-20th century bourgeois society). Indeed, the example of plantation slavery in the US South is, Weheliye notes, even stronger—for it spanned a longer period than camps (which were largely limited to war), began earlier than them, were also crucial to the creation of bourgeois society in the imperial metropolises, and was normalized to a far greater degree than the concentration camp. Similarly, Agamben uses the case of the “Muselmann” in the Nazi concentration camps (the term, derived from a racial slur for Muslims, denotes a class of concentration camp inmates who were so affected that they, in the words of Weheliye, “resembled phlegmatic but still living corpses”) as the final limit case for bare life. But for Weheliye:

In order for the Muselmann to function as the most radical paradigm of bare life, Agamben must insist on the indivisibility of this state so that it does not resemble traditional racial identities. And, despite being the product of racialization, the Muselmann represents the indivisible endpoint of modern politics’ conscription of human biological matter. In fact, for Agamben, the advent of the Muselmann in Nazi death camps represents a completely unique event in its ethical and biopolitical radicality. Yet the death camps not only were aimed at extermination, they also produced a surplus, an excess, not just “an absolute biopolitical substance” but the Muselmann as a racial category; this is how racializing assemblages work, plain and simple. Far from exceeding race, then, the Muselmann represents an intense and excessive instantiation thereof, penetrating every crevice of political racialization; how else to explain the very name Muselmann, a racial slur for Muslims? If we follow Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s definition of racism as not resting on phenotype or culture, but as “the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death,” what, then, is racism if not the political exploitation and (re)production of race? Which is to say that the biopolitical function of race is racism; it is the establishment and maintenance of caesuras, not their abolition. Clearly,

⁴⁶Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life

racism cannot erase race in the force field of the political, whether state sanctioned (legal) or not.

Foucault, as Weheliye notes, does cede the importance of racism in biopolitics in Foucault (1975-6)⁴⁷, but has a too-broad definition of racism that encompasses division in general and, like Deleuze and Guattari, glorifies the “hybrid” as the “solution” to racism. Foucault, then, finds himself just as blind to what he terms “ethnic racism” as Agamben or Deleuze-Guattari. In addition, as Weheliye shows, Foucault’s earlier work on prisons, Foucault (1975)⁴⁸, exploits the intellectual work of an uncredited source—Jackson (1964-1970)⁴⁹, which Foucault read in an anti-prison study group (*Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons*) that he founded. Weheliye makes this point powerfully (the bracketed sentence is his, not ours):

Since the ideas of the BPP are limited to concerns with ethnic racism elsewhere, they do not register as thought qua thought, and can thus be exploited by and elevated to universality only in the hands of European thinkers such as Foucault, albeit without receiving any credit. [Dear reader, if this reminds you of the colonial expropriation of natural resources, you would be neither wrong nor alone in making such an assumption. In the words of Kanye West: that shit cray.]

Weheliye then brings in Mbembe (2011)⁵⁰ to indict post-Mai ’68 French (though the conclusion could apply to Continental theory as a whole) theory and left-wing politics for its abandonment of anti-imperialism and antipathy towards post-colonial theory. Through a discussion and dissection of M.I.A.’s music video *Born Free*, and then Ronald Judy’s comparison of the situation of Muslims in Europe and Black people in the US, Weheliye arrives at the conclusion that “bare life and biopolitics” are just race in a different skin; *homo sacerization* is *racialization*. Agamben’s formulation denies any alternative to liberal personhood and cannot introduce an intervention into existence, as Weheliye puts it. Agamben also, through bundling bare life with Schmitt’s legal concept of the state of exception, ties life and violence (including revolutionary violence) to law, which is what Benjamin critiques in Benjamin (1921)⁵¹—Weheliye demonstrates that Benjamin is able to root the elimination of law and State power in revolutionary violence, while Agamben (charged here with “trying to make Benjamin into a Schmittian”) can only place this in the indefinite future. Agamben distinguishes martial law from penal law in that martial law is “abnormal” and penal law is “normal”, but the various elements of martial law he discusses are ever-present in penal law—torture, for instance, which is normalized in the US prison system (for example, solitary confinement). In place of Agamben’s *homo sacer*, Weheliye advances the theory, derived from *pornotroping* (in the words of Weheliye, “the enactment of black suffering for a shocked and titillated audience”) as developed in Spillers (1987) and from Wynter’s project to allow the flourishing of “different genres of human beyond the world of Man” (finding alternate forms of life beyond “bare life”, which Agamben’s project

⁴⁷Society Must be Defended

⁴⁸Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison

⁴⁹Soledad Brother

⁵⁰Provincializing France?

⁵¹Critique of Violence

ends up denying), of *habeas viscus* ('you have the flesh'), which, however, remains elusive. I will thus conclude my discussion of this concept with an excerpt where Weheliye comes closest to explaining what *habeas viscus* is (through a discussion of *Mandingo*, no less):

While carnality plays a significant role in this craving, there exists also within this hunger an immense longing for a different form of freedom, which, within the system of plantation slavery—seen as a miniature version of the world of Man—can only be articulated by white subjects in the form of social and sexual domination; to such an extent, in fact, that the very being of the white characters in *Mandingo* consists of alternately wanting and subjugating the flesh of slaves. Thus, the white I, synonymous with Man, is birthed through the labors of the desire encrypted in the regionally accented expression “I craves,” which inaugurates this subject. In doing so, *Mandingo* draws our attention not only to the patently seeable subjection of black subjects but also to the usually tightly bound and gagged question of desire and its purpose in the creation of Man as the human. As a performative chant, “I craves” lends quasi-decipherability to the hieroglyphics of the flesh, decrypting the master code of “cultural seeing by skin color” (Spillers, “Mama’s Baby,” 207). Although the actual differentiation between desiring and conquering the flesh might not stretch further than the small tract of land located between nonexistent and very slight, it is nonetheless important to notice this ever-so-slight vacillation, because it gestures toward a conceptual galaxy—one not quite so far away as that other one—in which the flesh embodies both more and less, but above all something other, than it does in the world of Man. The differently signified flesh is *habeas viscus*, for in the world of Man, the hieroglyphics of the flesh are translated to the jargons of negativity, lack, the subhuman, and so on. Given the systematic use of torture as a political tool of “democratic” governments—now legalized in the United States of exception—and the simultaneous sexualization of its medial images in our contemporary moment, how might we go about viewing and thinking these depictions not as deviations from the normal order, since that would only affirm the putative externality of pornotroping from the center stage of culture and politics?

§2.1.2.4.1 Against Anti-Blackness One of the most important features of racism is *anti-Blackness*, as one of the most important features of race is *Blackness*. Legally, Black people have often been excluded from personhood; liberal humanism has defined the human to exclude the Black human. To understand blackness, we must also understand *whiteness*, which can be seen, through the lens of critical race theory (as argued in Harris (1993)⁵², as less a racial characteristic than a form of property, with inherent value. Indeed, an early recognition of this was articulated in DuBois (1935)⁵³:

It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they

⁵²Whiteness as Property

⁵³Black Reconstruction in America

were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent on their votes, treated them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them. White schoolhouses were the best in the community, and conspicuously placed, and they cost anywhere from twice to ten times as much per capita as the colored schools. The newspapers specialized on news that flattered the poor whites and almost utterly ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule.

Non-Black people of colour like to assume that all people of colour are oppressed by the same mechanisms, in the same ways, and with the same measures. This allows them to remain complicit in anti-Blackness, ready to ascend the ladder of whiteness while still claiming to be just as oppressed as Black people, centring themselves and relying on the labour of Black people. Gone are the days of Yuri Kochiyama and Yellow Peril Supports Black Power: the most recent Asian-American protests have been in favor of an Asian-American policeman (running-dog of capitalist imperialism) who shot a Black man and, unlike White policemen, received more than a token punishment. It is quite apparent, then, that what non-Black people of colour want is not the end of racism and anti-Blackness, but rather a bigger slice of the pie: access to Whiteness and White privilege. We call on non-Black people of colour revolutionaries to resist this whenever it appears.

§2.1.2.4.2 Against Anti-Semitism Anti-Semitism is a persistent problem in the world and in the Left, which has a history of Anti-Semitism that stretches from Proudhon and Bakunin to the Strasserites and the chauvinist Anti-Semitism of the postwar Soviet Union. Because Israel likes to call all of its critics Anti-Semites, as well as due to a hagiographic reverence of previous Leftist figures and an aversion to self-criticism (especially with a charge so damning as Anti-Semitism) many in the Left have turned a blind eye to this unfortunate truth. Indeed, it has become commonplace to claim that Anti-Semitism is “a problem of the past”. It is not; the past, as suggested by the title of Rosenblum (2007)⁵⁴, didn’t go anywhere. Anti-Semitism does, however, look different from other racial oppressions such as Anti-Blackness. Rosenblum (ibid.) cites the following as the mechanism behind Anti-Semitism:

1. Jews are isolated from other oppressed groups and from gentile society as a whole
2. other oppressed groups are pitted against Jews and told to identify their anger with Jews
3. Jews are targeted for violence, either intentionally or spontaneously
4. Jews are pressured to cooperate with the ruling class and stay silent.

Anti-Semitism was born in the Roman Empire, born when early Christians portrayed Jews as the killers of Jesus, which Emperor Constantine and his successors used to redirect the sentiment against the Roman Empire at the heart of Christianity. As Europe changed,

⁵⁴The Past Didn't Go Anywhere

so too did Anti-Semitism, adopting new theoretical bases like clothes, and from the 19th century onwards (due to the effects of colonization and its *Weltanschauung*), it expanded outside of Europe into the Third World. (In the Islamic world, prior to imperialism, there was a more generic form of second-class citizenship for non-Muslims). But while Anti-Semitism has changed its form over the centuries, Rosenblum (2007) notes some general common beliefs:

1. Jews are mysterious or act secretly behind the scenes
2. Jews have abnormal, supernatural, or otherwise disproportionate amounts of power
3. Jews are alien to and disloyal to the societies they live in
4. Jews are disproportionately the cause of harm in the world
5. Jews are wealthy or greedy
6. Jews are the “brains” behind the action.

Anti-Semitism allows other oppressed people to divest material analysis and pick an easy target, avoiding the systems of power and giving the largely White gentile bourgeoisie cause to laugh. Anti-Semitism appears to be cyclical: it slowly grows in intensity, then cools down, pretending to have disappeared and allowing Jews to “move up” to prepare for the next round. Indeed, Rosenblum (ibid.) notes that just before the most vicious attacks against Jews, they often appeared to be well-integrated, successful minority groups. This is because the point of Anti-Semitism is to redirect rage from the ruling class. Indeed, it works best when some Jews are allowed some success, to afford some credibility to the myth. This, for example, can be seen in the phenomenon of the “Court Jew”, an assistant to feudal kings who would become the animus of popular rage when the gentile peasantry revolted—similarly, kings used Jews as tax-collectors such that the peasantry would identify their woes with Jews and not feudalism. Rosenblum (ibid.) cites a modern example of how Anti-Semitism works: in the 1980s, many farmers in the Midwest failed. White supremacists organized relief, telling them the cause of the farm crisis was “Jewish bankers”, who would thus have to be targeted—as opposed to agribusiness and capitalism. Anti-Semitism is prominent among the Left already: see, for example, Adbusters’ investigation into which neo-conservatives were Jewish, or the examples mentioned earlier. No one in the Left talks about it. In part this is due to the factors mentioned above, but Rosenblum (ibid.) also cites internalized oppression as an important source: internalized oppression teaches Jewish people not to rock the boat, and so discourages them from discussing Anti-Semitism. The Left also often silences discussion of Anti-Semitism, reinforcing this.

We say Anti-Semitism *appears* to be cyclical (for this is a reasonable and succinct observation, empirically) largely because when people say Anti-Semitism is cyclical, they often are making a transhistorical, not a historical, claim, claiming that modern Anti-Semitism is exactly the same thing as Roman Anti-Semitism, made in a completely different mode of production by people speaking a different language and practicing different religions. In doing so they feed into the narrative of an essential antagonism between Gentiles and Jews,

which implicitly leads to Zionism, a settler-colonial project. We make this qualification of Rosenblum's otherwise great essay following from Halevi (1981)⁵⁵.

Anti-Semitism also is used to neutralize and destroy Leftist Jews. For Jews traditionally formed a large part of the Left in Europe and in the US. In the first decade of the 20th century, the Jewish Left was devastated by the publishing and distribution of *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. In the US from the 1950s onwards, McCarthyism, which disproportionately targeted Jews, along with the recentness of the Holocaust and the prospect of assimilation into the White middle-class, encouraged Leftist Jews to go underground—but then, organizations simply disappeared.

And now we must come to the issue of Anti-Semitism and activism for Palestine. It is indeed true that Anti-Semitism is quite present here, despite how uncomfortable this truth is. This is not because of Palestinians or Arabs or Jews. Rosenblum (2007) cites three reasons:

1. Issues that involve the visibility of an oppressed group (in this case, Jews) will attract the bigotry associated
2. In an issue where Jews (by and large; internal divisions would complicate this notion) do have some power, it is hard to distinguish an accurate observation of settler-colonialism and Anti-Semitic thinking
3. activist tactics often rely on demonizing opponents—which plays right into Anti-Semitism

Obviously, criticism of Zionism (though that word does often get used as a cypher for “Judaism” by Anti-Semites) is not inherently Anti-Semitic, but in order to avoid falling prey to Anti-Semitism, gentiles on the Left must be careful and specific, must not essentialize, and must constantly self-criticize. Rosenblum (ibid.) then lists many things we must do or keep in mind: for reasons of space, we have not reproduced this list here⁵⁶, but we wholeheartedly recommend that this be read and understood and put into praxis.

§2.1.2.4.3 Against Islamophobia Since at least the Nakba—and even more so since the Second Bush Administration, Islamophobia, a persistent undercurrent of European and US empire, has had particular salience. This has been memorably described in Saïd (1978)⁵⁷. While we ought to criticise Saïd's dismissal of Marxism, his book has provided a number of valuable insights regarding the phenomenon of Orientalism (which, though originally focused on the MENA region, on Arabs and on Muslims—which Western scholarship lumps together as 'the Orient'—has also turned out to be useful in understanding the way in which the West has seen other regions and cultures around the world such as, for example, those of East Asia) and Islamophobia. The West lumps in the MENA region, Arabs, Muslims (and indeed other 'Eastern' groups such as Russians, South Asians, Jews, and East Asians) as the “Orient”, an irrational, feminized, despotic, weak &c Other to be conquered, subordinated, subjugated &c to the rational, masculinized, 'free', strong &c West, which is defined by this Otherizing move. This can be seen in the omnipresent

⁵⁵ A History of the Jews: Ancient and Modern

⁵⁶ the booklet can be found here: <http://www.buildingequality.us/prejudice/antisemitism/rosenblum/the-past.pdf>

⁵⁷ Orientalism

narrative of the white man freeing the submissive, subjugated, hyperfeminised “Eastern” woman from her sequestering, feminized, despotic “Eastern” husband (whether it was the British Empire justifying its brutal imperialism upon India with the sensationalist narrative around *sati* or the US-American Empire justifying its brutal imperialism upon Afghanistan using the symbol of the burqa—in both cases, with the support of White Feminists), to become one of the celebrated white man’s concubines at the end. Saïd, in a 1980 interview with *The Nation*, said:

So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab–Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have, instead, is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world, presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression.

These caricatures (leading to a resurgence in Crusader narratives displaced to the modern day), combined with a “divide and conquer” strategy that promotes anti-Semitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jews and Christians (both of which rely on the same Orientalist and anti-Semitic caricatures which owe much to one another), justify imperialist aggression and appalling violence towards Muslims in the West. We must remember that “the West”’s supposed enemy in the first part of the 21st century, religious traditionalists and reactionaries, were built up by “the West” during the Cold War (when they were referred to as the Mujahideen, and, euphemistically, “freedom fighters”) to murder communists—and indeed, are supported today by “the West” if they are connected to Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabis. As Ronald Judy remarks (as found in Weheliye (2014)), “there are amazing resemblances between the Muslim population that emerges in twentieth-century Europe and the Negro population of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America. I mean precisely their constitution as an essential disposable population”. Weheliye expands upon this: “In the United States the Negro came into being when the slave no longer accomplished the required labor of distinguishing black from white subjects so as to ensure the continued superiority of Man [the term for the most powerful sector of bourgeois society, i.e. white cis-het abled bourgeois man, derived from Fanon’s usage in Fanon (1961)] with its attendant class privilege, at the same time as Muslim became necessary as a racialized category in Europe when it threatened to dislodge the until then unchallenged advantages of whiteness, Europeanness, and Protestant secularism of the autochthonous population.”. The “unspoken wage of whiteness” originally theorized by Du Bois in the US, then, extends to Europe when contrasting the Christian population from the Muslim.

§2.1.3 Revolutionary Feminism

One is not born a woman, but rather
becomes one

Le Deuxième Sexe
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR

We advocate for a feminism that is separate from the positions of both the liberal

feminist and the “radical” feminist (which is only considered radical by virtue of a radical lineage and militaristic rhetoric): *revolutionary feminism* (sometimes called *proletarian feminism*).

Federici (2001) convincingly argues that one of the primary functions of gender is to provide capitalism with a constant stream of primitive accumulation in the form of unpaid reproductive and “nurturing” (so to speak) labour, as well as to break solidarity amongst the rising proletariat by co-opting proletarian men and men of colour at the expense of women. Ghandy (2006)⁵⁸, however, complicates this—reproductive labour is important and must be paid attention to, but it is not the central aspect of women’s oppression, because women have played an historically crucial role in social production. Ghandy (ibid.) locates the first division of labour as between men and women in bearing children—but then notes that this did not in itself produce domination or oppression (otherwise, one would fall into biological determinism and a transhistoric justification for patriarchy)—first, non-sex-based division of labour developed through the development of tools, domestication of animals, potter, metal-work, agriculture &c; then, with the process of kinship/clan formation and the generation of surplus, wars, and subjugation, were women forced to withdraw from the field of social production, leaving the means of production and surplus in the hands of (male) clan heads—the development from this into communal or private property depends on societies. From Gough (1973)⁵⁹, we have some of the primary effects of patriarchy as the following: “men’s ability to deny women [their own] sexuality or to force it [male sexuality] upon them; to command or exploit their labor to control their produce; to control or rob them of their children; to confine them physically and prevent their movement; to use them as objects in male transactions; to cramp their creativeness; or to withhold from them large areas of the society’s knowledge and cultural attainments.”. The various repressive and ideological methods by which this is done are as varied, sinister, degrading, and traumatic as can be. Gender, then, is created for the subjugation of women and the exploitation of women’s physical, intellectual, and emotional labour, and it will punish all who dare defy or disrupt it.

We oppose the theory that patriarchy is autonomous from capitalism, instead subscribing to what Arruzza (2014)⁶⁰ calls the “unitary thesis”—patriarchal relations are not autonomous from capitalism, but a part of it—and patriarchy is not a transhistorical fact as both second-wave radical-feminism and patriarchal society may choose to believe, but a historical one, which has not historically been universal. As the primary contradiction is class and not gender (following Ghandy (2006), which additionally notes that the claim that the primary contradiction is man-woman is entirely ahistorical and has no solution outside lifestyle and separatism), class solidarity trumps gender solidarity—yes, Hillary Clinton and Madeline Albright are women, but they are bourgeois white women who have been the prime instruments for imperialism and genocide. To be sure, patriarchal relations existed before capitalism and colonialism in many societies (indeed, in the West, the system of patrilineal hierarchy which underscores patriarchy is much older than bourgeois society—capitalism has destroyed the feudal justification for this but retained the structure nevertheless), but the processes at the advent of capitalism—colonialism, proletarianization through primitive accumulation &c—fundamentally transformed them (the

⁵⁸Philosophical Trends in the Feminist Movement

⁵⁹The Origin of the Family

⁶⁰Remarks on Gender

patriarchal relations, that is), causing them to lose whatever autonomy they may have had and become absorbed into capitalism. However, following from Arruzza (2014), we also oppose the view that capitalism is indifferent to patriarchy, that it would work fine without it and merely exploits it opportunistically—while this may appear to make *logical* sense, abstracted away, it does not make *historical* sense.

Revolutionary feminism recognizes the fact that *both sex and gender* are constructed and assigned to people coercively, beginning at birth. What does it mean that sex and gender are constructed? It means several things. First, following Barad (2007)⁶¹ from a theoretical standpoint, though materiality precedes discourse, the phenomena we observe don't precede the tools we use to understand them (even before the body emerges from the womb, through sonograms it is assigned a gender), and our representations are approximations of phenomena, not mirrors of the material: thus, as argued in Butler (1990)⁶², there is no prediscursive body (again, sonograms allow the sexing and thus gendering of the body before it exists). Sex and gender are thus discursive, not material, categories *assigned to* bodies, beginning at birth, based on a myriad of physical features (and later, social features) that are all assumed to be essential to one's gender and to be perfectly correlated to one another in a dimorphic way—certain norms, then, are forced upon the person based on this assigned gender, and their forced repetition of these norms allows for the propagation of this system. As argued in Lugones (2008) and Lugones (2010), the modern system of gender originated during colonialism and was imposed by the West upon the rest of the world, which often had differing gender systems (including the two-spirits, hijras, and kathoey among others): indeed, for this reason, it is called the Colonial/Modern Gender System, though it functions in a way dissimilar to race (given that if one is a man, for example, one's heredity must not be made of all men under the Colonial/Modern Gender System, but rather of half men, half women).

Let us make a brief detour, for we are certain some may accept this argument about gender but challenge it about sex, claiming that “gender's in your mind and sex is between your legs”. Besides the theoretical response that a recourse to “biological sex” is always already a recourse to the gender binary, we must elaborate. There are several biological bases that people claim to be the source of gender: genetic, hormonal, external genitalia, and secondary sexual characteristics being the most common. First, unless one has had it tested, one likely does not know one's genotype, and the variation is much more than XX or XY—except that the other genotypes (Xo, XXY, XYY, XXXY, XXXYY, XXXXY, XXX, XXXX, XXXXX, XYY, YYY, YYYYY), if they result in “abnormal” phenotypes, are classified as disorders to be cured. Second, hormonal systems are more complex than simply a dichotomy of androgen-dominant or estrogen-dominant—indeed, if the levels do not fit this dichotomy (and this results in “abnormal” phenotypes), then it is regarded as a disorder to be cured. Third, external genitalia are often ambiguous—and thus are, once again, fitted to the Procrustean bed of the sex binary through *intersex mutilation* (for more on this, see §2.1.3.5, which analyses this as an exercise of the negative functions of *biopower*, and see the book Fausto-Sterling (2000)⁶³). The same holds true for secondary sexual characteristics—they are not as straightforwardly binary as one might think. Finally,

⁶¹Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning

⁶²Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity

⁶³Sexing the Body

these may all coexist. Now, the standard response is to just sweep all of this variation under the rug and reassert the sex binary (“they’re exceptions to the rule and would be discarded by any *real* scientist”—in here lies an assertion of medical violence against trans and intersex people). But it does not need to be so. Professor Fausto-Sterling has published a paper (Fausto-Sterling (1993)⁶⁴) that shows a different, equally plausible, division. The point is not to endorse a five-sex model so much as to demolish the two-sex model.

§2.1.3.1 Abolish the (Bourgeois) Family Following Marx and Engels (1848)⁶⁵ and Engels (1884)⁶⁶, we call for the abolition of the bourgeois family. The bourgeois family is built upon the exploitation of women and children, the reproduction of the labour force and of cisheteropatriarchy, and the abuse of women and children. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1972)⁶⁷, the nuclear family is an agent of psychological repression, by which the child assumes guilt (and the parents transmit their fears and angst to the child), absolving parental authority of it, and the child’s desires are repressed and perverted—tied to shame and guilt, transforming the child into a docile individual who can be easily controlled. According to Engels (1884), the capitalist marriage-contract creates a scenario where the husband, by reaping wages while the wife does not, creates a situation where the wife becomes the property of the husband. This is elaborated on in Federici (2001) among others, where the wife’s reproductive and emotional labour (the latter being a concept later elaborated on in *Emotional Labor: The MetaFilter Thread Condensed* (2015)⁶⁸) are recognized as unpaid labour that is a place of primitive accumulation as well as the site of the reproduction of the labour force. If the family is the micropolitics of the State, then abuse is the micropolitics of state violence. Furthermore, the bourgeois family is an ISA, as Althusser rightly notes—indeed, *the* secondary ISA in capitalism, after the school—it forms the School-Family couple.

However, the family cannot be seen as the *source* of patriarchal oppression. The traditional conclusion, when uncritically accepted, ends up generalizing the condition of the bourgeois family, and especially the white bourgeois family. This has been rightly criticized by the Black feminist tradition, according to Ghandy (2006), which notes that the Black family was a source of resistance to racism, not a source of oppression, and that reproductive labour for Black women was also that of the reproduction of white labour through domestic labour in white houses. Ghandy (ibid.) argues that in order to move beyond this, we must examine the wider socioeconomic context for the family, which shapes the family, instead of universally condemning the family

§2.1.3.2 On Interactions and Intersections with Race

⁶⁴The Five Sexes

⁶⁵The Communist Manifesto

⁶⁶The Origins of Family, Private Property, and the State

⁶⁷Anti-Œdipus

⁶⁸Emotional Labor

The most disrespected woman in America, is the Black woman. The most un-protected person in America is the Black woman. The most neglected person in America, is the Black woman

Who Taught You to Hate Yourself?

EL-HAJJ MALIK EL-SHABAZZ

It is by now a commonly accepted fact that not only do multiple axes of oppressions compound upon one another (for example, a woman of colour must face both racism and sexism), they interact with one another in such a way that their effects differ from the “unmarked” ideal (for example, sexism as faced by women of colour will have different practical effects than sexism as faced by white women: women of colour were and are often forcibly sterilized, while white women as white women—that is, without considering other factors—are not). Black feminists in particular have recognized this fact for a long time (indeed, since at least the time of Sojourner Truth’s speech Truth (1851)⁶⁹); it was only recently, however, that it took the name of “intersectionality” (in the article Crenshaw (1993)⁷⁰) and became commonplace in feminism as a whole. Indeed, we see this quite well articulated in the 1977 collective statement of the Combahee River Collective, quoted in §2.1.3.4.1, and in several of the essays in Lorde (1984)⁷¹. Besides the commonplace examples of White Feminists hailing a victory for White women that harms women of colour as “a victory for women”, exploiting the labour of women of colour, erasing, abusing, and dismissing them &c &c, we must also note how many well-meaning attempts, by a lack of consideration, end up ignoring the ways they affect women of colour. Take, for example, the fight for reproductive justice. Oftentimes this fails to take into account the fact that women of colour have been and continue to be targeted by eugenics: that is, forcibly sterilized. Thus, White Feminist conceptions of the fight for reproductive justice often limit it to birth control and abortion, either ignoring or *leading* initiatives to forcibly sterilize women of colour.

§2.1.3.3 Against Homophobia, Serophobia, Biphobia, and Lesbophobia Homophobia and its derivatives spring forth from the oppressive structures of gender. Specifically, gayness (same-gender attraction, for lack of a better word; “homosexuality” being nowadays mostly a pejorative term associated with medicalization of gay people) disrupts the coherence of gender and also frustrates the process of the reproduction of the labour force, the accumulation of women’s labour, and the construction of the bourgeois nuclear family. Thus, gay people have been—and continue to be—murdered for being gay, raped for being gay, and abused both personally and institutionally for being gay. Gayness is presented as an unnatural aberration, and thus people are coerced by the normative nature of heterosexuality into denying their gayness, often in incredibly violent manners facilitated by the medical system. This especially applies to women, as described in the theory of *compulsory heterosexuality* (a harbinger of a more general theory of heteronormativity) outlined in

⁶⁹ Ain’t I A Woman?

⁷⁰ Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color

⁷¹ Sister Outsider

Rich (1980)⁷². Here we turn, as with the case of racism, to the negative functions of the Foucauldian notion of *biopower* as formulated in Foucault (1976)⁷³ and Foucault (1975-6). The AIDS crisis showed quite well the negative functions of biopower, specifically when articulated as the theory of necropolitics in Mbembe (2003)—the healthcare industry and the government both wilfully ignored AIDS for years. When it was brought up, it was used to demonize gay men as well as trans women and call for a quarantine or genocide of gay people. Gay people have been victims of eugenics—one only need see the sad case of Patient B-19 (described in the horrifying 1972 papers *Septal stimulation for the initiation of heterosexual behavior in a homosexual male* and *Pleasure and Brain Activity in Man: Deep and Surface Electroencephalograms During Orgasm* by the perpetrators of the “experiment”, Drs. Robert Galbraith Heath and Charles E. Moan), but the existence of conversion therapy and sodomy laws should themselves be enough evidence of this. Serophobia, the persecution of HIV+ people, is derived from homophobia and must be fought alongside it. We propose a programme of *harm reduction* where instead of attempting to paternalistically punish people, we attempt to reduce the potential harmful consequences of sex and drug use. This includes, in the case of HIV sex education, the promotion of the use of condoms, birth control, and PrEP/PEP. In terms of policy, we demand:

1. universal availability of condoms, birth control, and PrEP/PEP
2. an end to HIV criminalization laws
3. universal sex education

§2.1.3.4 Against Transphobia, and Transmisogyny Much like homophobia, transmisogyny and its more general derivative transphobia (transmisogyny being traditionally considered as the intersection of transphobia and misogyny, now here as the form of oppression that specifically affects trans women, while transphobia is a more general oppression that affects trans people in general) derive from the oppressive structure of gender. Indeed, the response to transness and the response to gayness are so closely tied together, especially historically, that it can at times be hard to distinguish the two—indeed, in 19th century Europe, to be gay was to be trans much like all squares are rectangles. One could make a convincing, though likely incorrect, case for the idea that all homophobia is derivative of transmisogyny; clearly, some of it is. Transness, moreso than gayness, disrupts the coherence of the Colonial/Modern Gender System (being, as it is, an agency which navigates the production and reproduction of sex and gender—flesh and symbol—which are inextricable and simultaneous), confuses the accumulation of women’s labour, and refuses the process of the reproduction of the labour force—trans women in particular are thus categorized as both deviant men and failed women simultaneously, and are subjected to the effects of *pornotroping* (in Spillers (1987) and Weheliye (2014), as seen through the way in which violence against trans women, especially Black trans women, is legitimated and sexualized) and *necropolitics* (in Mbembe (2003), as seen through the disposability of trans women, especially when one considers the AIDS crisis), as well as the negative functions of *biopower* through eugenics and conversion therapy. We should not be surprised to see that similar—but often more intense, for trans people have never been considered as respectable

⁷²Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence

⁷³The History of Sexuality, Volume 1

as cis gay people sometimes may, and have in fact been constantly betrayed and attacked by cis gay people since at least their ejection from the Gay Liberation Front in 1971 despite founding the LGBT movement with the Compton's Cafeteria Riots of 1967 and Stonewall Riots of 1969—disciplinary measures attack trans people (especially trans women, especially trans women of colour, and especially Black trans women) as those which attack gay people—indeed, the AIDS crisis hit trans women hard, and the medicalisation of trans people remains in full force to this day, with abusive practices by far the norm.⁷⁴ In order to better understand transmisogyny (and thus transphobia), we recommend Stone (1987)⁷⁵ (which follows arguments in the also-recommended essay Haraway (1985)⁷⁶), and Stryker (1994)⁷⁷ among others.

§2.1.3.4.1 Against TERFs TERFs (trans-exclusionary radical feminists, although a better term may be TWEFS, or trans woman exterminatory feminists, as they exclusively want a genocide of trans women, instead choosing to emotionally abuse trans men, and may be either in the liberal or “radical” feminist tradition) have been a mainstay of feminism since the 1960s, and have helped define its priorities to be a genocide of trans women first and foremost, with only the exploitation of women of colour being nearly as much a priority. Through active and passive exclusion of trans women from resources such as shelters, alliances with the far-Right about legislation against trans women (such as bathroom bills, but also with regards to healthcare, see *TERFs & Trans Healthcare* (2013)⁷⁸), and through rhetoric encouraging violence against trans women (such as the attempted murders of Sandy Stone, Beth Elliott &c &c), TERFs have shown themselves to be violent and dangerous—indeed, genocidal—towards trans women. Yet they are also wily, changing their theory again and again in order to find new justifications for the murder of trans women: from the “symbolic phallus” of Raymond to the faux-materialism of Jefferys, and more.

It is because of transmisogyny, biphobia (specifically, lateral aggression towards bi women), and racism—along with the folk-political tendency to *drop out* rather than *fight back*—that we must reject the politics of *lesbian separatism*, which is associated with TERFs. As the Black lesbian feminist organization the Combahee River Collective put it in their collective statement, Combahee River Collective (1977)⁷⁹:

Although we are feminists and Lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive Black men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand. Our situation as Black people necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race, which white women of course do not need to have with white men, unless it is their negative solidarity as racial oppressors. We struggle together with Black men against racism, while we also struggle with Black men about sexism.[...] As we have already stated, we reject the stance of Lesbian separatism because it is not a viable political

⁷⁴For this reason, we also oppose the movement of *transmedicalism* (also known as Harry Benjamin Syndrome, or, colloquially, truscum), who embrace the negative functions of biopower and the gender binary

⁷⁵The *Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto*

⁷⁶A *Cyborg Manifesto*

⁷⁷My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of Chamounix

⁷⁸TERFs and Trans Healthcare

⁷⁹The Combahee River Collective Statement

analysis or strategy for us. It leaves out far too much and far too many people, particularly Black men, women, and children. We have a great deal of criticism and loathing for what men have been socialized to be in this society: what they support, how they act, and how they oppress. But we do not have the misguided notion that it is their maleness, *per se*—i.e., their biological maleness—that makes them what they are. As Black women we find any type of biological determinism a particularly dangerous and reactionary basis upon which to build a politic. We must also question whether Lesbian separatism is an adequate and progressive political analysis and strategy, even for those who practice it, since it so completely denies any but the sexual sources of women's oppression, negating the facts of class and race.

Indeed, Ghandy (2006) criticises separatism as the only praxis left for the radical-feminist *Weltanschauung* which views the man-woman contradiction as primary, and which furthermore leads to the idealist position that personality traits and cultural values are primary, that women's and men's natures are immutable, and leading to the view that class does not matter.

We must be *active* in confrontation with transmisogyny. If we are not, TERFs *will* take advantage and take over: the track-record of feminist and LBPQ women's spaces attests to this—indeed, one need only look to Stryker (1994). It is not enough to say “trans women are women” or “trans women are allowed”: we must mean it, and we must enforce it. This *means* active exclusion of TERFs and all their intellectual kin—a *cordon sanitaire*, so to speak—and frequent denunciation of specific TERFs and their actions, as well as the denial of resources to TERFs. No friendship with TERFs, no time for their viewpoints, no space for them, no resources for them. If TERFs are speaking at local universities or town-halls, protest those speeches. We must be relentless, ruthless, and ever vigilant. This *means* catering to trans women. This means constant self-criticism in light of transmisogyny. For decades trans women have been viciously attacked by cis LGB people, and especially LBPQ women despite forming the vanguard of the LGBT movement. Now it is time for cis LGB people to pay the penalty, and beg for forgiveness.

§2.1.3.5 Against Interphobia Picking up from §2.1.3, we see that the traumatic experience of medicalizing and mutilating intersex bodies (including hormonally and genetically intersex people) to fit the Procrustean bed of the sex binary can be analyzed through the Foucauldian notion of *biopower*. But beyond the institutional medical abuse of intersex people, intersex people are overwhelmingly pressured by gender to appear gender-conforming, which is often much more difficult and strenuous than for non-intersex people as gender non-conformity is closely tied to being intersex. Thus, intersex people who do not undergo rigorous measures to appear gender-conforming are subjected to harassment and social abuse on behalf of gender. In that we oppose the sex binary and the gender binary, we thus oppose the mutilation and medicalization of intersex people and the general abuse and harassment intersex people face during their lifetimes.

§2.1.3.6 On Sex Work Like any “hot-button” issue, the politics of sex work are a work of navigation betwixt the Scylla of sex-positive liberal feminist bullshit and the Charybdis of SWERFs. This creates a chilling effect where sex workers often feel compelled to stay quiet about any criticisms they may have of the industry, for fear of being co-opted by

SWERFs who are animated more by moral outrage than any concern for their well-being and who advocate for policies that only further endanger sex workers.

Let us, then, begin from some theses: first, sex work is work. If sex workers are “selling their body”, then so are factory workers. If sex workers are exploited, it is due to capitalism, through the same mechanisms as all other workers. We must position our demands and our strategies about sex work in the context of labour in general, then. It is true that misogyny is a dominant element in sex work (as are racism, lesbophobia (through men’s fetishization of lesbians), and transmisogyny among others), but the righteous outrage surrounding this should not blind us from listening to sex workers and advocating policies that they identify as helping their situation as opposed to policies that center around moral outrage and hurt them (even if on paper they would not do so—take for example the “Nordic Model”, which uses the repressive state apparatus in a way that on paper shouldn’t harm sex workers—though in practice sex workers themselves end up being the victims of police aggression—but in practice disproportionately makes their lives harder by making it harder to receive livable wages safely). We thus oppose criminalization of sex work (including the “end demand” models which are *de facto* criminalization and enforced impoverishment), but we also oppose the liberal bourgeois politics of sex-positivity which seeks to conflate all sex-workers with the middle-class white sex-worker and ignores the very real exploitation in sex work, including trafficking, pervasive paedophilia and abuse, sex-tourism &c &c.

§2.1.3.7 Against Vulgar Identity-Politics Once more we see the treachery of liberal feminism. For in the past few years, the term “intersectionality” has been taken by these liberal feminists and eviscerated of any revolutionary content one might perceive in its founding texts. Often it is used to legitimize a tokenizing treatment of women of colour, or when even that is too much, a locus of difference is transformed by liberal feminists into an axis of privilege/oppression (see, for instance, the nonsense surrounding asexuality or ‘femmephobia’), by which liberal feminists can claim to be “intersectional” and “more oppressed” than the unmarked woman. This is done by noting the different ways in which oppression manifests between the “privileged” and “oppressed”, and claiming that somehow the manifestation of oppression amongst the “oppressed” shows that the “privilege” hold power over the “oppressed”: for example, trans women of colour, who are murdered daily for their visibility, somehow hold “visibility privilege” over the poor, oppressed, cisgender heterosexual asexual men, who receive no visibility. Similarly, “binarism” was lifted from its original context of the destruction of indigenous gender systems through colonialism to be now a bludgeon by which white non-binary people can use to attack trans women of colour. These cases are often the result of taking micro-aggressions out of the context of systematic, material, oppression and macro-aggression, transforming it into the base of a supposed oppressive dynamic—thus, calling a cisgender heterosexual asexual person a “plant” is just as much grounds, in this bourgeois idealistic liberal system, for a theory of oppression as, for example, the genocide of gay men and trans women (especially of color) in the AIDS crisis. This is often used to obfuscate real forms of oppression and further reinforce feminism’s commitment to only serving a privileged elite amongst women. This is very much related to the “selective purity enforcement” discussed in the preface. A lazy, binary privilege/oppression framework that relies on checklists and rungs on an oppression ladder instead of material and discursive analysis of lived realities is a tool of abuse, nothing more, and this is very well documented, especially in how “radical

milieus” have used it to attack trans women: see Porpentine (2015)⁸⁰ especially.

Similarly, we urge caution, nuance, and analysis on the issue of cultural appropriation. Cultural appropriation (which we may call *cultural misappropriation* or *cultural exploitation* to distance ourselves from the vulgarised theory underlying most uses of the term “cultural appropriation”) is a real problem, where oppressed people (most often people of colour as people of colour—but this also occurs with, for example, LGBT people as LGBT people) are denigrated and attacked for their culture, which is violently repressed—and then exploited by their oppressors, who imitate it to widespread acclaim, accruing capital and using it to articulate their own hegemony. Take, for example, dreadlocks—everywhere, Black people are punished for them (indeed, even in elementary schools, where it can be the excuse to suspend or expel Black children) and denigrated for them (as they’re “unprofessional”), but then white people start to dread their hair, and it becomes a fashion trend, with the first white thief being acclaimed as creative and inventive. Another example would be the continual thievery of the stories and experiences of trans women, which end up told by—and who end up portrayed by—cis men, or occasionally cis women or trans men. Critics of this concept have created a strawman where this is used to refer to any form of cultural exchange whatsoever, and not the specific process detailed above. Unfortunately, some vulgar identity-politicians have *accepted the strawman* and *defended it* as the definition of cultural appropriation! This can only lead to the reactionary beliefs of nationalism, which embrace an exclusionary form of culture and relentlessly attempt to purify it—when supposedly-Leftist beliefs begin to sound like “birds fly among birds, fish swim among fishes”, we are in trouble. We thus call upon Leftists to approach this issue with a bit more nuanced and to ultimately ground their understanding of this phenomenon in power relations and commodification, not in anecdotal permission to be given or refused.

§2.1.4 Against Ableism

In any struggle for liberation worth its salt, there must be a struggle against ableism. Ableism is the name by which the oppression of disabled peoples is called. Our model of disability is the social model of disability created by the Marxist group known as the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1975: “In our view it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society.” Impairments often interfere with the extraction of surplus value, and often disabled peoples require different resources than the norm to meet their needs; this is thus posed as the ‘problem of disability’ in the medical model. Ableism is thus heavily connected with eugenics, both the original eugenics movement of Galton *et al.* and the modern revival—indeed, eugenics depends upon ableism (itself here in service to racism, for White disabled people were seen as a detriment to “the White race”) for its existence, especially rhetorically, and later generalizes to targeting other oppressed peoples—as eugenics is based on the ableist narrative that biological fitness can be increased through the death and sterilization of “inferior degenerates” and the mass procreation of “superior” beings, the former relying on ableist rhetoric, tying ableism into the negative functions of *biopower*. Of course, this ableism is in service of racism: eugenicists historically claimed the presence of White disabled people were signs that “the race” (white people) was “degenerating”—and so eugenics is inseparable from racism. Ableism and eugenics rely on the reduction

⁸⁰Hot Allostatic Load

of humanity to “costs” and “benefits” (benefits, of course, meaning “how efficiently can surplus value be extracted”), as pointed out by the SPK (Sozialistisches Patientenkollektiv). Foucault, in Foucault (1961)⁸¹ traces the origins of the institutionalization of “mad” people (in a conclusion which, though originally focused on mental illness, can be applied to ableism as a whole, especially in light of the later work on *biopower* in Foucault (1975-6) among others, which formalises and refines this work) to a need for a means of removing ‘undesirables’ beyond the confines of the judicial system so as to more easily control wages and unemployment.

Unfortunately, the rhetoric and theory of the disability liberation movement and anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s have been, over the past 20 years, been recuperated (especially by Greens, soccer-moms, &c) into nonsensical woo-marketing for “alternative medicines” and indeed for the very abusive psychiatric structures (such as ABA, conversion therapy &c) that they were fighting against! Many of them, for instance, trot out claims that vaccines cause autism—not only is this patently untrue, but this would only change a person’s actions if they believed autism were a worse fate than measles, mumps, rubella, whooping cough &c &c. Others claim that SSRIs are evil tools which must be avoided by people with depression—this is a heinous position, as SSRIs, though not always effective, are for many a necessity. We note, then, the following two principles which should guide us:

1. The medical infrastructure and its relations are abusive and exploitative, functioning as an apparatus of capitalism to suppress people, most visibly through eugenics, and they must be replaced and rethought
2. Medicines and treatments are a necessity, and should not be uniformly rejected or withheld or replaced with a yet-more slavish adherence to the abusive medical infrastructure

Disabled peoples should not be institutionalized or coerced, but rather accommodated and assisted such that they can live their lives as they are.

§2.1.4.1 Neurodiversity As part of our opposition to ableism, we advocate for the rights and freedoms of neurodivergent people. Neurodivergence is a term that refers to the state of having a brain which is viewed as beyond normality, much as how disability is constructed by society as part of a normalizing effort regarding bodies and physical impairment. Neurodivergent people have traditionally been institutionalized and abused *en masse*, and have been targeted by eugenics—targeted again by the negative functions of *biopower* (ABA, for instance, is quite literally the same as conversion therapy—to the point where it often was developed by the same people, such as Ole Ivar Lovaas). This begins with the medicalization of differences in emotional, social, and mental development and thought, which is then seen as an isolated phenomenon far outside ‘normality’ (thus creating a binary of normal/mentally ill and collapsing all variation into that dichotomy). Neurodivergent people should not be institutionalized or coerced, but rather accommodated and assisted such that they can live their lives as they are.

⁸¹Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason

§2.1.4.2 On Addiction Addiction and the social phenomena surrounding it are best understood through the lens of disability and ableism.

As with serophobia before, our praxis with this is based in the theory of *harm reduction*: instead of attempting to paternalistically punish people, we attempt to reduce the potential harmful consequences of drug use. In this case, harm reduction means the creation and maintenance of safe injection sites, needle-exchange programmes, education about drugs and their effects, the decriminalisation of drugs and release of prisoners imprisoned for drug-related offenses.

§2.1.5 Anthropocentric Dark-Viridian Environmentalism

Late capitalist industrial production has created an existential problem for humanity—namely, environmental destruction through both pollution and global warming. These twin threats will kill and displace millions in the years to come, and unless stopped, make Earth inhospitable for human life. This is not a mere possibility, this is a certainty; indeed, it is already happening—and it may be the case that it is already too late to stop it. Neither social democracy nor neoliberalism have proven effective in dealing with this threat, and the most prominent leftist *Weltanschauung* associated with it, anarcho-primitivism, is beneath contempt in its callous essentialist naturalism and frankly racist equation of animals with people of colour. We also reject the theoretical solution of abandoning Earth for space—this, theoretically, is colonial in nature; more practically, it is laughably impossible, —even if it were attempted, it would not relocate all of humanity but merely the haute bourgeoisie. It is thus our duty to stop pollution and climate change as quickly as possible. The good news here is that many of the technologies necessary either already exist, or are being developed. The bad news is that neoliberalism and newness has kept these technologies largely inaccessible to the mass scale by which less friendly technologies have been deployed. We call for, thus, an environmentalism which:

1. maintains universal access to vital—and often rare—resources such as clean water and air through central planning
2. urbanizes
3. replaces “dirty” technologies with “clean” technologies on a mass scale rather than as a luxury

Centralism will be necessary in order to avoid pollution and to maintain access to rare resources. In order to avoid a total climate catastrophe (rise in global temperatures over 2 degrees Celsius), we will need to run negative carbon emissions for a few years at least—this will require tight controls over industrial production. Capitalism in its neoliberal form is unable to manage even this—consider that even the flimsy environmental treaties that are proposed pass slowly if at all and generally don’t bind countries to anything concrete.

§2.1.5.1 Against Political Veganism

There is no ethical consumption under late capitalism

Ancient proverb

The environmental movement has spawned another liberal (and largely white and petty-bourgeois) movement closely allied to anarcho-primitivism: *political veganism*. Political veganism is a form of liberalism firstly because it believes in ethical consumption under late capitalism—that somehow individual choices of consumption can make a difference and thus gain a moral dimension comparable to that which Prohibition had in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the US. In doing so, it embraces *petty-moralism*, comparing meat-eaters to murderers—and most of the proletariat in the First World are meat eaters (often due to the high cost of vegetarian food compared to meat, something political vegans will handwave away). The comparison to murder is quite often racially-charged: specifically, the term often used is *Animal Holocaust*, which implicitly compares Jewish and Rromany peoples to animals. Indeed, political vegans prefer animal life to human life: what about the peasantry who does the farming, exposed to toxic chemicals and exploited? Somehow this choice in individual consumption does not garner the same sense of moral outrage. Political vegans would rather spend energy fighting for animals than they would for those unfashionable oppressed peoples, who after all don't listen to the hip new indie-rock band and thus can't have any value. Faced with this allegation, political vegans often make an environmental claim, talking about the drain on resources livestock represents—but planting vegetables to replace them would also produce a similar drain.

§2.1.6 Against Eugenics

I am, somehow, less interested in the weight and convolutions of Einstein's brain than in the near certainty that people of equal talent have lived and died in cotton fields and sweatshops.

STEPHEN JAY GOULD

In earlier sections we have noted the use of eugenics to bludgeon oppressed groups into submission. Eugenics can be seen as one of the negative powers of biopower as defined in Foucault (1976): the power to *disallow* life (as opposed to the ancient right to kill). Foucault refines this in the final lecture of Foucault (1975-6):

Now I think we see something new emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century: a new technology of power, but this time it is not disciplinary. This technology of power does not exclude the former, does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself into existing disciplinary techniques[...]How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings? How, under these conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but its own citizens to the risk of death? Given that this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower? It is, I think, at this point that

racism intervenes [...] On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: “The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I—as species rather than individual—can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate.” The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer[...] So you can understand the importance—I almost said the vital importance—of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say “killing,” I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on[...] At the end of the nineteenth century, we have a new racism modeled on war. It was, I think, required because a biopower that wished to wage war had to articulate the will to destroy the adversary with the risk that it might kill those whose lives it had, by definition, to protect, manage, and multiply. The same could be said of criminality. Once the mechanism of biocriminal was called upon to make it possible to execute or banish criminals, criminality was conceptualized in racist terms. The same applies to madness, and the same applies to various anomalies. I think that, broadly speaking, racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality.

Foucault here terms the culprit as racism (as it historically has been the most important motivator for eugenics), though we may generalize it, as it explains eugenics as a whole. Biopower’s negative functions include the power to disallow life, but also incorporate the ancient power of death through a narrative of increased biological fitness through violence against oppressed groups, who are conceptualized as degenerate and inferior. We can also see this in the concept of *necropower* defined in Mbembe (2003), where sovereignty (defined here through defining who is and who is not *disposable*) is generated by the creation of *zones of death*, where terror and death create both power and resistance. As mentioned above, in the section on ableism, eugenics relies on reducing people to “costs” and “benefits”, with benefits more or less corresponding to one’s place in the hierarchies of capitalism and for proletarians, to the ability to extract surplus value.

§2.1.7 On Technology

Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the netherworld whom he has called up by his spells

Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei
KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS

Our approach towards the issue of technology is largely derived from engagements with the tendency of accelerationism and its critics—specifically, the tendency expounded in Srnicek and Williams (2013)⁸², from which some of our terms (*folk-politics* among them) descend. Unfortunately, the term is hardly this clear, and so we must distinguish between this meaning and two other, related meanings of the term “accelerationism”. Here are the three meanings of accelerationism we can distinguish:

1. Left-Accelerationism, or Accelerationism as defined in Srnicek and Williams (ibid.), which embraces modern science and technology and attempts to intensify its development while simultaneously using it for ends outside of the goals set by capitalism—indeed, to emancipate people from capitalism (deterritorialisation in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari), and which rejects the “noble savage” romanticism of anarcho-primitivism, the Occupy-style fetishization of participatory democracy, and the tendency to value noble defeats over messy victories.
2. Accelerationism as the deepening of exploitation within capitalism in the hope that this will intensify its self-destructive tendencies and thus bring forth the Revolution
3. Right-Accelerationism—support of the unshackling and intensification of capitalism (and technology within capitalism) to bring about a singularity and a neo-feudal system ruled by a super-intelligent AI

Clearly, the second sense is wrong-headed, and the third sense is championed only by our enemies. At first, we were ardent followers of the first sort—and we still hold on to many of its core ideas, but what we had to qualify hollowed out the term enough that we no longer can call ourselves accelerationists. But let us first spell out where we agree with the accelerationists, at least regarding technology. (Our points of agreement with them regarding organization are to be found under the header *Against Folk-Politics*) The old social-democratic “compromise” of the 20th century relied on several pillars that have mostly begun to erode for various reasons:

⁸²#ACCELERATE: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics

1. Women's reproductive labour and unpaid domestic labour, which continues to provide a constant stream of primitive accumulation (as argued in Federici (2001)): one need only contemplate the "ageing crisis" in Europe, Japan, and the US to understand however partially how this is even today a pillar by which "social democracy" functions: in this case, reproducing a labour force and tax base.
2. A bundle of cheap commodities including food, oil, and copper
3. Fordist/Stakhanovite production; this is undermined by Toyotism
4. Cheap labour outside of the "labour aristocracy": this often means racialized, non-unionized labour in the metropole or labour in general in the (neo-)colonies.

Politically, too, as argued in Kalecki (1943), the idea of *full employment* under a capitalist system will be resisted and attacked at every stage by the bourgeoisie: neoliberalism shows the prescience of that theory. Instead of arguing for full employment, we should argue for *full unemployment*: an automated future of plenty, with minimal if any work. Automation and technological development *after* (not *before*, for then it will serve capitalism) the revolution should be embraced, and we should intervene in technology to use it for ends other than those for which it was made (an example being the use of storage space and mass communications technology to distribute radical literature for free, i.e. files sharing). We vociferously reject the technophobia of primitivism, as it attempts to put the cat back in the bag, a reactionary manoeuvre.

To an extent we can see precursors to this position in the idea of the destruction of the aura and increased access of arts to the masses in the age of mechanical reproduction as articulated in Benjamin (1936)⁸³.

We also champion *Xenofeminism*, as defined in Cuboniks (2015)⁸⁴

§2.1.7.1 Xenofeminism Xenofeminism, as defined in Cuboniks (ibid.) (drawing from Haraway (1985) among others), is a feminism which rejects naturalism and essentialism to instead call for the repurposing and development of technology for feminist ends. Indeed, as found in Oxo1 of Cuboniks (2015):

Freedom is not a given—and it's certainly not given by anything 'natural'. The construction of freedom involves not less but more alienation; alienation is the labour of freedom's construction. Nothing should be accepted as fixed, permanent, or 'given'—neither material conditions nor social forms. XF mutates, navigates and probes every horizon. Anyone who's been deemed 'unnatural' in the face of reigning biological norms, anyone who's experienced injustices wrought in the name of natural order, will realize that the glorification of 'nature' has nothing to offer us—the queer and trans among us, the differently-abled, as well as those who have suffered discrimination due to pregnancy or duties connected to child-rearing. XF is vehemently anti-naturalist. Essentialist naturalism reeks of theology—the sooner it is exorcised, the better.

⁸³The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

⁸⁴Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation

Xenofeminism (abbreviated XF) rejects the tidy neoliberal gender politics of today. Again, perhaps a quote is best to demonstrate this, from *oxoB* and *oxoC*:

A sense of the world's volatility and artificiality seems to have faded from contemporary queer and feminist politics, in favour of a plural but static constellation of gender identities, in whose bleak light equations of the good and the natural are stubbornly restored. While having (perhaps) admirably expanded thresholds of 'tolerance', too often we are told to seek solace in unfreedom, staking claims on being 'born' this way, as if offering an excuse with nature's blessing. All the while, the heteronormative centre chugs on. XF challenges this centrifugal referent, knowing full well that sex and gender are exemplary of the fulcrum between norm and fact, between freedom and compulsion. To tilt the fulcrum in the direction of nature is a defensive concession at best, and a retreat from what makes trans and queer politics more than just a lobby: that it is an arduous assertion of freedom against an order that seemed immutable. Like every myth of the given, a stable foundation is fabricated for a real world of chaos, violence, and doubt. The 'given' is sequestered into the private realm as a certainty, whilst retreating on fronts of public consequences. When the possibility of transition became real and known, the tomb under Nature's shrine cracked, and new histories—bristling with futures—escaped the old order of 'sex'. The disciplinary grid of gender is in no small part an attempt to mend that shattered foundation, and tame the lives that escaped it. The time has now come to tear down this shrine entirely, and not bow down before it in a piteous apology for what little autonomy has been won.

If 'cyberspace' once offered the promise of escaping the strictures of essentialist identity categories, the climate of contemporary social media has swung forcefully in the other direction, and has become a theatre where these prostrations to identity are performed. With these curatorial practices come puritanical rituals of moral maintenance, and these stages are too often overrun with the disavowed pleasures of accusation, shaming, and denunciation. Valuable platforms for connection, organization, and skill-sharing become clogged with obstacles to productive debate positioned as if they are debate. These puritanical politics of shame—which fetishize oppression as if it were a blessing, and cloud the waters in moralistic frenzies—leave us cold. We want neither clean hands nor beautiful souls, neither virtue nor terror. We want superior forms of corruption.

Cuboniks (2015) terms XF a "gender abolitionist" philosophy; however, it takes care to distinguish itself from other forms of gender abolitionism which work to reify sex (and thus gender) instead of abolishing them as a stable category and thus form of oppression. Due to the monopolization of the term "gender abolition" by TERFs, we would prefer to call it a "gender nihilist" philosophy, following the innovative but flawed anti-manifesto, Escalante (2015)⁸⁵, which, following Butler (1990) articulates an abolitionism that does

⁸⁵ Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifesto

not rest upon a reification of the sex binary, thus sex, thus the gender binary, and thus gender. Indeed, *once again*, Cuboniks (2015) articulates this point in a wonderful way—and in a way that facilitates a new universalism:

Xenofeminism is gender-abolitionist. ‘Gender abolitionism’ is not code for the eradication of what are currently considered ‘gendered’ traits from the human population. Under patriarchy, such a project could only spell disaster—the notion of what is ‘gendered’ sticks disproportionately to the feminine. But even if this balance were redressed, we have no interest in seeing the sexuate diversity of the world reduced. Let a hundred sexes bloom! ‘Gender abolitionism’ is shorthand for the ambition to construct a society where traits currently assembled under the rubric of gender, no longer furnish a grid for the asymmetric operation of power. ‘Race abolitionism’ expands into a similar formula—that the struggle must continue until currently racialized characteristics are no more a basis of discrimination than the color of one’s eyes. Ultimately, every emancipatory abolitionism must incline towards the horizon of class abolitionism, since it is in capitalism where we encounter oppression in its transparent, denaturalized form: you’re not exploited or oppressed because you are a wage labourer or poor; you are a labourer or poor because you are exploited.

Xenofeminism understands that the viability of emancipatory abolitionist projects—the abolition of class, gender, and race—hinges on a profound reworking of the universal. The universal must be grasped as generic, which is to say, intersectional. Intersectionality is not the morcellation of collectives into a static fuzz of cross-referenced identities, but a political orientation that slices through every particular, refusing the crass pigeonholing of bodies. This is not a universal that can be imposed from above, but built from the bottom up – or, better, laterally, opening new lines of transit across an uneven landscape. This non-absolute, generic universality must guard against the facile tendency of conflation with bloated, unmarked particulars—namely Eurocentric universalism—whereby the male is mistaken for the sexless, the white for raceless, the cis for the real, and so on. Absent such a universal, the abolition of class will remain a bourgeois fantasy, the abolition of race will remain a tacit white-supremacism, and the abolition of gender will remain a thinly veiled misogyny, even—especially—when prosecuted by avowed feminists themselves. (The absurd and reckless spectacle of so many self-proclaimed ‘gender abolitionists’ campaign against trans women is proof enough of this).

From the postmoderns, we have learnt to burn the facades of the false universal and dispel such confusions; from the moderns, we have learnt to sift new universals from the ashes of the false. Xenofeminism seeks to construct a coalitional politics, a politics without the infection of purity. Wielding the universal requires thoughtful qualification and precise self-reflection so as to become a ready-to-hand tool for multiple political bodies and something that can be appropriated against the numerous oppressions that transect with

gender and sexuality. The universal is no blueprint, and rather than dictate its uses in advance, we propose XF as a platform. The very process of construction is therefore understood to be a negentropic, iterative, and continual refashioning. Xenofeminism seeks to be a mutable architecture that, like open source software, remains available for perpetual modification and enhancement following the navigational impulse of militant ethical reasoning. Open, however, does not mean undirected. The most durable systems in the world owe their stability to the way they train order to emerge as an ‘invisible hand’ from apparent spontaneity; or exploit the inertia of investment and sedimentation. We should not hesitate to learn from our adversaries or the successes and failures of history. With this in mind, XF seeks ways to seed an order that is equitable and just, injecting it into the geometry of freedoms these platforms afford.

Now, what is a XF platform? Well, from Cuboniks (2015) itself, we have the following items as ideas, strategies, and vital points of consideration:

1. Intervention into domesticity and the domestic such as to destroy the primacy of the bourgeois nuclear family and the structures that support it
2. Widespread, do-it-yourself, cheap distribution of hormones and information about hormone replacement therapy (HRT) alongside grassroots abortion clinics and other such strategies to ‘hack gender’ and medicine
3. Building institutions to facilitate these goals

§2.1.7.2 Theoretical Limits and Blind Spots of Accelerationism When writing this section, we had to abandon our earlier accelerationism in favor of a more nuanced approach. The following quick criticisms have been levelled against accelerationism, though there are deeper ones to follow:

1. Accelerationism appears Proudhonian, presuming that one can take all the good without any of the bad, and as articulated in Marx (1847b)⁸⁶, development proceeds by its bad side. How will tedious, poorly-paid jobs (the jobs listed include data entry, abusive-content management, and help desk technician) be automated?
2. It is unlikely, to say the least, that care work can be automated. How will accelerationism avoid the replication of patriarchy in care work?

Both of these are serious problems that ought to be considered, analyzed rigourously, and solved—not brushed away.

Indeed, there is a more in-depth theoretical critique, advanced by Andreas Malm and Anthony Galluzzo, derived from Theses 8-15 of Benjamin (1947)⁸⁷, and ultimately from the same understanding in Marx (1847b) that *development proceeds its bad side*. Specifically, what we are addressing here is the myth of progress, which is deeply embedded

⁸⁶The Poverty of Philosophy

⁸⁷Theses on the Philosophy of History

in accelerationism—as well as the understanding that technology is a social relation, and under capitalism a capitalist social relation—surely, we cannot just appropriate already existing technology for ourselves without careful consideration of how it encodes capitalist social relations. Furthermore, we cannot control the pace of automation under capitalism, which is based on how much it can extract for the capitalists. To thus call for an intensification of automation under capitalism is to merely wait for the process to grind through and immiserate the proletariat and intensify exploitation, creating a passive praxis. Srnicek and Williams’ accelerationism, then, necessarily decays into Land’s accelerationism, though they try to deny it with a mild critique of techno-utopianism, and so we cannot accept accelerationism.

From Noys (2014)⁸⁸, we take the following quote:

[Walter Benjamin suggests] that the desire for acceleration on the tracks of history breeds passivity before the productive forces: ‘Once the classless society had been defined as an infinite task, the empty and homogenous time was transformed into an anteroom, so to speak, in which one could wait for the emergence of the revolutionary situation with more or less equanimity.’ The idea of the tracks stretching into the future leaves revolution as a receding moment—the station we never quite arrive in. The result, contra to the revolutionary intervention, is the constant stoking of the train, i.e. the capitalist productive forces. This is another instance of accelerationism, which either tries to actively increase the speed of capital, or simply becomes the passenger on the train, allowing the constant destruction of living labor at the hands of dead labor to do its work. [The famous image of the emergency break in “On the Philosophy of History,” then], is not merely calling to a halt for the sake of it, some static stopping at a particular point in capitalist history (say Swedish Social Democracy—which the American Republican Right now takes as the true horror of ‘socialism’). Neither is it a return back to some utopian pre-capitalist moment, which would fall foul of Marx and Engels’s anathemas against ‘feudal socialism’. Rather, Benjamin argues that: ‘Classless society is not the final goal of historical progress but its frequently miscarried, ultimately [endlich] achieved interruption.’ We interrupt to prevent catastrophe, we destroy the tracks to prevent the greater destruction of acceleration.

We thus do not call for the expansion of automation *under capitalism*, but rather as a goal to be achieved after the Revolution

§2.1.8 Against Folk-Politics

What is folk-politics? Folk-politics is a description of a particular tendency among the left outlined in Srnicek and Williams (2015)⁸⁹ (though alluded to earlier in Srnicek and Williams (2013)) that is ritualistic, moralistic, and ultimately defeatist, advocating a prefigurative politics instead of a future orientation. Unable to come to terms with the complex, global structures of neoliberalism, the various tendencies of the left have taken up folk-politics: a fetishization of horizontalism, consensus, and direct democracy; a glorification of the local, the small, the direct; a ritualistic repetition of the forms of direct action,

⁸⁸Malign Velocities

⁸⁹Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work

protest, &c; a rejection of a future orientation in favour of a prefigurative politics; and a self-righteous “holier than thou” attitude towards those who are not as pure as you, especially online. This is perhaps best seen in the Occupy movement that made all the headlines in 2011 (along with large tendencies in anarchism in general). Occupy stressed horizontalism and consensus politics: nothing could be done unless *everyone* agreed to it. It rejected organization beyond a local level. Thus, Occupy presented us with a large number of heterogeneous local movements, with a motley stew of anarchists, liberals craven to reformism and moderation, social democrats, and right-libertarian conspiracy theorists. Due to this, and to its fetishization of the horizontal, Occupy as a whole (and most local variants) presented no demands, no platforms: indeed, they had the audacity to claim that this was somehow “more radical” than having any demands or platforms, because that would be “divisive”, or, perhaps, because that would somehow cede some sort of theoretical legitimacy to the neoliberal state they claimed to oppose. If Occupy got *anything* done at all, it was by groups that had abandoned this craven worship of process and the hagiographic attitude of anarchism (the uncritical worship of St. Nestor Makhno and Catalonia and of course, the Zapatistas: which neoliberalism allows to exist *precisely because* it provides no real threat to its global order). Everyone knows the old Trotskyist selling newspapers or hoping that his little organization is the new vanguard—or indeed the “Maoist” who asks you to come to their lecture series on the wisdom of St. Bob Avakian, or the social-democrat on their constant repetition of “Socialism 101” talks—is a waste of space and indeed destructive: we must condemn folk-politics for the same reason. Indeed, this problem was known as far back as Engels, who wrote in Engels (1873)⁹⁰:

Why do the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out against political authority, the state? All Socialists are agreed that the political state, and with it political authority, will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their political character and will be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society. But the anti-authoritarians demand that the political state be abolished at one stroke, even before the social conditions that gave birth to it have been destroyed. They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be the abolition of authority. Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon — authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionists. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough? Therefore, either one of two things: either the anti-authoritarians don't know what they're talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion; or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the movement of the proletariat. In either case they serve the

⁹⁰On Authority

reaction.

While we do not support or endorse the fetishization of the organizational form of the Marxist-Leninist wedding-cake vanguard party, we recognize, like Engels, that horizontalism *as a theory* and prefigurative politics that refuse a future hinder revolution more than they help it.

Thus, we oppose Monsieur Dupont's *Nihilist Communism* as theoretical resentment (following Moufawad-Paul (2015))—a recognition of the death of neoliberalism but a refusal to find value outside of its limits. We oppose Hakim Bey's *temporary autonomous zone* (as well as his open advocacy of pæderasty) as lifestyleism and as folk-politics, unable to come to terms with the global structures of neoliberalism.

Many folk-political activists like to claim Murray Bookchin as one of their own (and considering the record of the Vermont Greens, they might have a point) but even he knew that there had to be coöperation and coördination, and there had to be struggle on a large scale with delegation rather than only in one city or in one neighbourhood. Indeed, from Bookchin (2014):

Every revolution, indeed, even every attempt to achieve basic change, will always meet with resistance from elites in power. Every effort to defend a revolution will require the amassing of power – physical as well as institutional and administrative – which is to say, the creation of government. Anarchists may call for the abolition of the state, but coercion of some kind will be necessary to prevent the bourgeois state from returning in full force with unbridled terror. For a libertarian organization to eschew, out of misplaced fear of creating a “state”, taking power when it can do so with the support of the revolutionary masses is confusion at best and a total failure of nerve at worst.

We expect the Stirnerites, nihilists, and other such folk-political wreckers to sneer at this. Let them sneer—it is all they know how to do. They will be impoverished; they will sneer. The capitalist state will conduct genocide; they will sneer. The Revolution will happen; they will still sneer—and all the world will pass them by.

§2.1.8.1 Against Anarcho-Primitivism Anarcho-primitivism is perhaps the ultimate expression of this folk-political trend, and shows how quickly it regresses into reactionary politics. Even Bookchin balked from anarcho-primitivism—citing the fact that many anarcho-primitivists celebrated the Ethiopian famine as “nature taking revenge”: the fact that it took over much of US-American anarchism led him to call himself a Communalist (with a capital C) instead. Primitivism is an idealistic *Weltanschauung*—it relies on the fetish of the idea of a “return to nature”, a nonsensical concept upon which they project political desires such as the mass murder of people with disabilities, trans people, and other “degenerates”. Primitivists also rely on condescending towards workers, who are seen as being unable to run an industrial society on their own—and any “primitivist society” would be centred around people dying in youth due to lack of access to medicine. Anarcho-primitivists should be recognized for the reprehensible neo-Malthusian reactionaries they are and expelled.

§2.1.8.2 New Universalism and Coalitional Politics One problem the Left has faced in recent years is a collapse in its coalition and in the very idea of coalitional politics.

Many of the Old Left have charged “intersectionality” with the decay of coalitions, accusing intersectional feminism of promoting splits and identity politics. When one looks at the politics and theory of some so-called “intersectional” liberal feminists, one might be tempted to agree—however, this is a mistake. It is not the recognition of difference, intersection, and so on that destroys coalitions as much as it is the consequent rejection of universalism as being inherently opposed to an articulation of difference—as well as the overcoded identity politics of the Old Left, which identified the worker as a unionized white cis straight abled neurotypical man who worked in an auto factory in Detroit. Indeed, we find the groundwork for a new coalitional politics in the very text that many charge with destroying it; namely, Crenshaw (1993), which, after all, attempted to show why traditional anti-racist and feminist politics were both ineffective at best when it came to addressing the struggles of women of colour, and how recognition of difference could be used to reconceptualize and thus reconstruct a coalitional politics that does not overcode its basis and thus leave its multiply-marginalized members behind. In place of folk-politics, we argue for a mass movement that, though it consists of many disparate groups with different problems, has a unified theoretical language (so to speak), project, and programme, with the abolition of capitalism as the goal. This implies a universalism that folk-politics refuses to take.

§2.1.9 Against the Police and Against the Prisons

The police force can be considered one of the most ubiquitous, recognizable, and characteristic forms of the repressive state apparatus in modernity. Modern policing originated in the 18th and 19th centuries: in the US, as the slave patrols (beginning in 1704) and later Fugitive Slave Catchers (established by the *Fugitive Slave Act* of 1850) as well as the post-war Ku Klux Klan formed, combined with the anti-labour forces of the Pinkertons, the basis of the police force. In Europe, police were originally created to suppress strikes and riots. Police, then, emerged not as a reaction to crime but to crowds, a phenomenon originating in 19th-century urban centres.

Of course, when one proposes prison and police abolition, especially to white US-Americans, one can expect a horrified reaction—“How will we remain safe?”. While the social function of prisons and police are not to “keep people safe” (so to speak) but rather “keep capitalism safe”, the question is still one that we ought to be able to answer. First, much crime is based on social and economic circumstance. It is said that “It is equally illegal for a rich man and a poor man to steal bread” (or so the cliché goes). Thus, much of crime would be robbed of its *raison d’être* by removing the *material basis* of crime, i.e. poverty. We urge further research—by way of *action* into various alternatives to policing that have been proposed.

One other thing of note will be how reactionaries are dealt with during and after the Revolution—“Red Terror”. Summary execution cannot be a “golden hammer” against which everything is a nail. Prison abolition, though it is a necessary goal in the long run, must not interfere with the temporary authority accorded to the Revolution. What will stop reactionaries from organizing, receiving aid from reactionaries abroad, and smashing the revolution—as they have done or attempted to do in every revolution since the French Revolution? This is an open question, but it must be answered—and it must be answered realistically, not idealistically.

§2.1.10 Radical Urbanism

One subject that does not often occur to radicals (though thankfully it is increasingly becoming a subject of conversation, especially in urban centres) is just how much the organization of space and human geography is itself implicated within capitalist ideology, and how it must be transformed.

§2.1.10.1 The Right to the City And Beyond We champion the *right to the city*, first laid out by Henri Lefebvre in his 1967 essay of the same name, Lefebvre (1967)⁹¹. In this essay, Lefebvre concludes that the traditional city was gone and could not be recuscitated and that the traditional urban-rural (city-country for our British readers) divide was giving way for an amorphous urban/suburban sprawl. To claim the right to the city is thus to claim something that not only does not exist but also has never existed and is an empty signifier. Furthermore, revolution cannot be limited to a single city (one merely needs to remember the Paris Commune, narrated well in Marx (1871)⁹², to understand this). As Harvey (2012)⁹³ summarizes: “The city may be dead;” Lefebvre seems to say, but “long live the city!”, and we agree. In order to claim the right of the city, we must make it clearer what it means. Fundamentally, the right of the city means that the urban proletariat should control urbanization and urban planning. The organization of human space (housing, districts for public services, roads, zoning &c &c) is, in capitalism since at least Haussmann’s 1854 renovation of Paris, a way for capitalism to circumvent barriers to capital circulation, expansion, and accumulation—Harvey (ibid.) makes a sophisticated case for this. As capital is absorbed through urban redevelopment, it also displaces and dispossesses the urban proletariat. Engels himself was aware of this even in 1872, and Engels (1872)⁹⁴ is not only a striking analysis of the “housing question” in 19th century European cities, but a shocking precognition of modern gentrification. The right to the city, then, falls to the hands of billionaires such as Michael Bloomberg of New York, Carlos Slim of Mexico City, and Paul Allen of Seattle—and to powerful private institutions, such as Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. In contemplating the return of the right to the city to the urban proletariat, then, Harvey explores the suggestions of Murray Bookchin and his libertarian municipalism. The problem Harvey identifies in most proposals related to this conception (specifically, those of Tiebout and of Ostrom are mentioned) is that they rely on the notion of “voting with your feet”, which, given the disparity in resources, would only empower the capitalist class. But Bookchin, too, recognizes this and proposes confederalism as an attempt to avoid the problem, where municipal assemblies form a network to coordinate and resolve disputes, interlinking municipalities from the bottom up. Harvey maintains that what really matters is less the details of organization so much as the goal of not allowing endless accumulation by the capitalist class, but the idea of the commons can easily be appropriated for such a purpose. He proposes a two-pronged strategy of forcing concessions in the form of public goods while forming independent organizations among the populace to “appropriate, use, and supplement these goods in ways that extend and enhance the qualities of the non-commodified reproductive and environmental commons”.

⁹¹The Right to the City

⁹²The Civil War in France

⁹³Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution

⁹⁴The Housing Question

Harvey then (moving to the issue of culture and the arts) discusses monopoly rent and the cultural cachet of cities. Specifically, “claims to uniqueness, authenticity, particularity, and specialty underlie the ability to capture monopoly rents” (the example given earlier is wines, where monopoly rents are extracted through the emphasis on unique qualities of the grapes or of the land or of the history of the wine). This he then applies to the urban, showing how cities use “collective symbolic capital”, following the terminology of Bourdieu, to gain economic advantages: thus, the cultural cachet attached to Paris (for example) gives it an advantage over Lille. Cities often then spend considerable effort to accumulate collective symbolic capital. Harvey gives the example of the rise of Barcelona, which aggressively branded, emphasized a Catalan heritage, invested in museums and hosted the Olympic Games. However, this lead to a contradiction, for with the economic advantages of collective symbolic capital comes homogenization (“Disneyfication”), for who invests but multinational corporations? Disneyfication poses a challenge to claims of uniqueness and thus the extraction of monopoly rent through collective symbolic capital. Questions arise—whose aesthetics and history are to be celebrated—the Icarians, the Catalan nationalists, or perhaps Franco’s ally Samaranch? In order to preserve this creation of collective symbolic capital and the extraction of monopoly rents, the institutions that create it (museums, for example) try to keep out the proletariat: close their doors to the general public, or, perhaps (as in New York under Giuliani) organize a “decency committee”, or rely on police repression. Harvey poses the question—why let the fruits of collective symbolic cultural capital be reaped by the bourgeoisie? He now presents the example of Berlin after the annexation of the German Democratic Republic and thus East Berlin—with this monumental change, there was a question: how would the symbolic capital of Berlin be defined? One faction he mentions in particular (not the only one—it, for example, could not prevent the modernist takeover of Potsdamer Platz) tried to re-create 19th century Berlin, specifically that of Schinkel, which of course has tremendous *potential* implications for who is considered a Berliner and who has a right to the city: it, for example, *could* charge this with a traditional sort of nationalism and romanticism which would unknowingly replicate the plans of Albert Speer and leave out the contributions of the Turkish Berliners, in a context where many of them have lived in Berlin all their lives and violence against them is widespread. This should remind us: an attachment to “authenticity”, particularity, and localism isn’t a good foundation for radical politics and can all too easily be commandeered by neo-fascists, as it already is. However, Harvey tempers this by noting that these implications are *potential*: Schinkel’s architectural merit (which is, after all, quite great) need not be limited to the nationalist reading of him, and a local sort of romanticism might be merely an innocent element of a diverse and complex city; it’s not like the alternatives (such as modernism, or postmodern architecture, or perhaps neo-Gothic architecture) are *inherently* safe or better.

From then, Harvey (2012) moves on to urban revolution. Noting the fetishism of organization, he takes upon a critique similar to the one made in Srnicek and Williams (2015) of the dogmatic adherence to abstract ideals of horizontalism and non-hierarchy, after of course noting the earlier dogmatic adherence to a Leninist model. He then notes that an urban revolution must organize workers who do not belong to the conventional factory system—unorganized producers of urbanism, often in part-time work scattered throughout the urban area—such as construction workers (who build the urban environment), transit workers (who can cut supply lines), domestic workers (whose labour is crucial in the re-

production of the labour force), street vendors, restaurant workers, retail workers, hotel workers, sanitation workers, and the unemployed among others. Furthermore, organization must be done outside of the workplace as well as in-within the neighbourhood. Indeed this has historically been crucial to labour organization, though rarely recognized. Coalitions must also be formed on gender, sexuality, and race lines. Harvey exhorts us to look on the examples of “Red Bologna” in the 1970s, “Red Vienna”, the radical municipal councils of Britain in the 1920s, the municipal administrations of the French Communist Party, and the Greater London Council under Ken Livingstone. He then offers an example of a rebel city: El Alto in Bolivia, where neighbourhood associations provide collective local goods and mediate conflicts, forming an Association of Neighbourhood Associations which, however, has a number of checks and mechanisms to keep leaders accountable to their base and rotate them. Workers in the informal sector are organized as well into associations that mediate disputes and connect urban workers with the surrounding peasant population, allowing one to support the other. Finally, of course, there were the strong, more traditional, trade unions.

§2.1.10.2 Principles of Radical Urban Planning A radical urban planning must:

1. make life in the city affordable to those who work in the city—this means housing, transportation, food, &c &c
2. make life in the city accessible and safe for marginalized populations such as women, people of colour, people with disabilities, and LGBT people
3. provide a responsive and accountable municipal administration
4. encourage the growth of diverse and vibrant communities
5. make life in the city enjoyable for children and adults alike
6. provide education
7. expand public transportation and encourage walking, biking &c

Though the works of Jane Jacobs have been rightly criticised for having contributed to policies that led to the modern spectre of gentrification (we note especially the chapter on “unslumming”), they should not be abandoned entirely, for they do contain useful principles on the city. Many of her proposed policies were based on assumptions which stopped holding true (such as the cheapness of old buildings)—and only some of her policies were ever pursued (the harder work of maintaining affordability is and was directly in conflict with the capitalist ideal of real-estate investment, so it was and is continually relegated—an endless deferral), creating Jacobsian neighbourhoods which were inhabited entirely by ex-suburbanites: members of the white bourgeoisie. But there will be no return to Le Corbusier. We thus recommend reading Jacobs (1961)⁹⁵, but with prominent reservations. Specifically, the following principles may be extracted from it as useful:

1. Mixed primary uses (mixed-use development)
2. Small blocks, to favour pedestrians, with the sidewalk as central to any city

⁹⁵The Death and Life of Great American Cities

3. Buildings of differing ages and states of repair
4. High density
5. A duty to make the fabric of the streets a continuous network throughout a neighbourhood.
6. A duty to use parks, squares, and public buildings as part of the street fabric and encourage multiple uses rather than separating out individual uses
7. A duty to encourage the life of lively and interesting streets
8. A duty to foster neighbourhood community and identity
9. Well-designed (intricate, centred, multi-use, with a diversity of surroundings and access to sunlight) parks

To this we may add the following as vital, some of which are very basic, others of which are reform measures (for after the Revolution, many of the assumptions and constructs—such as *income*—will no longer be relevant or will no longer exist) that will presage the revolutionary form:

1. A regular street grid as opposed to the Radburn street-hierarchy model that characterizes low-density US-American suburban sprawl
2. Restructuring and elimination of zoning laws such that low-income and mixed-income housing is built, high-density housing is built (as opposed to single-family housing), and schemes for *de facto* racial segregation and redlining (both integral parts of US zoning laws) are thwarted at every turn.
3. Narrow streets, to improve walkability
4. Heavy investment into public transportation, such as various types of rail (subway, streetcar, elevated rail, light rail, inter-city rail &c), busses, and ferries, to be provided at cheap costs
5. An end to the building of highways within city limits, as highways destroy the fabric of the city, promote car use and suburbanization, and often bulldoze through the neighbourhoods of poor people of colour
6. “Second-generation” rent-stabilization (rent increases being based on cost of living) measures in urban areas on all units, without exception. This is of course a stop-gap reform—in the end, one will do away with rents and landlords altogether
7. Housing coöperatives

One interesting idea being developed is the *superille* (often rendered in English as *superblock*, which creates an unfortunate naming coincidence with Le Corbusier’s modernist automobile-driven nightmare) in Barcelona, which is intended to reduce automobile dependency (and thus air pollution) and foster neighbourhood life. Nine existing blocks will be grouped in a square, and the internal roads will be declared off-limits to cars

§2.1.10.3 NIMBYs, the Rearguard of Neighbourhood Activism However, with neighbourhood organization comes risk—namely, the risk of organizing a greedy petty-bourgeois constituency to oppose density and diversity in favour of suburbs within city limits. These are called NIMBYs, after their implicit slogan, “not in *my* backyard!”. An excellent case of this is Seattle, where neighbourhoods reign supreme in city politics and have used their power to prevent upzoning and protect their property values—protect their white single-family bedroom communities. This was not always the case; in their origin in the 1990s, Seattle neighbourhood activism was a way of allowing disadvantaged people in neighbourhoods to have input into what was planned for the neighbourhood, such that it was responsive to their needs. This changed because home values rose as Seattle grew—as there is little room to expand the single-family housing regime, the current homes have appreciated in value; the organizing techniques of 1990s neighbourhood activism were coöpted by rich, white neighbourhoods to halt development (using the same slogans—somehow, refusing to build dense, affordable housing will, according to these people, “gentrify” the neighbourhood—despite the fact that refusing to build dense housing will limit the amount of housing available while demand for said housing increases, raising prices for housing and thus making it accessible only to the rich), and the city council and mayor are generally complacent and compliant—as their main goal is to be reelected and liked, they always buckle to the rich white neighbourhoods whose support they depend upon, weakening and destroying projects.

§2.1.10.4 Against Suburbs We oppose suburbs and suburbanization on two principal grounds: environmental and racial, among others.

Environmentally, suburbanization has been a disaster. The low-density, segregated-use development characteristic to the US-American suburb combined with a street hierarchy, wide streets and general lack of sidewalks promotes the use of cars, and thus the use of fossil fuels, and thus the proliferation of greenhouse gases (alongside other pollutants such as carbon monoxide), which only contributes to global warming and air pollution. Beyond that, the need for a perpetually-green lawn (enforced by homeowner’s associations, who of course also enforce the continual maintenance of green golf courses—a measure of wheat for a penny, and three measures of barley for a penny; and see thou hurt not the oil and the wine) even in dry areas such as Southern California requires the waste of precious freshwater—which should be considered criminal, especially in light of the privatization of the water supply and resulting widespread lack of access to clean water (with tapwater itself often being contaminated with lead).

Apart from the environmental ramifications of suburbanization, there is also the racial aspects: suburbs were created to resegregate the population and re-entrench white supremacy, a phenomenon originally called *white flight*. This is well-documented, and can be seen clearly even today—just look, for example, at Milwaukee, one of the most segregated cities in the US. Historically, suburbs in the US originated in the 1940s and 1950, and their growth intensified after exclusionary covenants and sundown towns became no longer formally legal. The Interstate Highway System allowed white people to move out of the city while still working in it—it also divided and isolated black neighbourhoods, an early salvo on urbanized black populations from the US government. Redlining was once formal, now it is done secretly and informally—it is the tactic by which poor, black neighbourhoods were and are either denied or charged exorbitantly for goods and services

such as health care, banking, insurance, loans, clean water, garbage collection, and food. White people were incentivised to move to the suburbs through tactics such as block-busting, which sold houses in white neighbourhoods to black people, causing alarm about decreasing home prices and allowing real estate agents to sell them homes in the suburbs. Exclusionary covenants were re-created through suburban zoning laws. The government aided this by spending taxes on suburban construction while withholding maintenance capital mortgages for non-white urban neighbourhoods. After *Brown v. Board of Education*, in order to avoid desegregation, white people established private schools and moved to the suburbs. The Supreme Court initially tried to remedy this with *desegregation busing* (pejoratively referred to as *forced busing* by white supremacists and unknowing liberal dupes), where white suburban kids would be bussed to inner city schools and Black urban kids would be bussed to suburban schools, but white people strongly resisted this, and after *Milliken v. Bradley*, the law began to surrender, first with *Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell*, then with *Freeman v. Pitts*, and finally *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1* and *Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education*. Because school funding is largely reliant on property taxes, school quality also is assured for white suburban schools but not for Black urban schools, which have correspondingly suffered.

§2.1.10.5 Gentrification, or, Colonialism of the Inner City Gentrification can, following Harvey (2012) as well as Benjamin (1926-1940/1982)⁹⁶ among others, be seen as parallel to Haussmann's 1854 renovation of Paris, which demolished many homes, caused property speculation to balloon and thus raise rents, and widened streets to facilitate army movements and destroy the ability of the urban proletariat to build barricades in resistance. This made Paris "safe for capital" and began the century-long process of displacing its poor to the outskirts. Under modern gentrification, the people who suffer the most are poor proletarian people of colour. Harvey analyzes gentrification as one of the forms of "accumulation by dispossession", his term for the modern forms of primitive accumulation.

Is it a stretch, then, to consider gentrification as colonialism of the inner city? Here, as in colonialism elsewhere, we see the mass displacement of poor proletarian people of colour, to be replaced with white, bourgeois or petty-bourgeois settlers—done through a form of primitive accumulation.

§2.1.10.5.1 Responding to Gentrification After it is Complete: A Sketch Sometimes, it may be too late to be merely *against* or *resist* gentrification: sometimes, the city has entirely gentrified, leaving the urban proletariat to the impoverished suburbs—though perhaps in this meaning, we had better borrow the French term *banlieue*, which refers to impoverished, industrial, largely racialized suburbs of major cities. Returning to Haussmann's 1854 renovation of Paris, which led to the displacement of the urban proletariat to the banlieue—Benjamin (ibid.) notes, however, that this created a *red belt* surrounding Paris, ever ready to revolt. Perhaps this could be better studied and learned from in our current situation.

§2.1.10.6 Squatting and Social Centres In many, if not most, of the highly populated areas of the imperial core of capitalism, we notice a strange phenomenon, where there are many homeless people but even more empty homes—and legally, of course, due to the

⁹⁶The Arcades Project

property regime, the homeless cannot occupy those empty homes. Thus, the practice of doing exactly that has been given a name, *squatting*, and political dimensions. We support squatting, as we support the needs of the homeless to live and oppose capitalism, which treats land as another investment and creates homelessness in the midst of abundance.

Born from the autonomist squatting movement is the *social centre* movement, which uses squatting outside of a residential context to create a public space that can be used for a myriad of needs: organizational centres, discussion venues, libraries, computer labs, cafés, bars, music venues &c. In an age where areas for what have been referred to as “counterpublic spheres” (in response to Habermas’s idea of the bourgeois public sphere of the 18th century—which has been criticised by Fraser among others for presenting the bourgeois public sphere as truly open and inclusive and thus buying into liberal ideology while ignoring the exclusion of marginalised groups—*counterpublic spheres* are similar to the bourgeois public sphere but formed by marginalised peoples for themselves) have been targeted by enclosure and systematically destroyed, the *social centre* offers a chance to recreate it.

§2.1.11 Aesthetics

Our theory of aesthetics originates from Benjamin (1936), Althusser (1970), and Adorno and Horkheimer (1947)⁹⁷. Let us run through the course of it briefly. In Benjamin (1936), it is concluded that with the mass-reproduction of art, art will necessarily lose its “aura” (“the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be”). This undermines the traditional authority of art and allows for the participation of the masses in traditional cultural forms: readers become writers, viewers become artists. Such a change then allows for the politicization of art, and thus its use for revolutionary ends. However, this is not a guaranteed end. Benjamin himself notes in the epilogue of the essay that fascism is born of this intermingling of aesthetics and mass-politics: specifically, it *aestheticizes politics*:

The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses are two aspects of the same process. Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves. The masses have a right to change property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property. The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its Führer cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values.

All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today’s technical resources while maintaining the property system. [...] Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an

⁹⁷The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception

object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.

Indeed, bourgeois regimes have learned quite quickly and quite well how to integrate the mass reproduction of art. This is expounded upon in Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) among other works of Adorno, which posits that under late capitalism a *culture industry* (which Adorno is careful to distinguish from the concept of *mass culture*—the culture industry is the result under bourgeois rule) forms, which mass-produces identical cultural goods (such as hit songs, Hollywood movies, and television shows—which are all the same, barring minor variations of detail) to be sold to everyone. It organizes people into groups of consumers and distinguishes its products not based on subject but on which group of consumers are to buy it, with none to escape, and no alternatives or response. Variation is accepted as a mere deviation from the norm, carefully calculated, which show just how legitimate the norm is to be. The culture industry reduces culture to style, which preaches obedience to hierarchy. Quoth Adorno and Horkheimer:

But what completely fettered the artist was the pressure (and the accompanying drastic threats), always to fit into business life as an aesthetic expert. Formerly, like Kant and Hume, they signed their letters “Your most humble and obedient servant,” and undermined the foundations of throne and altar. Today they address heads of government by their first names, yet in every artistic activity they are subject to their illiterate masters. The analysis Tocqueville offered a century ago has in the meantime proved wholly accurate. Under the private culture monopoly it is a fact that “tyranny leaves the body free and directs its attack at the soul. The ruler no longer says: You must think as I do or die. He says: You are free not to think as I do; your life, your property, everything shall remain yours, but from this day on you are a stranger among us.” Not to conform means to be rendered powerless, economically and therefore spiritually—to be “self-employed.” When the outsider is excluded from the concern, he can only too easily be accused of incompetence. Whereas today in material production the mechanism of supply and demand is disintegrating, in the superstructure it still operates as a check in the rulers’ favor. The consumers are the workers and employees, the farmers and lower middle class. Capitalist production so confines them, body and soul, that they fall helpless victims to what is offered them. As naturally as the ruled always took the morality imposed upon them more seriously than did the rulers themselves, the deceived masses are today captivated by the myth of success even more than the successful are. Immovably, they insist on the very ideology which enslaves them. The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities. It is stronger even than the rigorism of the Hays Office, just as in certain great times in history it has inflamed greater forces that were turned against it, namely, the terror of the tribunals. It calls for Mickey

Rooney in preference to the tragic Garbo, for Donald Duck instead of Betty Boop. The industry submits to the vote which it has itself inspired. What is a loss for the firm which cannot fully exploit a contract with a declining star is a legitimate expense for the system as a whole. By craftily sanctioning the demand for rubbish it inaugurates total harmony. The connoisseur and the expert are despised for their pretentious claim to know better than the others, even though culture is democratic and distributes its privileges to all. In view of the ideological truce, the conformism of the buyers and the effrontery of the producers who supply them prevail. The result is a constant reproduction of the same thing.

As for the *content* of the culture industry, it promises fulfillment but always defers it: relying on exploiting desire but never sublimating it. This is often combined with advertisement, which helped generate the techniques used and which implicitly is the lifeline of the culture industry, but it need not be explicitly so: indeed, it is all the more sinister when it is declared public—for Adorno, the example of public radio (at the time funded by auto, electric, and soap companies) demonstrates that the culture industry is the kindergarten of fascism:

But art as a type of product which existed to be sold and yet to be unsaleable is wholly and hypocritically converted into “unsaleability” as soon as the transaction ceases to be the mere intention and becomes its sole principle. No tickets could be bought when Toscanini conducted over the radio; he was heard without charge, and every sound of the symphony was accompanied, as it were, by the sublime puff that the symphony was not interrupted by any advertising: “This concert is brought to you as a public service.” The illusion was made possible by the profits of the united automobile and soap manufacturers, whose payments keep the radio stations going—and, of course, by the increased sales of the electrical industry, which manufactures the radio sets. Radio, the progressive latecomer of mass culture, draws all the consequences at present denied the film by its pseudomarket. The technical structure of the commercial radio system makes it immune from liberal deviations such as those the movie industrialists can still permit themselves in their own sphere. It is a private enterprise which really does represent the sovereign whole and is therefore some distance ahead of the other individual combines. Chesterfield is merely the nation’s cigarette, but the radio is the voice of the nation. In bringing cultural products wholly into the sphere of commodities, radio does not try to dispose of its culture goods themselves as commodities straight to the consumer. In America it collects no fees from the public, and so has acquired the illusory form of disinterested, unbiased authority which suits Fascism admirably. The radio becomes the universal mouthpiece of the Führer; his voice rises from street loud-speakers to resemble the howling of sirens announcing panic—from which modern propaganda can scarcely be distinguished anyway. The National Socialists knew that the wireless gave shape to their cause just as the printing press did to the Reformation. The metaphysical charisma of the Führer invented by the sociology of religion has

finally turned out to be no more than the omnipresence of his speeches on the radio, which are a demoniacal parody of the omnipresence of the divine spirit. The gigantic fact that the speech penetrates everywhere replaces its content, just as the benefaction of the Toscanini broadcast takes the place of the symphony. No listener can grasp its true meaning any longer, while the Führer's speech is lies anyway. The inherent tendency of radio is to make the speaker's word, the false commandment, absolute. A recommendation becomes an order. The recommendation of the same commodities under different proprietary names, the scientifically based praise of the laxative in the announcer's smooth voice between the overture from *La Traviata* and that from *Rienzi* is the only thing that no longer works, because of its silliness. One day the edict of production, the actual advertisement (whose actuality is at present concealed by the pretense of a choice) can turn into the open command of the Führer. In a society of huge Fascist rackets which agree among themselves what part of the social product should be allotted to the nation's needs, it would eventually seem anachronistic to recommend the use of a particular soap powder. The Führer is more up-to-date in unceremoniously giving direct orders for both the holocaust and the supply of rubbish. Even today the culture industry dresses works of art like political slogans and forces them upon a resistant public at reduced prices; they are as accessible for public enjoyment as a park. But the disappearance of their genuine commodity character does not mean that they have been abolished in the life of a free society, but that the last defense against their reduction to culture goods has fallen. The abolition of educational privilege by the device of clearance sales does not open for the masses the spheres from which they were formerly excluded, but, given existing social conditions, contributes directly to the decay of education and the progress of barbaric meaninglessness.

As we stated in the beginning of this essay, however, we must be careful with Adorno and we must refuse the position that subversion is impossible. Still, his discussion of the culture industry is incredibly important, and helps structure our notion of culture in late capitalism.

More generally, we can take Adorno's discussion of the culture industry in the context of ideology and the ideological state apparatus (ISA) as elaborated upon in Althusser (1970). Althusser, beginning from Marx's notion of the reproduction of labour-power, posits that aside from the traditional economic context of this idea, there must also be a reproduction of the submission of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie's rules and the ability for the bourgeoisie to manipulate capitalist ideology. This ensures the reproduction of the relations of production. These tasks are done through two sorts of state apparatus: the RSA (repressive state apparatus) and the ISA (ideological state apparatus). The RSA consists of the government, administration, army, police, court, prisons &c &c, while the ISA is not one but many entities: Althusser mentions a religious ISA (places of worship), an educational ISA (the school system), a family ISA, a legal ISA, a political ISA (the political system, including the party system), the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio, television), and the cultural ISA (literature, arts, film, music, sport &c). ISAs are often, unlike RSAs, private, and RSAs function primarily by repression (secondarily by

ideology) while ISAs function primarily by ideology (secondarily by repression). Beneath ruling ideology, the ISAs, despite their multiplicity, function as one—indeed, ruling class ideology secures their unity: Althusser likens it to a concert with numerous instruments but a single score. Furthermore, no class can hold power without exercising hegemony over ISAs, thus ISAs often become the site of class struggle. Althusser then expounds on the history of ISAs in France, specifically noting that, though the Catholic Church was the dominant ISA in pre-modern France, a multiplicity of ISAs existed even then, including the family, the political system, the guilds, and later, theatre and publishing, which slowly wrested independence from the Church. Because the Church, however, was the dominant ISA, resistance to feudal domination from the 16th to the 18th centuries prominently featured anti-clerical campaigns as forms of *ideological* struggle. The French Revolution is the ultimate example, for not only did it fight to wrest ISA power from the feudal aristocracy to the bourgeoisie, it also fought a fierce campaign to destroy the foremost feudal ISA. But this took a long, long time, from the Protestant Reformation to the Third Republic. Althusser then posits that the Church ISA has been replaced in its dominant position by the educational ISA in capitalism—even that the School-Family couple now plays the role the Church-Family couple once did. After defending this position, there is a discussion of *ideology*. He begins with *The German Ideology*, where he takes the phrase “ideology has no history” and interprets them in a radically different manner, positing that though ideology in general has no history (that is, ideology in general is eternal), ideologies have a history of their own. He then introduces two theses: ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence, and ideology has a material existence (“I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.”). Furthermore, Althusser claims the following two theses: there is no practice except by and in an ideology, and there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. It is here that Althusser comes to *interpellation* and the subject. Ideology is made possible by the category of the subject (also known as the soul in Plato, or God &c). But this is qualified: “the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects”. The explanation of interpellation is somewhat difficult, but here’s what it means. Interpellation is the process by which ideology constitutes the identities of the subject: it transforms individuals into subjects. It does this by “hailing” at them in social interactions. For example, when a cop shouts “Hey, you there!” and an individual turns around to respond to the call, the individual has become a subject. The consequence of this is that subjects are not independent agents with self-produced identities, but rather produced by social forces. Butler (1990) relies on this to describe the social origin of gender.

In the light of this theory of aesthetics, it is rather easy to fall into despair. However, as we have stressed again and again throughout: the solution is not to turn back the clock. Turning back the clock, besides being an impossibility in human affairs, is also by its very nature a reactionary impulse.

§2.1.12 Against Fascism

Considering the increasingly-likely possibility—nay, *probability*—that the World will succumb to a period of global fascism in the next two decades, we recognize the need for a vigorous, violent anti-fascist organization to combat fascism by direct action. Our theories surrounding this are too long and complex to summarize here, so we have compiled them into a separate document: “The Far Right in Europe and North America: Their History, Typology, Tactics, and How to Fight Them: A Guide for Leftists”, which we heartily recommend all of our readers read alongside this document.

§2.1.13 On Religion

When it comes to religion, many on the Left merely repeat, without historical context, the famous phrase from the introduction to *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*: “religion is the opiate of the masses”. What this fails to explain is that “opiate” here did not have a purely negative meaning like it might today—indeed, the meaning is best illustrated with the *full* quote “Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” We thus refuse to impose an anti-religious system, as the New Atheists might wish us to. Following Althusser (1970), we note that the various systems of organized religion, however, are a prominent ISA, and thus must be combatted. Thus, we advocate *anticlericalism* and forms of spirituality and religion (alongside atheism, of course) which ideologically are in concert with communism to combat the bourgeois theology and spirituality of the Church ISA, alongside tolerance and secularism.

§2.1.13.1 Anticlericalism We advocate anticlericalism to combat the Church ISA, which maintains considerable influence despite modernity. We recognize organized religion as reinforcing cis-hetero-patriarchy, despite conciliatory measures sometimes taken in recent years and imperialism (Christianity is especially implicated in this, but is not the only wrongdoer). In order to dismantle the superstructural elements of oppression, the institutions by which they are disseminated—including organized religion—must be removed and replaced.

§2.1.13.2 Godbuilders and Liberation Theology The Godbuilders, centred around Anatoly Lunacharsky, were a Bolshevik group (specifically, aligned with the *Vpered* group) which, inspired by Maximilien Robespierre’s cult of reason and Ludwig Feuerbach’s ‘religion of humanity’ (and perhaps Georges Sorel’s myth of the general strike) posited that in order to inspire and provide for the social and psychological wellbeing of the masses, symbolism, myth, and ritual were important. Thus, Lunacharsky called for, in Lunacharsky (1908/1911)⁹⁸ the creation of new symbolism, myth, and ritual to replace the old, as well as the re-interpretation of existing rituals and symbols within a socialist context—one of the various traditions he investigated was the Eleusinian Mysteries. Lenin rejected Lunacharsky’s proposal, for he thought that it had compromised with religion too much and would regress to a mild liberal reformism. We believe that this, though understandable in the context of the hegemonic role of the Russian Orthodox Church with which Lunacharsky’s theory could be seen (incorrectly, in our view, as Lunacharsky agreed that

⁹⁸Religion and Socialism

organized religion was a part of an exploitative superstructure) as a compromise, is a dogmatic mistake born from a misunderstanding of the “opiate of the people”. Lunacharsky’s theory would indeed later be revived, though on a smaller scale, with (for example) the All-Union Day of the Agricultural Worker, an adapted version of St. John the Baptist’s Day. A similar theory was later put forth by Ernst Bloch, though he was likely unaware of Lunacharsky, in Bloch (1954/1955/1959)⁹⁹—which later inspired Gutiérrez’s *liberation theology* (a specific instance of this rooted in Latin American Catholicism which has been adapted to differing contexts and to different religions), first sketched in Gutiérrez (1971)¹⁰⁰. Similar projects can be seen in, for example, Leftist interpretations of *tikkun olam* in Judaism—a concept which indeed gave its name to the French philosophical journal *Tiqqun*, the predecessor of the Invisible Committee.

We endorse Godbuilding and Liberation Theology projects. Godbuilding projects, including occult godbuilding projects, should not be seen as frivolities, but as important tools in the cultural, superstructural struggle—especially as fascists have, following the post-war writings of Alain de Benoist and Julius Evola, decided to spread fascist ideas in subculture, occultism, religion, &c &c with too little pushback. See also the section, under “Praxis”, on agitprop—and read Rosenthal (1997)¹⁰¹.

§2.1.14 On the Role of Critique

In Latour (2004)¹⁰² Bruno Latour confronts an unsettling but important problem, that is:

What has critique become when a French general, no, a marshal of critique, namely, Jean Baudrillard, claims in a published book that the Twin Towers destroyed themselves under their own weight, so to speak, undermined by the utter nihilism inherent in capitalism itself—as if the terrorist planes were pulled to suicide by the powerful attraction of this black hole of nothingness? What has become of critique when a book that claims that no plane ever crashed into the Pentagon can be a bestseller? I am ashamed to say that the author was French, too. Remember the good old days when revisionism arrived very late, after the facts had been thoroughly established, decades after bodies of evidence had accumulated? Now we have the benefit of what can be called instant revisionism. The smoke of the event has not yet finished settling before dozens of conspiracy theories begin revising the official account, adding even more ruins to the ruins, adding even more smoke to the smoke. What has become of critique when my neighbor in the little Bourbonnais village where I live looks down on me as someone hopelessly naïve because I believe that the United States had been attacked by terrorists? Remember the good old days when university professors could look down on unsophisticated folks because those hillbillies naïvely believed in church, motherhood, and apple pie? Things have changed a lot, at least in my village. I am now the one who naïvely believes in some facts because I am educated, while the other guys are too unsophisticated to be gullible:

⁹⁹The Principle of Hope

¹⁰⁰A Theology of Liberation

¹⁰¹The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture

¹⁰²Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?

“Where have you been? Don’t you know that the Mossad and the CIA did it?” What has become of critique when someone as eminent as Stanley Fish, the “enemy of promises” as Lindsay Waters calls him, believes he defends science studies, my field, by comparing the laws of physics to the rules of baseball? What has become of critique when there is a whole industry denying that the Apollo program landed on the moon? What has become of critique when DARPA uses for its Total Information Awareness project the Baconian slogan *Scientia est potentia*? Didn’t I read that somewhere in Michel Foucault? Has knowledge-slash-power been co-opted of late by the National Security Agency? Has *Discipline and Punish* become the bedtime reading of Mr. Ridge (fig. 1)? Let me be mean for a second. What’s the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized, that is a teachable version of social critique inspired by a too quick reading of, let’s say, a sociologist as eminent as Pierre Bourdieu (to be polite I will stick with the French field commanders)? In both cases, you have to learn to become suspicious of everything people say because of course we all know that they live in the thralls of a complete *illusio* of their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an explanation is requested for what is really going on, in both cases again it is the same appeal to powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly. Of course, we in the academy like to use more elevated causes—society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism—while conspiracists like to portray a miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I find something troublingly similar in the structure of the explanation, in the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal explanations coming out of the deep dark below. What if explanations resorting automatically to power, society, discourse had outlived their usefulness and deteriorated to the point of now feeding the most gullible sort of critique? Maybe I am taking conspiracy theories too seriously, but it worries me to detect, in those mad mixtures of knee-jerk disbelief, punctilious demands for proofs, and free use of powerful explanation from the social neverland many of the weapons of social critique. Of course conspiracy theories are an absurd deformation of our own arguments, but, like weapons smuggled through a fuzzy border to the wrong party, these are our weapons nonetheless. In spite of all the deformations, it is easy to recognize, still burnt in the steel, our trademark: *Made in Criticalland*.[...] What’s happening to me, you may wonder? Is this a case of midlife crisis? No, alas, I passed middle age quite a long time ago. Is this a patrician spite for the popularization of critique? As if critique should be reserved for the elite and remain difficult and strenuous, like mountain climbing or yachting, and is no longer worth the trouble if everyone can do it for a nickel? What would be so bad with critique for the people? We have been complaining so much about the gullible masses, swallowing naturalized facts, it would be really unfair to now discredit the same masses for their, what should I call it, gullible criticism? Or could this be a case of radicalism gone mad, as when a revolution swallows its progeny? Or, rather, have we behaved like mad scientists who have let the virus of critique out of the confines of their laboratories

and cannot do anything now to limit its deleterious effects; it mutates now, gnawing everything up, even the vessels in which it is contained? Or is it another case of the famed power of capitalism for recycling everything aimed at its destruction? As Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello say, the new spirit of capitalism has put to good use the artistic critique that was supposed to destroy it. **If the dense and moralist cigarmoking reactionary bourgeois can transform him- or herself into a free- floating agnostic bohemian, moving opinions, capital, and networks from one end of the planet to the other without attachment, why would he or she not be able to absorb the most sophisticated tools of deconstruction, social construction, discourse analysis, postmodernism, postology?** In spite of my tone, I am not trying to reverse course, to become reactionary, to regret what I have done, to swear that I will never be a constructivist any more. I simply want to do what every good military officer, at regular periods, would do: retest the linkages between the new threats he or she has to face and the equipment and training he or she should have in order to meet them—and, if necessary, to revise from scratch the whole paraphernalia. This does not mean for us any more than it does for the officer that we were wrong, but simply that history changes quickly and that there is no greater intellectual crime than to address with the equipment of an older period the challenges of the present one. Whatever the case, our critical equipment deserves as much critical scrutiny as the Pentagon budget. [emphasis ours] My argument is that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The question was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism. What I am going to argue is that the critical mind, if it is to renew itself and be relevant again, is to be found in the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude—to speak like William James—but a realism dealing with what I will call matters of concern, not matters of fact. The mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to believe that there was no efficient way to criticize matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing one's attention toward the conditions that made them possible. But this meant accepting much too uncritically what matters of fact were. This was remaining too faithful to the unfortunate solution inherited from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Critique has not been critical enough in spite of all its sorescratching. Reality is not defined by matters of fact. Matters of fact are not all that is given in experience. Matters of fact are only very partial and, I would argue, very polemical, very political renderings of matters of concern and only a subset of what could also be called *states of affairs*. It is this second empiricism, this return to the realist attitude, that I'd like to offer as the next task for the critically minded.

Latour laments the fact that despite the intentions of science studies, they are always seen as weakening rather than strengthening science. In his discussion of academic social cri-

tique, one is reminded of the Mechanical Turk called “historical materialism” (Second International, or “Orthodox” Marxism, which is suggested to be merely vulgarized Marxism animated by theology) that Benjamin so rightly criticized in Benjamin (1947). This Mechanical Turk is dubbed *critical barbarity* by Latour. To this, Latour offers the remedy of realism:

The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather. The critic is not the one who alternates haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya, but the one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and caution. I am aware that to get at the heart of this argument one would have to renew also what it means to be a constructivist, but I have said enough to indicate the direction of critique, not away but toward the gathering, the Thing. Not westward, but, so to speak, eastward.

The practical problem we face, if we try to go that new route, is to associate the word criticism with a whole set of new positive metaphors, gestures, attitudes, knee-jerk reactions, habits of thoughts. To begin with this new habit forming, I’d like to extract another definition of critique from the most unlikely source, namely, Allan Turing’s original paper on thinking machines. I have a good reason for that: here is the typical paper about formalism, here is the origin of one of the icons—to use a cliché of antifetishism—of the contemporary age, namely, the computer, and yet, if you read this paper, it is so baroque, so kitsch, it assembles such an astounding number of metaphors, beings, hypotheses, allusions, that there is no chance that it would be accepted nowadays by any journal. Even *Social Text* would reject it out of hand as another hoax! “Not again,” they would certainly say, “once bitten, twice shy.” Who would take a paper seriously that states somewhere after having spoken of Muslim women, punishment of boys, extrasensory perception: “In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping [God’s] power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates” (“CM,” p. 443).

Lots of gods, always in machines. Remember how Bush eulogized the crew of the *Columbia* for reaching home in heaven, if not home on earth? Here Turing too cannot avoid mentioning God’s creative power when talking of this most mastered machine, the computer that he has invented. That’s precisely his point. The computer is in for many surprises; you get out of it much more than you put into it. In the most dramatic way, Turing’s paper demonstrates, once again, that all objects are born things, all matters of fact require, in order to exist, a bewildering variety of matters of concern. The surprising result is that we don’t master what we, ourselves, have fabricated, the object of this definition of critique: Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace’s objection, which stated that the machine can only do what we tell

it to do. One could say that a man can “inject” an idea into the machine, and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop into quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one for machines? There does seem to be one for the human mind. The majority of them seem to be “sub-critical,” i.e. to correspond in this analogy to piles of sub-critical size. An idea presented to such a mind will on average give rise to less than one idea in reply. A smallish proportion are super-critical. An idea presented to such a mind may give rise to a whole “theory” consisting of secondary, tertiary and more remote ideas. Animals’ minds seem to be very definitely sub-critical. Adhering to this analogy we ask, “Can a machine be made to be super-critical?” [“CM,” p. 454] We all know subcritical minds, that’s for sure! What would critique do if it could be associated with *more*, not with *less*, with *multiplication*, not *subtraction*. Critical theory died away long ago; can we become critical again, in the sense here offered by Turing? That is, generating more ideas than we have received, inheriting from a prestigious critical tradition but not letting it die away, or “dropping into quiescence” like a piano no longer struck. This would require that all entities, including computers, cease to be objects defined simply by their inputs and outputs and become again things, mediating, assembling, gathering many more folds than the “united four.” If this were possible then we could let the critics come ever closer to the matters of concern we cherish, and then at last we could tell them: “Yes, please, touch them, explain them, deploy them.” Then we would have gone for good beyond iconoclasm.

§2.1.15 A Theory of the State

What is the State? In a political grouping where dispute over states too often take centre stage, it would do well to formulate a coherent theory of a state.

Our jumping-off point will be from Lenin (1918)¹⁰³:

The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonism objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

The state is a tool of class rule; the bourgeois state the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the proletarian the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletarian state will wither away as the contradictions of bourgeois society and as the class struggle die away; the bourgeois state will not wither away but defend the interests of the bourgeoisie until annihilation, overseeing a fall into barbarism as it becomes more monolithic and brutal—we may in

¹⁰³The State and Revolution

retrospect use the language of “fascism” to refer to this decay (although that implies a particular *Weltanschauung* that monolithic, barbaric capitalism in general need not share)—the Rightist known as Oswald Spengler called it “Cæsarism”—but it can be perceived even earlier in Marx (1852)¹⁰⁴.

But a theory of the State cannot end merely with noting its nature as a tool of class domination. We must understand how the State *works*. To do this, we call once more upon Althusser and more specifically Althusser (1970) and the more elaborate theory published posthumously as Althusser (1994)¹⁰⁵. As we have noted earlier, the State’s functions can be split into a repressive state apparatus (RSA) and an ideological state apparatus (ISA). The RSA is largely public and monolithic, and consists of the police, the armed forces, the courts, administration, and much of the security apparatus; it functions primarily by repression, secondarily by ideology. The ISA is largely private and functions through a multitude of organizations, including the schools, the family, the radio, TV, internet media companies, the newspapers, film, trade unions, the political system, places of worship, &c; it functions primarily by ideology, secondarily by repression. The ISA works to reproduce the submission of labour to capital; one might frame this in Gramscian terms as cultural hegemony, which creates masks of consent and ensures that the proletariat view the values of the bourgeoisie as “common sense” and identifies their good with the good of the bourgeoisie. In Althusser (*ibid.*), we see that the possession of state power can be affected while the state apparatus remains intact (Althusser cites as examples various changes of regime in France: 1830, 1848, 1851, and 1958)—indeed, Althusser claims (with the words of Lenin as his source) that even after the Great October Revolution elements of the old Tsarist state apparatus remained. Thus, Althusser stresses the importance of destroying and replacing the ISAs as one smashes the bourgeois RSAs.

In Poulantzas (1978)¹⁰⁶, Poulantzas transforms Althusser’s analysis of the state into a more mature and insightful theory. According to Poulantzas, the bourgeois State creates the separation between public and private spheres. Then:

For when we say that the individual-private is not a limitation on, but the very conduit of the power of the modern State, we do not mean that that power has no limits at all. It is just that these derive not from some natural condition of the individual-private, but from popular struggle and the class relationship of forces: the State, too, is a specific material condensation of a given relationship of forces, which is itself a class relation. Thus, the individual-private appears as a *resultant* of this relationship of forces and of its condensation in the State. Although the individual-private has no intrinsic essence opposing absolute external barriers to the State’s power, it limits that power through being one of the privileged modern representations of the class relationship *within* the State. The nature of this limit is well known: it is called *representative democracy*. However truncated by the dominant classes and by the materiality of the State, it still constitutes a mode whereby popular struggle and resistance are inscribed in that materiality; and while not the only limit to the power of the State, it is nevertheless decisive.

¹⁰⁴The 18th Brumaire of Louis-Napoleon

¹⁰⁵On the Reproduction of Capitalism

¹⁰⁶State, Power, Socialism

It is probably not of absolute significance in that it is born on the terrain of capitalism. But it remains a barrier to power and will doubtless continue to be of consequence as long as a State and social classes exist. The same goes for human and civil rights, which were conquered not by the individual facing the State but by oppressed classes. Indeed, the extension or contraction of the individual-private expresses the advance or retreat of their struggles insofar as they take the above political form. This is so not because popular struggle and resistance thereby carve out a domain external to the State (the individual-private), but because they are located on the strategic terrain of the State itself, which, in its modern form, appears as a public-private space.

Poulantzas then finds another insight:

Unlike caste-classes or slave and medieval Estates - 'closed' classes to which agents belonged once and for all by their very nature - classes under capitalism are 'open': they are grounded on the distribution and circulation of individualized agents among the bourgeoisie, the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, and classes based in the countryside. These open classes give rise to a previously unheard-of state role: that of *apportioning-distributing* individualized agents among the classes. The State is thus called upon to shape and condition, train and subordinate these agents in such a way that they are able to occupy class positions to which they are not tied by nature or by birth. This role falls especially to the schools, but it is also fulfilled by the army, prisons and the state administration. Through the mechanisms of individualization, the capitalist specificity of classes is already traced in the materiality of the State: the techniques of exercising power in the school or army (that is, the disciplines of normalization-individualization) are consubstantial with the role of these institutions in training-apportioning-distributing agents-individuals among the classes. Finally, being inscribed in capitalist corporality, this individualization possesses a meaning and modalities which vary according to the social class. There is a bourgeois and a working-class individualization, a bourgeois and a working-class body, just as there is a bourgeois family and a working-class family. In other words, there are different modalities of capitalist individualization and corporality, just as there are different modalities of the capitalist family that is grounded on the process of individualization.

From this, Poulantzas (ibid.) arrives at the following elements for a theory of the State:

1. The State represents and organizes the long-term political interests of a power bloc consisting of the dominant classes in society or indeed the dominant strata of ruling classes (Poulantzas cites the persistence of semi-feudalism in the periphery despite being part of bourgeois society as reason enough for this formulation, which might strike our readers as odd)
2. The dominant classes are split into several strata (such as large landlords, monopoly capital, non-monopoly capital-or a further division between industrial non-monopoly capital and finance non-monopoly capital, for example) with political division among

them; the State serves to organize the general interests of the bourgeoisie under the hegemony of one of its factions

3. The State consists of several apparati (political party, military, treasury, university, &c) which are seemingly separate from one another and which represent different factions of the power bloc; their unity is established by subordinating one apparatus to another in a chain
4. The dominated classes are part of the State as “centres of opposition to the power of the dominant classes”, not concentrating their power in an apparatus like dominant class factions
5. The State maintains hegemony through a series of compromises between the dominant and dominated classes (this was especially true in the era of the welfare state, when Poulantzas wrote; these compromises have proven to be short-lived and have been rolled back)
6. As contradictions grow sharper, more and more power is concentrated within the bureaucratic apparati of the State away from the “representative democratic” limit, hollowing out that democracy such that all that is left to decide is which element of administration should be emphasized; administration, however, is not as effective in maintaining hegemony as political parties are

Unfortunately, Poulantzas’ praxis is deeply disappointing—it is democratic socialism once again. Yet his theory—specifically the notion that the state’s various apparati serve to apportion-distribute individualized agents among classes, and the apparati represent differing elements within the power bloc—remains of use.

§2.2 Praxis

XI. Philosophers have hitherto only
interpreted the world in various ways;
the point is to change it

Thesen über Feuerbach
KARL MARX

§2.2.1 Dual Power

In order to build up organizational strength before the Revolution, we propose a programme of dual power and counter-hegemony, with organizational forms left to be generated at will—sometimes, certain forms will make sense, but at other points, different forms will be necessary—and these will be applied to a number of interlocking organizations which will focus on specific tasks in the creation of dual power and counter-hegemony as well as later in revolution, coördinated by a party. Dual power, of course, is a Leninist concept, developed in Lenin (1917b)¹⁰⁷:

¹⁰⁷The Dual Power

The highly remarkable feature of our revolution is that it has brought about a *dual power*. This fact must be grasped first and foremost: unless it is understood, we cannot advance. We must know how to supplement and amend old “formulas”, for example, those of Bolshevism, for while they have been found to be correct on the whole, their concrete realisation *has turned out to be different*. Nobody previously thought, or could have thought, of a dual power.

What is this dual power? Alongside the Provisional Government, the government of the *bourgeoisie*, another government has arisen, so far weak and incipient, but undoubtedly a government that actually exists and is growing—the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

What is the class composition of this other government? It consists of the proletariat and the peasants (in soldiers’ uniforms). What is the political nature of this government? It is a revolutionary dictatorship, i.e., a power directly based on revolutionary seizure, on the direct initiative of the people from below, and *not on a law* enacted by a centralised state power. It is an entirely different kind of power from the one that generally exists in the parliamentary bourgeois-democratic republics of the usual type still prevailing in the advanced countries of Europe and America. This circumstance often overlooked, often not given enough thought, yet it is the crux of the matter. *This power is of the same type* as the Paris Commune of 1871. The fundamental characteristics of this type are: (1) the source of power is not a law previously discussed and enacted by parliament, but the direct initiative of the people from below, in their local areas—direct “seizure”, to use a current expression; (2) the replacement of the police and the army, which are institutions divorced from the people and set against the people, by the direct arming of the whole people; order in the state under such a power is maintained by the armed workers and peasants *themselves*, by the armed people *themselves*; (3) officialdom, the bureaucracy, are either similarly replaced by the direct rule of the people themselves or at least placed under special control; they not only become elected officials, but are also *subject to recall* at the people’s first demand; they are reduced to the position of simple agents; from a privileged group holding “jobs” remunerated on a high, bourgeois scale, they become workers of a special “arm of the service”, whose remuneration *does not exceed* the ordinary pay of a competent worker.

This, and this alone, constitutes the essence of the Paris Commune as a special type of state. This essence has been forgotten or perverted by the Plekhanovs (downright chauvinists who have betrayed Marxism), the Kautskys (the men of the “Centre”, i.e., those who vacillate between chauvinism and Marxism), and generally by all those Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., etc., who now rule the roost. [...]

Why? Is it because Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and Co. are making a “mistake”? Nonsense. Only a philistine can think so—not a Marxist. The reason is *insufficient class-consciousness* and organisation of the proletarians and peasants. The “mistake” of the leaders I have named lies in their petty-bourgeois

position, in the fact that instead of clarifying the minds of the workers, they are *befogging* them; instead of dispelling petty-bourgeois illusions, they are *in-stilling* them; instead of freeing the people from bourgeois influence, they are *strengthening* that influence.

It should be clear from this why our comrades, too, make so many mistakes when putting the question “simply”: Should the Provisional Government be overthrown immediately?

My answer is: (1) it should be overthrown, for it is an oligarchic, bourgeois, and not a people’s government, and *is unable* to provide peace, bread, or full freedom; (2) It cannot be overthrown just now, for it is being kept in power by a direct and indirect, a formal and actual *agreement* with the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, and primarily with the chief Soviet, the Petrograd Soviet; (3) generally, it can not be “overthrown” in the ordinary way, for it rests on the “*support*” given to the bourgeoisie by the second government—the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, and that government is the only possible revolutionary government, which directly expresses the mind and will of the majority of the workers and peasants. Humanity has not yet evolved and we do not as yet know a type of government superior to and better than the Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labourers’, Peasants’, and Soldiers’ Deputies.

To become a power the class-conscious workers must win the majority to their side. *As long as no* violence is used against the people there is no other road to power. We are not Blanquists, we do not stand for the seizure of power by a minority. We are Marxists, we stand for proletarian class struggle against petty-bourgeois intoxication, against chauvinism-defencism, phrase-mongering and dependence on the bourgeoisie.

Let us create a proletarian Communist Party; its elements have already been created by the best adherents of Bolshevism; let us rally our ranks for proletarian class work; and larger and larger numbers from among the proletarians, from among the *poorest* peasants will range themselves on our side. For *actual experience* will from day to day shatter the petty-bourgeois illusions of those “Social-Democrats”, the Chkheidzes, Tseretelis, Steklows and others, the “Socialist Revolutionaries”, the petty bourgeois of an even purer water, and so on and so forth.

The first rule: *don’t jump to the party*. Build up support organizations *first*. “Jumping to the party” is a very alluring move, and the most common one, but it’s a trap—the siren-song of radicalism—because a party without support organizations, as we have seen time and time again, leads almost inevitably to burnout and reformism. See, for example, all the tiny left-wing parties in the West—but also the presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders, Podemos, Syriza &c &c, which are either reformist, have become reformist, or have failed utterly and dissolved as a result. After all, if all you’re doing is fighting against something (which these parties are almost always limited to by their very nature) it’s much easier to do so within the system. And indeed, if we look at any leftist success in the past, we find behind them many, many organizations which had different goals and different means. “Diversity of tactics” ought not to mean “do the same thing, but in many different ways”

(some campaign, some march, some riot, but all on the same issue), but if all we do is form parties, that is what we get—as well as, as was previously mentioned, a radicalism focused on opposition, as there is nothing to champion.

As has been rightly remarked: with all the money sent to electoral campaigns, how many of these societies could have been funded, doing real good to people on the ground? How many soup kitchens, how many union drives, how many clinics—and for how long? How much burnout would there be if, after struggle, one could go to a union hall or aid society for dinner, and to commiserate. As Nietzsche remarks, the Lion, who can say “no!” must become the Child who can say “yes”, and so similarly we must move beyond purely defensive struggles of resistance towards building our own services—dual power. Read Alinsky (1971)¹⁰⁸, and act accordingly. The rules are summarized below—to understand them in their context, we recommend reading the book (it would require too much space to reproduce them here):

1. Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have
2. Never go outside the experience of your people
3. Wherever possible go outside of the experience of the enemy
4. Make the enemy live up to their own book of rules
5. Ridicule is the most potent weapon
6. A good tactic is one that your people enjoy
7. A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag.
8. Keep the pressure on, with different tactics and actions
9. The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself.
10. The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure upon the opposition.
11. If you push a negative hard and deep enough it will break through into its counterside
12. The price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative.
13. Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.

We also recommend reading the short pamphlets Mao (1937a)¹⁰⁹ and Mao (1930)¹¹⁰.

Many have misinterpreted the strategy of dual power as merely a recruitment strategy. If that is the case, we would be no better than the Catholic Church. As Burns (2016)¹¹¹ rightfully complains, this elementary misunderstanding leads dual power organizations to

¹⁰⁸Rules for Radicals

¹⁰⁹Combat Liberalism

¹¹⁰Oppose Book Worship

¹¹¹What is Dual Power?

prioritize recruitment over building a community's power, breeds distrust, and is fundamentally dishonest. Dual power means independent organizations to meet the needs of oppressed peoples, controlled by oppressed peoples, as either alternatives to capitalist and government organizations (examples given are worker-owned businesses, neighbourhood vegetable gardens, housing coöps, and community-owned clinics) or as institutions meant to counter oppressive capitalist and government power (examples given are labor unions, to campaign against a new Wal-Mart store, tenants' unions, and clinic defense groups). The article then gives a wonderful guide as to how to build dual power organizations; we recommend all of our readers read and understand it.

§2.2.1.1 Workplace and Neighbourhood Organization First and foremost is workplace organization. The decline of the social-democratic trade-union organizations is not to be merely accepted—we call upon people to form new workplace organization that would allow workers to act collectively to resist further exploitation and to raise consciousness. Workplace organization has historically been the bedrock of Leftist organizing, and we hope that it is not forgotten. In our current neo-liberal era, the first-world proletariat has become increasingly impoverished, its exploitation made more naked and obvious. This does not only refer to the traditional conception of the proletariat consisting of industrial blue-collar workers and lower-level white-collar workers and administrators, but refers also to the remains of the peasantry, service workers (including sanitation workers, many healthcare workers, childcare workers, food service workers, sex workers &c), and large segments of the intelligentsiya (most obviously grad students and adjunct faculty—sometimes this segment of the intelligentsiya is called the lumpen-intellectuals or lumpen-intelligentsiya, but Marx recognized the proletarian nature of most academics in Marx (1863)).

Harvey (2012) reminds us that though workplace organization is important, it is not the be-all-end-all of organization, and indeed other forms of organization, especially neighbourhood organization, have been historically crucial yet overlooked. Neighbourhood organization focuses demands on living conditions and the cost of living—and thus on consumption (along with space)—as workplace organization focuses demands on working conditions—and thus on production. We thus move to the theory of libertarian municipalism:

Libertarian municipalism, outlined in Bookchin (1987)¹¹² and Bookchin (1991)¹¹³ makes use of the relative fluidity and vulnerability of local politics (compared to politics at higher levels such as district, county, state, province, nation) to loosen control and eliminate blocks to an impending revolution. We do not endorse a folk-political reading of libertarian municipalism, which seems particularly popular amongst anarchists and often ignores even the confederalism advocated by Bookchin, but rather choose to keep it as one of the many strategies that can be used to erode the power of capital.

Let us now explain libertarian municipalism. We do this by quoting Bookchin:

The recovery and development of politics must, I submit, take its point of departure from the citizen and his or her immediate environment beyond the

¹¹²Libertarian Municipalism: The New Municipal Agenda

¹¹³Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview

familial and private arenas of life. There can be no politics without community. And by community I mean a municipal association of people reinforced by its own economic power, its own institutionalization of the grass roots, and the confederal support of nearby communities organized into a territorial network on a local and regional scale. Parties that do not intertwine with these grassroots forms of popular organization are not political in the classical sense of the term. In fact, they are bureaucratic and antithetical to the development of a participatory politics and participating citizens. The authentic unit of political life, in effect, is the municipality, whether as a whole, if it is humanly scaled, or in its various subdivisions, notably the neighborhood[...]

The living cell that forms the basic unit of political life is the municipality, from which everything—such as citizenship, interdependence, confederation, and freedom—emerges. There is no way to piece together any politics unless we begin with its most elementary forms: the villages, towns, neighborhoods, and cities in which people live on the most intimate level of political interdependence beyond private life. It is on this level that they can begin to gain a familiarity with the political process, a process that involves a good deal more than voting and information. It is on this level, too, that they can go beyond the private insularity of family life—a life that is currently celebrated for its inwardness and seclusion—and improvise those public institutions that make for broad community participation and consociation.

In short, it is through the municipality that people can reconstitute themselves from isolated monads into an innovative body politic and create an existentially vital, indeed protoplasmic civic life that has continuity and institutional form as well as civic content. I refer here to the block organizations, neighborhood assemblies, town meetings, civic confederations, and the public arenas for discourse that go beyond such episodic, single-issue demonstrations and campaigns, valuable as they may be to redress social injustices. But protest alone is not enough; indeed, it is usually defined by what protestors oppose, not by the social changes they may wish to institute. To ignore the irreducible civic unit of politics and democracy is to play chess without a chessboard, for it is on this civic plane that the long-range endeavor of social renewal must eventually be played out. . . .

All statist objections aside, the problem of restoring municipal assemblies seems formidable if it is cast in strictly structural and spatial terms. New York City and London have no way of "assembling" if they try to emulate ancient Athens, with its comparatively small citizen body. Both cities, in fact, are no longer cities in the classical sense of the term and hardly rate as municipalities even by nineteenth-century standards of urbanism. Viewed in strictly macroscopic terms, they are sprawling urban belts that suck up millions of people daily from communities at a substantial distance from their commercial centers.

But they are also made up of neighborhoods—that is to say, of smaller communities that have a certain measure of identity, whether defined by a shared cultural heritage, economic interests, a commonality of social views, or even

an aesthetic tradition such as Greenwich Village in New York or Camden Town in London. However much their administration as logistical, sanitary, and commercial artifacts requires a high degree of coordination by experts and their aides, they are potentially open to political and, in time, physical decentralization. Popular, even block assemblies can be formed irrespective of the size of a city, provided its cultural components are identified and their uniqueness fostered.

At the same time I should emphasize that the libertarian municipalist (or equivalently, communalist) views I propound here are meant to be a changing and formative perspective—a concept of politics and citizenship to ultimately transform cities and urban megalopolises ethically as well as spatially, and politically as well as economically. Insofar as these views gain public acceptance, they can be expected not only to enlarge their vision and embrace confederations of neighborhoods but also to advance a goal of physically decentralizing urban centers. To the extent that mere electoral “constituents” are transformed by education and experience into active citizens, the issue of humanly scaled communities can hardly be avoided as the “next step” toward a stable and viable form of city life. It would be foolhardy to try to predict in any detail a series of such “next steps” or the pace at which they will occur. Suffice it to say that as a perspective, libertarian municipalism is meant to be an ever-developing, creative, and reconstructive agenda as well as an alternative to the centralized nation-state and to an economy based on profit, competition, and mindless growth.

Minimally then, attempts to initiate assemblies can begin with populations that range anywhere from a modest residential neighborhood to a dozen neighborhoods or more. They can be coordinated by strictly mandated delegates who are rotatable, recallable, and above all, rigorously instructed in written form to either support or oppose whatever issue that appears on the agenda of local confederal councils composed of delegates from several neighborhood assemblies.

There is no mystery involved in this form of organization. The historical evidence for their efficacy and their continual reappearance in times of rapid social change is considerable and persuasive. The Parisian sections of 1793, despite the size of Paris (between 500,000 and 600,000) and the logistical difficulties of the era (a time when nothing moved faster than a horse) functioned with a great deal of success on their own, coordinated by sectional delegates in the Paris Commune. They were notable not only for their effectiveness in dealing with political issues based on a face-to-face democratic structure; they also played a major role in provisioning the city, in preventing the hoarding of food, and in suppressing speculation, supervising the maximum for fixed prices, and carrying out many other complex administrative tasks. Thus, from a minimal standpoint, no city need be considered so large that popular assemblies cannot start, least of all one that has definable neighborhoods that might interlink with each other on ever-broader confederations.

The real difficulty is largely administrative: how to provide for the material amenities of city life, support complex logistical and traffic burdens, or maintain a sanitary environment. This issue is often obscured by a serious confusion between the formulation of policy and its administration. For a community to decide in a participatory manner what specific course of action it should take in dealing with a technical problem does not oblige all its citizens to execute that policy. The decision to build a road, for example, does not mean that everyone must know how to design and construct one. That is a job for engineers, who can offer alternative designs—a very important political function of experts, to be sure, but one whose soundness the people in assembly can be free to decide. To design and construct a road is strictly an administrative responsibility, albeit one that always open to public scrutiny.

If the distinction between policy making and administration is kept clearly in mind, the role of popular assemblies and the people who administer their decisions easily distinguishes logistical problems from political ones, which are ordinarily entangled with each other in discussions on decentralistic politics. Superficially, the assembly system is "referendum" politics: it is based on a "social contract" to share decision making with the population at large, and abide by the rule of the majority in dealing with problems that confront a municipality, a regional confederation of municipalities, or for that matter, a national entity. . . .

That a municipality can be as parochial as a tribe is fairly obvious—and is no less true today than it has been in the past. Hence any municipal movement that is not confederal—that is to say, that does not enter into a network of mutual obligations to towns and cities in its own region—can no more be regarded as a truly political entity in any traditional sense than a neighborhood that does not work with other neighborhoods in the city in which it is located. Confederation—based on shared responsibilities, full accountability of confederal delegates to their communities, the right to recall, and firmly mandated representatives—forms an indispensable part of a new politics. To demand that existing towns and cities replicate the nation-state on a local level is to surrender any commitment to social change as such. . . .

What is confederalism as conceived in the libertarian municipalist framework, and as it would function in a free ecological society? It would above all be a network of councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies, in the various villages, towns, and even neighborhoods of large cities. These confederal councils would become the means for interlinking villages, towns, neighborhoods, and cities into confederal networks. Power thus would flow from the bottom up instead of from the top down, and in confederations the flow of power from the bottom up would diminish with the scope of the federal council, ranging territorially from localities to regions and from regions to ever-broader territorial areas.

The members of these confederal councils would be strictly mandated, recallable, and responsible to the assemblies that choose them for the purpose of coordinating and administering the policies formulated by the assemblies

themselves. The functions of the councils would be purely administrative and practical, unlike representatives in republican systems of government, who have policy-making powers. Indeed, the confederation would make the same distinction that is made on the municipal level, between policy-making and administration. Policy-making would remain exclusively the right of the popular community assemblies based on the practices of participatory democracy. Administration—the coordination and execution of adopted policies—would be the responsibility of the confederal councils. Wherever policy-making slips from the hands of the people, it is devoured by its delegates, who quickly become bureaucrats.

Thus libertarian municipalism is not an effort simply to “take over” city councils to construct a more “environmentally friendly” city government. These adherents—or opponents—of libertarian municipalism, in effect, look at the civic structures that exist before their eyes now and essentially (all rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding) take them as they exist. Libertarian municipalism, by contrast, is an effort to transform and democratize city governments, to root them in popular assemblies, to knit them together along confederal lines, to appropriate a regional economy along confederal and municipal lines.

In fact, libertarian municipalism gains its life and its integrity precisely from the dialectical tension it proposes between the nation-state and the municipal confederation. Its “law of life,” to use an old Marxian term, consists precisely in its struggle with the State. Then tension between municipal confederations and the State must be clear and uncompromising. Since these confederations would exist primarily in opposition to statecraft, they cannot be compromised by the State, provincial or national elections, much less achieved by these means. Libertarian municipalism is formed by its struggle with the State, strengthened by this struggle, indeed, defined by this struggle. Divested of this dialectical tension with the State, of this duality of power that must ultimately be actualized in a free “Commune of communes,” libertarian municipalism becomes little more than sewer socialism.

§2.2.1.2 Mutual Aid Mutual aid, a concept developed by Pyotr Kropotkin in Kropotkin (1892)¹¹⁴ and Kropotkin (1898)¹¹⁵, is here an integral part of dual power, where we use it to denote small, communal, voluntary societies where resources and services are exchanged among members for the benefit of each other and for the benefit of all, with members controlling the resources and services called upon, and democratic, participatory decision-making. A mutual aid society is a not-for-profit organization meant to provide benefits and services towards its members, especially its members in need. In some sense it is often the duplication and extension of social services. For example, trade unions/labour unions can be considered mutual aid societies of a sort (though due to their reterritorialization within the capitalist system and structure, trade-union-consciousness rarely ascends past

¹¹⁴The Conquest of Bread

¹¹⁵Fields, Factories, and Workshops: or Industry Combined with Agriculture and Brain Work with Manual Work

reformism), as can coworking spaces, the Free Breakfast for Children program run by the Black Panther Party, soup kitchens, HIV/AIDS support groups, community clinics, online PDF-sharing websites &c &c

§2.2.1.3 Security Culture Every organization with the potential for revolution must, as revolution is inherently a violent act, maintain structures and operations which are clandestine, in order to avoid quick and harsh retribution by the repressive state apparatus before one is ready. However, it is also important to make these known to the masses, and to keep some openness to the masses. The road to building a proper and robust security culture, then, is fraught with dangers and errors, from the error of “pure transparency” to the error of cults and Blanquism.

First, fetishism of the transparent encourages infiltration by the repressive state apparatus. If they could infiltrate organizations such as the Black Panther Party with COINTELPRO, it must be even easier to do the same with “grassroots” “transparent” organizations. The problems this causes, we hope, are obvious. The structures that must be kept clandestine are especially the militant sections, for this will allow us to avoid being arrested *en masse* and blacklisted from employment as occurred to US Leftist organizations in the post-war McCarthyist period. In that case, despite our rejection of Blanquism, the writings of Blanqui (who, after all, was crucial in the formation of the Paris Commune) might ironically be of some use in providing ideas for good security culture in the most crucial elements of organization—specifically, we refer to Blanqui (1866)¹¹⁶. The surveillance state has only expanded in its power and perniciousness since the time of COINTELPRO—thus, we urge all Leftists to be well aware of infiltration and of information-gathering operations, and work to make it difficult for the surveillance state to monitor our activities. We thus recommend that the Left re-familiarize itself with cryptography and steganography, beginning with a good choice of tools to ensure privacy using computers. A good list to begin with can be found at <http://privacytools.io>

Secondly, Blanquism will be unable to mobilize the masses, as the masses will be unaware of its existence. If the people make history, keeping them out of organization keeps the organization out of history. Such groups cannot grow and often cannot pull off any action. Blanquism chokes organization and subordinates the role of the proletariat and peasantry to the intelligentsiya, and cannot be liberatory, especially as if a strong, secret, centralised organization cut off from society with little growth forms, it may easily become a cult. To understand the pitfalls of this, one needs only see the cranky, cultish fringe followings of 1960s political personalities on college campuses, such as Bob Avakian or Lyndon LaRouche. It is thus important that much of the structures must remain open, not secretive.

§2.2.1.4 Paramilitaries It is the height of liberalism to assume that revolution can occur—or indeed, that a revolutionary movement can survive—without violence. Even before dual power has reached to a stage where one can begin protracted people’s war, an armed paramilitary will be necessary, primarily in the task of anti-fascism and protection against the RSA. By the time fascists are up for election with an appreciable chance of winning, it is too late.

¹¹⁶Instructions for an Armed Uprising

§2.2.1.5 The Party All the organizations and institutions that are replicated in the task of building dual power must somehow coöperate and be coöordinated. This is also true in the Revolution, where armies must be defeated. After the Revolution, it will also be true in an attempt to avoid counter-revolution, to have a coherent change in the economic system, and to preserve the environment against pollution and global warming, among other areas. This is the task of the vanguard party, which we can define alongside largely Leninist and Maoist lines, developed in Marx and Engels (1848), Lenin (1902)¹¹⁷, and the theory of the *mass line* presented below. However, this must be heavily qualified, for too much discipline can easily lead to triangulation and reformism prior to the Revolution (Eurocommunism) or revisionism and suffocation of dissent after it. (We thus refuse the path of Amadeo Bordiga and his teleological, purely centralist *organic centralism*). We must thus limit centralist features to particular areas (such as environmental policy and coördination of armed groups during the revolution, and suppression of fascism, for example) where it would be existentially threatening or otherwise deeply counterproductive to decentralize. We then support a relatively loose party discipline with an emphasis on democratic decision-making, except in areas where centralism is crucial.

§2.2.2 Counter-Hegemony and Agitprop

In order to counter the cultural hegemony of bourgeois society (as described by Antonio Gramsci in Gramsci (1929-35)¹¹⁸), where bourgeois values become seen as “common sense” and where the proletariat identifies its goals and needs with those of the bourgeoisie. We contend, alongside Gramsci, that thus though the base may be prime over the superstructure, the superstructure *must* become a place of conflict—a place where the hegemony of the bourgeoisie is under constant attack.

§2.2.2.1 Foster Theoretical Literacy One of the most useful tools of the Left has been its ability to foster theoretical literacy through such mechanisms as study groups. Indeed, the Black Panther Party formed out of a Marxist study group. Yet in the contemporary Left, theoretical literacy is viewed with suspicion and has been replaced with vapid, petty-bourgeois listicles and common-sense petty-moralism. And yet, simultaneously, many of the earlier practical barriers to forming a reading group have dropped—theoretical literature is now more available than ever through free online distribution and archives (where before one merely had what one could find in local libraries or bookshops, which is and was usually quite limited and generally cost money), and one can easily find other people to study with or to ask for guidance online (where before if one was the only Marxist in an area it would naturally be quite hard to form a group).

§2.2.2.2 The Mass Line What is the *mass line*? The mass line is a Maoist concept developed in Mao (1938b)¹¹⁹ and Mao (1943)¹²⁰ among others, developing partly out of the left criticisms of Marxism-Leninism which charged that the vanguard party simply commanded the masses rather than engaging with them; indeed, this was Mao’s criticism of Stalin. It can be summed up in the following simple statement: “from the people, to the people”—or, equivalently, “be pupils of the masses as well as their teachers”. That

¹¹⁷What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement

¹¹⁸Prison Notebooks

¹¹⁹The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War

¹²⁰Get Organized!

is, it is the task of revolutionaries to go to the masses (as a friend, not a boss—an educator, not a bureaucrat or politician) to learn from them, then synthesize their experiences into principles and methods better articulated and adapted to their specific circumstances (alongside agitprop tailored to them), and finally call upon the masses to put them into practice, so that their problems are solved, leading to liberation and happiness. Thus, one may simultaneously combine the strong organization of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party with the democratic features of Left-Communist and anarchist practice. This, it is hoped, would also avoid the problem of the Party estranging itself from the proletariat.

In more detail, first, the revolutionary should find out:

1. What problems do the masses most want to solve?
2. What do the masses believe to be the root causes of those problems?
3. How do the masses believe these problems should best be addressed by community action?
4. Why do the masses believe that these solutions would work and be preferable to other solutions?

The masses, then, will likely fall into three groups:

1. a few 'backwards'
2. many 'intermediates'
3. a few 'advanceds'

Take the ideas of the most advanced and sharpen them—keep their essence but amplify their revolutionary content. In so doing, form:

1. slogans based on these sharpened ideas
2. a campaign based around their ideas on how to solve the problem

These are then presented to the 'advanceds', who will rally the 'intermediates' and the less dogmatic 'backwards' (isolating the committed reactionaries). If all goes well, the 'advanceds' will become Communists. Repeat this process again and again.

§2.2.2.2.1 On Criticism and Self-Criticism Following Mao (1929)¹²¹, Mao (1937a), Mao (1937b), Mao (1953)¹²², and Mao (1957)¹²³, we endorse self-criticism as praxis. To refuse self-criticism is to fall into danger of what Mao refers to as the 4th and 11th types of liberalism, which corrode the vital, open nature of Marxism with a selfish, opportunist spirit.

Hand-in-hand with self-criticism is the necessity of criticism in general—to refuse to criticise is to fall into the 1st, 3rd, or 8th type of liberalism. But this must be qualified. We must not engage in petty spite or personal attacks, or else fall into the 5th type of liberalism. Our criticism must not take the form of backroom gossip, or we are liberal in the 2nd type. Criticism and self-criticism must come from a place of modesty.

¹²¹On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party

¹²²Combat Bourgeois Ideas in the Party

¹²³On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People

§2.2.2.3 The Long March through the Institutions The slogan “the long march through the institutions” (*der lange Marsch durch die Institutionen*) was a slogan invented by Rudi Dutschke, a leader of the West German student movement, as a development of the theories of Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School. The actual meaning of this phrase is ambiguous and contested; however, we have taken it to mean the following: learn the specialized skills of the institutions of society ¹²⁴ while retaining your revolutionary consciousness, then replicate the ostensible functions of these institutions (if any use can be found in them) outside of the official spaces for them. It is theorized, then, that this would provide an effective bulwark against cultural hegemony by allowing the proletariat to produce its own organic organizations and culture to replace that of the bourgeoisie. It thus fits well inside a programme of dual power and counter-hegemony. To witness the power of institutions, consider how the intellectual backing for neoliberal economic policy was initially limited to the Mont Pelerin Society, a minor think-tank in the late 1940s. Some have taken Dutschke’s phrase to imply advocacy for reformism, but the context of a West Germany run by ex-Nazi Kiesinger in a CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition with a media monopoly by conservatives such as Axel Springer, with emergency laws passed to legitimate suppression of leftism &c &c as well as the origin of this line of thought in the works of Gramsci make it rather unlikely that this is what was meant: and regardless, the reading advanced here is not only more likely to be faithful, it is also a better praxis, as it fits quite well with the rest of this counter-hegemonic programme.

§2.2.2.3.1 Radical Pedagogy If the chief ISA is, as Althusser identifies it, the educational ISA, then struggle must be done to replace it. Luckily, there has been a tradition of Leftist thought on the subject, beginning with Freire (1968)¹²⁵, which itself began as an extension of and response to the theories of Frantz Fanon. While Freire’s philosophy is humanist, and thus at odds with theoretical anti-humanism as presented by Althusser *et al.*, we do believe it is possible to, from a close reading of Freire (*ibid.*), achieve a number of insights as to a radical, revolutionary pedagogy. After justifying his project, Freire sets out to describe the hegemonic form of education: the “banking” model. In the “banking” model, the teacher memorizes and recites narrated content, which is to be received by students, conceptualized as mere receptacles of knowledge. Freire considers this dehumanizing and destructive to any capacity for creativity—and if knowledge arrives through invention and re-thinking, destructive towards the capacity to generate new knowledge. The “banking” model’s assumptions and practices are then explicated, and it is shown that these mirror oppression as a whole, and produce the ideal worker. Freire poses dialogical education as an alternative. Dialogical education is an education founded, as the name suggests, on the concept of dialogue. Dialogics is not a mechanical method, where each student (say) gets 20 seconds to respond to the teacher. It relies on critical thinking, as opposed to naïve thinking, which is associated with the banking model where “truths” are merely accepted by receptacle-like students. Instead of approaching the oppressed in order to evangelize and bring messages of salvation, revolutionaries must come into dialogue with them to understand their material situation and consciousness. This is summed up in the classical

¹²⁴Marcuse, when referring to Dutschke’s theories in his 1972 book *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, lists the following examples: “how to program and read computers, how to teach at all levels of education, how to use the mass media, how to organize production, how to recognize and eschew planned obsolescence, how to design, et cetera”

¹²⁵Pedagogy of the Oppressed

Maoist slogan of the mass line: “from the people, to the people”. But even beyond these particular circumstances (political education so to speak), more generally teachers should base their dialogues on the concrete situations of the students. Freire offers examples of how dialogics may work, which are of great use in illuminating his theories—we recommend reading them to understand pedagogical praxis. Finally, Freire expounds on just how essential dialogics is to revolutionary praxis, and defends it from charges of naïveté and idealism. He notes that antidialogical theories in a situation of conflict necessarily lead to paternalism and mythicization of social relations, as well as manipulation of the masses and cultural conquest.

Apart from Freire, we recommend an understanding of the field of *critical pedagogy* as a whole, including the works of bell hooks, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Joe Kincheloe, Shirley Steinberg *et al.*

§2.2.2.3.2 The Press We now move to the institution of the Press. Trotskyists are known for focusing on this institution obsessively (and generally in a risibly obsolete manner), to the point of humour. Yet it remains our responsibility to provide an alternative press, which informs and agitates the masses through agitprop, keeping them informed of events (especially those which the bourgeois state would rather they not know, such as prominent labour disputes or protests) and politically conscious. The Left must, with agitprop methods, create a comprehensive set of alternative media institutions. To be sure, we may not have access to TV stations, but we can make news websites, we can make large left-wing discussion boards (in the vein of “social media” news aggregators, blogging sites, forums—which can aid in recruitment purposes &c), podcasts, video channels, and, when it is useful, traditional ink-and-paper newspapers.

§2.2.2.4 Agitprop For agitprop, we again recommend Alinsky (1971)—but also a number of other texts. A foundational text in the study of propaganda is Ellul (1962)¹²⁶, though some of the observations it makes can be considered outdated (for example, it claims that religious propaganda no longer works, and that propaganda can only be made in the direction of centralization—observations that might have appeared true in the 1960s but appear laughable now). Agitprop must be conducted by all means available to us—Ellul (*ibid.*) specifically mentions the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, and door-to-door canvassing. To this we may add various new media forms using the Internet: online news sites, online social media pages, &c &c. It is true that we often do not have access to some of these older forms of media, which is why we must compensate elsewhere. But do not underestimate the usefulness of radio and its new replacement the podcast.

Propaganda depends on priming—*pre-propaganda*, which clears the field, breaks down apprehensions and prejudices, and prepares for the propaganda itself. Propaganda, too, must be continuous, though varied in tone. In general it is a bad idea to try and maintain high emotional stakes for a long period of time—this will create burn-out. But do not abandon propaganda—merely adapt it to be useful in times of low emotional intensity. Propaganda is most effective when it tells the truth, or at least avoids lying at any point—telling lies, especially lies which may be discovered as lies, carries the risk of the lie being discovered and the whole source, then, being dismissed. Propaganda relies on conditioned reflex and on myth in varying amounts. Propaganda cannot create from wholecloth, but

¹²⁶Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes

must rely on pre-existing myths—it, however, can transform them in a creative way. Ellul in particular lists “four collective sociological presuppositions”:

1. That an individual's aim in life is happiness.
2. That man is naturally good.
3. That history develops in endless progress.
4. That everything is matter.

He also lists the following “collective myths”:

1. of Work
2. of Happiness
3. of the Nation
4. of Youth
5. of the Hero

Propaganda relies on proper timing—if the news event it seizes upon has already passed, it is no longer *news* and the public cannot help but react with indifference. It is the “undecided” and the “current events man” who Ellul thinks are the most susceptible to propaganda, and of these only the petit-bourgeoisie, the labour aristocracy, and the proletariat, as the haute bourgeoisie will not agitate and the lumpenproletariat will not integrate and often cannot afford the technology used to distribute various channels of propaganda. He then creates a taxonomy of propaganda: political vs. sociological (political propaganda being a method by which a political group attempts to change the behaviour of the public, sociological propaganda being where a society attempts to integrate people into itself by subjecting them to a single way of life), vertical vs. horizontal (vertical propaganda being imposed upon the group and renewed constantly while horizontal propaganda begins within the group and encircles individuals), rational vs. irrational (rational propaganda relating to people via facts, information, and arguments, irrational propaganda relating to people via inflammatory rhetoric—Ellul claims, though we doubt this, that irrational propaganda is the root of rational propaganda and irrational propaganda itself is fading away, leaving only rational propaganda which attempts to arouse an irrational response to a rational stimulus), and agitation vs. integration propaganda (agitation propaganda seeking to enthusiastically mobilize people into rebellious action, integration propaganda aiming to reinforce norms, values, a “way of life”, myths or whatever message is being sent. Agitation propaganda can only be used in small doses, otherwise it wears itself out and causes burnout in its listeners—integration propaganda provides a context and a backdrop and is used more permanently).

§2.2.2.4.1 Psychological Warfare Agitprop traditionally agitates supporters and those who are undecided, but it is essential to also use psychological warfare, which targets enemies by attacking their morale and conviction in their beliefs. That the term is associated, in the United States, with conspiracy theorists and other sorts of cranks is no reason to take it less seriously—for armies and governments devote much resources to their psychological warfare, under names such as “PSYOP”, “PSYWAR”, “MISO”, and “active measures”. Indeed, the conspiracy theorists, which have formed the nucleus of reactionary neo-fascist militias in North America, have, as a result of their paranoia about the Left’s supposed psychological warfare (nonexistent, as the Left has virtually no influence whatsoever), attempted to develop psychological warfare of their own. Given the critical importance of morale and numbers in warfare, and the fact that politics is merely war by another means, we must study the techniques of psychological warfare and apply them generously. To do otherwise is to leave open an avenue of vulnerability which we know is being exploited as we speak.

§2.2.2.4.2 Æsthetics

Don’t start from the good old things
but from the bad new ones

Versuche über Brecht
WALTER BENJAMIN

A question emerges: what æsthetic choices must we, as communists, take? Engels preferred Realism—specifically, Balzac, despite his reactionary beliefs—in a sense that he preferred a sophisticated Realism which did not necessarily *glorify* the proletariat as much as it depicted, realistically, class relations. This point of view was carried forth by Lukács in his 1927 work *The Historical Novel* (not to be confused with *The Theory of the Novel*, also written by Lukács in that same year)—a polemic against the narcissistic tendencies of High Modernism which recommended instead the novels of Sir Walter Scott. Another Realist æsthetic—a simpler one—was chosen by Mina Kautsky, Ferdinand Lassalle, and eventually Anatoly Lunacharsky, Maxim Gorky, and Andrei Zhdanov, who christened it “Socialist Realism” in 1934 whence it became the official æsthetic of Soviet art and literature—artists who strayed from it were punished, and formal experimentation was suppressed. Amongst dissenting critics, there was a joke about the novel Zhdanov had in mind: “boy meets tractor, boy loses tractor, boy goes to the city to find tractor, finds tractor, continues to be in love, takes tractor back to the countryside and lives happily ever after”. But in spite of our vociferous rejection of it as an official æsthetic, we do note that Socialist Realism did manage to produce “Worker and Kolkhoz Woman” as well as the Moscow Metro system, which truly brought art out of the museums and into the daily lives of Muscovians. Another line of æstheticians (if we may call them that) believed that Realism had been appropriated by the bourgeoisie (the universal protagonist of the realist novel had become bourgeois) and was thus outmoded. Walter Benjamin thusly claims that Realism is bourgeois commodification of the aura—and, hopefully, the last grasp of bourgeois art. Benjamin in Benjamin (1936) among other essays outlines the case for an æsthetics based on the notions of fragments and participation, such that those who enjoy art also participate in its construction. Adorno makes an interesting choice of æsthetic, reversing that of Lukács by championing High Modernism, and making the case that in

form itself there is a politics. This approach, however, has been rightly criticised as, well, unrealistic—who in their right minds listens to Schoenberg and decides to be a communist? Ernst Bloch has a different approach in *The Principle of Hope*, where he argues that in late capitalism, hope has been extinguished—but in folk art, oral culture, and popular culture, hope springs anew in a utopian manner, which is a projection of a possibility on the future that is unavailable in the real world.

What is our position? Let a thousand aesthetics bloom! Different aesthetics will be useful in different times and different situations, as various aesthetics grow sclerotic and are reterritorialised by the bourgeoisie, but also as other aesthetics gain a new freshness and revolutionary potential, or can be detoured. But following Benjamin, revolutionary art and culture ought to be participatory. We hold the DIY culture of underground music subcultures (traditionally, punk, hip hop, heavy metal, goth, indie &c &c) as an example of the sort of thing that we're talking about. We must be careful to caution against the adoption and fetishization of fascist aesthetics, a near-constant part of largely-white subcultures which opens the doors for actual fascists to commandeer the movements for themselves.

§2.2.2.4.3 On Reterritorialisation It would be remiss to discuss aesthetics without the danger of *reterritorialisation* (also analyzed as a type of *reification* by Lukács and *recuperation* by Debord): when radical ideas and images are appropriated and commodified by bourgeois society and manufactured by the culture industry with all radicalism defused in favour of innocuous liberalism. This tendency was noticed early on: see, for example, the beginning of Lenin (1918):

What is now happening to Marx's theory has, in the course of history, happened repeatedly to the theories of revolutionary thinkers and leaders of oppressed classes fighting for emancipation. During the lifetime of great revolutionaries, the oppressing classes constantly hounded them, received their theories with the most savage malice, the most furious hatred and the most unscrupulous campaigns of lies and slander. After their death, attempts are made to convert them into harmless icons, to canonize them, so to say, and to hallow their names to a certain extent for the "consolation" of the oppressed classes and with the object of duping the latter, while at the same time robbing the revolutionary theory of its substance, blunting its revolutionary edge and vulgarizing it. Today, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists within the labor movement concur in this doctoring of Marxism. They omit, obscure, or distort the revolutionary side of this theory, its revolutionary soul. They push to the foreground and extol what is or seems acceptable to the bourgeoisie. All the social-chauvinists are now "Marxists" (don't laugh!). And more and more frequently German bourgeois scholars, only yesterday specialists in the annihilation of Marxism, are speaking of the "national-German" Marx, who, they claim, educated the labor unions which are so splendidly organized for the purpose of waging a predatory war!

However, the term *reterritorialisation* and its analysis were developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Deleuze and Guattari (1972) as part of a sophisticated dialogue with and rejection of psychoanalytic theories. It is accompanied by a corresponding term *detrterritorialisation* (similar to Debord's *détournement*). *Deterritorialisation* can be either *relative* (where it is always accompanied by reterritorialization) or *absolute* (where it gives rise to a "plane of immanence"). According to Deleuze and Guattari, "flows" are first *territorialised*—that is, traced onto a social body which takes credit for production, which in ancient societies was the Earth, and which in capitalism is capital. In these ancient societies, deterritorialisation occurs when production and flows are no longer credited to the Earth, and reterritorialisation immediately follows by crediting production to the body of the despot. In capitalism, flows are territorialized on capital, deterritorialized relatively, and then reterritorialized on people who are understood as the family members in the Œdipal triangle. Now this, at first, may seem to be an irrelevant venture, but this does have implications for aesthetics. Specifically, this provides a theoretical basis from which one can understand the ways in which radical aesthetics become commandeered by capital, and bourgeois aesthetics become reclaimed by radicals: the former is *reterritorialisation*, the latter *detrterritorialisation*.

Let us take for example the reclaimed slur (which, we must emphasize, remains a slur) *queer*. It was at first used to describe a certain theoretical area ("queer theory"), then a certain LGBT/feminist politics which wished to project a radical aesthetic ("not gay as in happy but queer as in fuck you", differing mainly from mainstream LGBT politics in that it saw marriage as irrelevant and scorned the HRC—while accepting the rest of neoliberal LGBT politics) while often not delivering on this promise, i.e. resorting to neoliberal LGBT politics as opposed to a truly radical politics. Now it has become merely an aesthetic, to be worn at will even by cishets. This also teaches a related lesson: if you wish to adopt an aesthetic of radicalism, be fully prepared to back it up with an actual radical politics.

§2.2.2.5 Against Vulgar Identity-Political Praxis When the Revolution comes, the editors of BuzzFeed will be first against the wall.

The praxis of many supposedly-Leftist activists seems to be more in the vein of 19th-century Liberal social reformers—lecturing the poor rather than reaching out to them. It also, in some respects, resembles mediævel astronomy—creating ever-more elaborate and useless theoretical constructs to reinforce artificial barriers between "identities" in a community. Take, for example, the endless bickering over slur reclamation in LGBT communities, such as whether or not trans people can reclaim slurs that often are used against them when they are directed prototypically against cis gay people of another gender. There is also the quixotic focus on micro-aggressions, which seems like an attempt to find something that seems easy to fix to give oneself the impression that they have done something useful. (Some "theorists" have also tried to build up theories of oppression purely on micro-aggression, which can be dismissed here as nonsense). Micro-aggressions, by their very nature, are smaller consequences of a greater macro-aggression—*oppression*—and they won't go away without the disappearance of the greater oppression. One might direct this criticism at all superstructural activism, but that would mistake the mutual co-dependence of base and superstructure with the base being primary for simple dependence of superstructure on base—superstructural activism (i.e. propaganda, criticism, counter-hegemony)

in general can feed back into the base, but activism focused on micro-aggressions largely cannot feed into dismantling of oppression in general. We also must remind our readers of the vulgarization of the important concept of cultural appropriation—divorced from its context of commodification and oppression, and imbued with a moralistic spirit, it resembles nationalism and racism, sounding uncomfortably close to “birds fly with birds, fish swim among fishes”.

Take, for example, rich White students telling poor White people that they have white privilege. Because these poor white people have to deal with the crushing weight of being poor, insinuating that they have privilege will build more barriers. Instead of giving them all the theory first, why not show them exactly what we mean by privilege first—for example, telling them (and showing them with evidence) that Black people are more likely to be imprisoned for drug-related offenses but less likely to actually use drugs—and then giving them the theoretical construct to refer to these as a group? In some sense, you have to give people facts to fill a theoretical bag with before giving them the bag with which to carry it.

Furthermore, if you claim to be a revolutionary, *it is your job to educate the masses*. This is of *primary importance*. Saying “it’s not my job to educate you” merely pushes the masses away into the warm embrace of fascism, which is *more than happy* to provide for their political education. While it is not one’s duty to always provide this labour to people who are not genuinely asking for education (many just want to waste one’s time), and while there are to be allowances for a person’s own trauma and misery relating to oppression being too painful to tread in public, *at the very least* refer people to resources (such as a FAQ—not to Google or any other search engine, do *not* dismiss them!) and to people who would be able to answer their questions and to help in their political education.

We also recommend that our readers read and take into account Porpentine (2015), especially when it comes to disposability. While this text has been mobilized by separatists to loudly declaim any disagreement or refusal to engage with separatism as “abuse”, it remains, by and large, an important text when it comes to ways in which marginalized peoples find themselves excluded by groups supposedly dedicated to supporting them.

Moves that are intended primarily to signal how good of a person one is are repugnant. Consider, for example, the gesture of putting a safety pin on one’s shirt, adopted after the spike in hate crimes following Brexit and then popularized after the election of Donald Trump as US President. Ostensibly, this is to show that you are safe to be with, and is to be backed up by defending marginalised people if they are attacked. However, this was spread through Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr &c. It was easily co-opted by neo-Nazis, who have planned to use it themselves to lull their victims into a false sense of security, then attack them. When learning about this co-optation (something that should have been considered given the complete lack of security culture) and how it renders the supposed safety of the safety pin effectively moot, the proponents of the idea pushed back, revealing that the true motive was not to keep marginalised people safe at all but to broadcast that one is a good person and feel good about oneself. This is counterproductive, a waste of resources, and frankly dangerous.

§2.2.3 Reform without Reformism

We oppose reformism but advocate reform. This might surprise some, but we do not believe that “the worse it gets, the better it gets”. Reforms are meant to destroy barriers

to organization and thus make such a task easier, to lessen the damage done by capital, and to make life easier for the vulnerable populations whose liberation requires revolution. Reforms are meant to put a brake, however temporary, to new innovations of capitalism which, unhindered, would do serious damage to us all. We oppose reformism—the idea that reforms are sufficient, that one can reform their way to socialism, that revolution is unnecessary and harmful, &c &c. Unlike the social-democrats and social-chauvinists, we hold that revolution is necessary. Lenin’s reading (in Lenin (1918)) of Engels’ discussion of the *withering away of the state* in Engels (1878)¹²⁷ is clearly superior to the Social-Democratic reading: the bourgeois state does not wither away, but rather the proletarian state does, after a revolution:

The state is a product and a manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively *cannot* be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable. [...] According to Marx, the state is an organ of class *rule*, an organ for the *oppression* of one class by another; it is the creation of “order”, which legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes. [...] As a matter of fact, Engels speaks here [in *Anti-Dühring*] of the proletarian revolution “abolishing” the *bourgeois* state, while the words about the state withering away refer to the remnants of the *proletarian* state *after* the socialist revolution. According to Engels, the bourgeois state does not “wither away”, but is “*abolished*” by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after the revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state Secondly, the state is a “special coercive force”. Engels gives this splendid and extremely profound definition here with the utmost lucidity. And from it follow that the “special coercive force” for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, of millions of working people by handfuls of the rich, must be replaced by a “special coercive force” for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the *dictatorship of the proletariat* [emphasis ours]). This is precisely what is meant by “abolition of the state as state”. This is precisely the “act” of taking possession of the means of production in the name of society. And it is self-evident that *such* a replacement of one (bourgeois) “special force” by another (proletarian) “special force” cannot possibly take the form of “withering away”.

The following two are measures that could take the form of reform, though they likely would not be enacted until after a revolution—the example of the Rehn-Meidner plan (specifically, the Worker’s Fund discussed in the Löntagarfonderna of 1971) for a peaceful mutualist reform process, which was harshly rejected followed by a massive propaganda campaign by neoliberals, is pertinent here as to why these reforms would likely be impossible without a revolution. They would help achieve what is called the ‘lower stage’ of socialism, allowing for later measures to achieve full communism.

§2.2.3.1 The Virtues and Pitfalls of the UBI Of late, proposals for a *universal basic income* (UBI) have been quite popular in Leftist circles; indeed, Srnicek and Williams

¹²⁷Anti-Dühring

(2015) lists an UBI as a core demand. It is not difficult to see why; a UBI, if properly implemented, would free up time and energy to organize for still more, and would ease the lives of the unemployed, the homeless, and the poor whose wages cannot support their life.

However, the UBI has some pitfalls. First and foremost, the UBI is often used as a proposal to eliminate current social services. This can be seen quite clearly in the original proposal for a UBI: Milton Friedman's negative income tax. If the UBI is too small, it becomes merely a subsidy to business. These two are serious problems, for given the political climate of neoliberalism, if any UBI becomes a political possibility they are likely to become built-in flaws of it as part of the "compromise" needed to enact it in law. If these problems are baked-in, then the UBI will not uplift the poor, but further immiserate them. The UBI, then, must not exist in isolation—but we do think that it, alongside mutualism, would provide a good basis for a 'lower stage' of socialism, likely after the revolution but before the achievement of communism.

§2.2.3.2 Mutualism as a Transitional Stage Mutualism is not an end-in-itself. We do not endorse Proudhon—the fact that Mondragon, the largest worker's coöperative, must still, due to its embeddedness within capitalism, exploit workers in South America should show that mutualism is not the end. We instead see mutualism, along with a UBI, as a good first step towards communism—as the 'lower stage' of socialism, so to speak.

We must thus clear up what exactly we mean by mutualism here. Mutualism can be seen as a platform of the following planks:

1. Industrial democracy—workers run workplaces as coöperatives in a democratic fashion
2. Mutual credit

Industrial democracy—or corporate democracy, as it is sometimes called (especially in the post-Fordist era), with a more watered-down form referred to as workplace democracy—is a rather literal and direct method by which the workers would own the means of production. Similarly, mutual credit would replace the banking system, allowing for the benefits of credit to go to the people and not just the bankers. Of course, both of these, being embedded in market relations as here mutualism is part of the 'lower stage' of socialism not the 'higher stage' of communism, will likely have to be coöordinated and regulated. When combined with the UBI and increased automation, the result will hopefully be that automation will provide for most of the livelihood of everyone, its benefits being reaped by all, and not merely by the capitalist class, with a small amount of labour remaining, to be organized coöperatively.

§2.2.4 Revolution through Protracted People's War

Our theory of revolution rests on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist conception of *protracted people's war*, outlined in Mao (1938a)¹²⁸ and in Mao (1937c)¹²⁹. Mao originally formulated the theory in response to rural conditions in China that would render the traditional urban-insurrection strategy of the Left impractical; this strategy has been generalized by

¹²⁸On Protracted War

¹²⁹On Guerrilla Warfare

Maoists. We will thus present it in its general form here, with a sub-section providing additional detail in circumstances surrounding urban revolution.

When the revolution occurs, it must take into account the objective conditions of the oppressed. That is, if the oppressed—those who have the least to lose, with the most fervor and militancy—live in the city or in the suburbs, one might be expected to rely more strongly on an urban guerrilla strategy, whereas, if the oppressed live in the rural areas, consisting more of the peasantry than the urban proletariat, than one might be expected to rely more strongly on a peasant war strategy. We do recommend considering and incorporating both strategies, for it is unlikely that conditions will call for only a rural people's war or only an urban guerrilla warfare: more likely, both will be needed. We contend that it will be necessary to form a worker's state to maintain the *dictatorship of the proletariat* (as opposed to the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie* that all of us live in), especially as the class struggle continues—indeed, *intensifies*—after socialism. Anarchists contend this, but most anarchist tendencies rely on the building of a state in all-but-name, a dictatorship of the proletariat that they claim is not a state for idealist reasons (e.g. it is not organized by means of the vanguard party), which, from a materialist standpoint, are nothing more than special pleading.

After a revolutionary movement has gained the support of the people through dual-power measures, it is to begin guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas should “swim through the masses like the fish through the sea” and should use 10-on-1 ambush tactics to slowly weaken the state, steal its arms and supplies, train soldiers, and kill reactionaries to serve the people. Avoid conventional battles, because a small army of a few dozen soldiers can be easily routed by the great armies of capital. Instead, choose your battles carefully and maintain mobility above all else. Strategically, the aim should be to form *revolutionary base areas* ruled by Communists where the bourgeois state can no longer *de facto* control or govern. In these areas, begin forming the embryo of socialism through popular programmes such as land reform—this will have the additional positive effect of spreading the influence of the Communists and earning the support of the populace. These areas also can produce resources to strengthen the movement, politicize the masses, and create more *revolutionary base areas*. At this stage, tactics remain guerrilla tactics, but with much greater volume. Once enough base areas are formed, one can revert to conventional warfare tactics and take entire cities, going small-to-large. Finally, one can encircle the largest cities and cut off the supply lines of capital, or unite with revolutionaries already inside.

The People's Army is an army of a type different from those of the bourgeoisie—it is a producing army which does not leech off of the masses but goes into fields and participates in productive labour such that the people can eat and support themselves, and it relies on the mass line to learn from, teach, and politicize the masses. Often it is necessary to form a “united front” with groups that are not necessarily Communist (but who are also committed to revolution because it is in their interests) to bring down the bourgeois state. It must be guided by the Communists, who should win over the rest of the factions of the “united front”. Because in protracted people's war the soldiers are one with the people, the enemy should not be able to defeat it militarily, for in so doing they would have to slaughter their productive base because they cannot kill all of the soldiers without killing all of the people. In this way, the militants can bleed the capitalists dry by slowly taking more arms and resources, coming out only when they are sure to win and refusing to attack

otherwise.

Protracted people's war imposes the following conditions on guerrilla warfare:

1. Guerrilla warfare must be made alongside the creation of dual power in order to be ready to administer socialism once the capitalist state collapses or once revolutionary base areas have been established, and in order to gain the support of the masses
2. Guerrilla warfare must be conducted once the support of the people is behind the people's army—when this does not happen, the guerrilla is termed *adventurist*, and will probably die an anonymous, gruesome, futile death in the jungle (such as Che's ill-fated adventures in the Congo and in Bolivia)

While Che was not a Maoist—indeed, his wars and his *foco* theory are the canonical example of adventurism—we recommend Guevara (1961b)¹³⁰ as well.

An insurrectionary strategy requires waiting for a 'Right Moment' which is difficult to find, and risks everything on soldiers which are untested. If we have learned anything from the Spartakus Revolt, Mai 68, &c, it is that there are no returns, no “do overs” with insurrection—the enemy will crush you and prevent a Leftist revolution for at least 20 more years. A protracted war strategy is clearly superior, for it allows for sustained radicalism.

§2.2.4.1 Urban Warfare Urban warfare is the traditional means of the Left, from the French Revolution (1789-1794) to the 1830 Revolution to the 1848 Revolutions to the Paris Commune of 1871 to the Petrograd Soviet of 1917 to the 1968 Revolutions. There has thus been much writing as to how to conduct it, and many innovations in both tactics and strategy. Of course, none of us have ever been involved in any of them, so we refuse to comment from experience as much as give a survey of the various tactics and strategies as well as their historical contexts and rates of success in gaining power. The method of protracted people's war was originally developed for rural warfare—while it applies too to urban warfare, urban warfare will need some additional clarification, which we here provide.

One particular tactical innovation of the past 36 years deserves note: the black bloc. The black bloc was invented in demonstrations in 1980 in Berlin-Kreuzberg and St. Pauli-Hafenstraße in Hamburg (following increased police violence in a 1977 Brokdorf anti-nuclear demonstration), where the *Autonomen* all wore identical black clothes and masks such as to elude identification by the West German police. It gained prominence after the 1987 May Day demonstration in Berlin-Kreuzberg, after which the tactic spread globally—gaining prominence once again after the 1999 anti-WTO demonstration in Seattle. One article on black-bloc tactics that we recommend is Green Mountain Anarchist Collective (2001)¹³¹. However, returning to the issue of security culture, since the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle, police have learned to infiltrate the black-bloc. And indeed, in Germany the far-Right has learned to imitate the black bloc—now dubbed *Autonome Nationalisten*. This, alongside the phenomena of black-bloc spectators and “black bloc as fashion” means the black bloc will require refinement and rethinking, but not abandonment. Two good

¹³⁰ Guerrilla Warfare

¹³¹ Communiqué on Tactics

articles were published in 2002 in *Barricada* outlining how this might be done: Severino (2002b)¹³² and Severino (2002a)¹³³.

§2.2.4.2 The Continuation of Class Struggle After the Revolution It is vital to remember that after the revolution, class struggle not only continues but *intensifies*. The bourgeoisie will not dissolve themselves without a struggle, and unless the revolution quickly spreads throughout the world, imperialist countries will move to encircle and contain the revolution, if not to topple and reverse it. This movement will occur regardless of supposed variation in the imperialist countries—Marx and Engels themselves note this in their vivid description of the “holy alliance” throughout Europe which was united despite their various disputes with one another in the exorcism of the spectre of Communism. We need not repeat the myriad examples from history demonstrating this fact. This is indeed also the justification behind the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, which was developed in Marx (1871), Engels (1873), Marx (1875)¹³⁴, Engels (1878), and eventually Lenin (1918). However, it is largely latent in that concept—it is only fully realized as a concept of its own, and fully emphasized as it ought to be, in the works of Mao, specifically Mao (1957). Mao prescribes as a solution through *cultural revolution*—what can be understood in terms of Althusser as the replacement of the bourgeois ISAs with proletarian ones.

§3 Our Demands

The abolishment of the mutilation of intersex people

The abolishment of HIV-criminalization laws

The abolishment of ABA and gay/trans conversion therapy; summary execution of all people involved in creating and running these “treatments”

The abolishment of “gay panic” and “trans panic” legal defenses

The repeal of laws that legalize discrimination against LGBT people, and the creation and enforcement of legal standards to protect LGBT people from employment, housing, &c discrimination

The repeal of “bathroom bills” that bar trans people from using restrooms corresponding to their gender

The repeal of institutional medical abuse of trans people via medical gatekeeping, replaced by an informed consent model

“Second-generation” rent control in major cities, without exceptions

The restructuring or abolition of zoning law such as to provide for high density and affordable housing

The abolition of the tuition system and other marketizations of education

An end to the construction of highways within city limits

The decriminalization of drugs, with safe injection sites and needle-exchange programs to replace institutionalization

Universal sex education

The decriminalization of sex work

An end to *de facto* discrimination in public education, whether through the Hauptschule/Realschule/Gymnasium system or through the American system of funding public education through local prop-

¹³²Reforming the Black Bloc: Tactics and Ideology

¹³³Has the Black Bloc Tactic Reached the End of its Usefulness?

¹³⁴Critique of the Gotha Programme

erty taxes, among others
 An end to oil and gas projects, including pipelines and fracking
 Violent suppression of fascists and reactionaries
 Raising the minimum wage to a wage large enough to live upon, indexed to a cost-of-living index
 Abolition of “workfare”
 Abolition of loopholes allowing for sub-minimum wage labour (such as those which allow paying sub-minimum wage to people with disabilities)
 Mandatory fair-scheduling practices, including predictable schedules provided well-in-advance of labour
 Abolition of prison labour
 The building of massive, separated-grade public transportation systems with low, uniform, fares
 Carfree zones in cities
 The mass distribution of carbon-neutral and electric cars in lieu of gas cars
 Increased pedestrian and bicycle access in cities
 The replacement of Radburn street plans with grid plans
 An end to the pervasive food waste in grocery markets, restaurants &c with the excess food siphoned into food banks
 Mandatory coöperative ownership of apartment housing
 Legalization of squatting in empty buildings and loosening of adverse possession laws
 Provision of free housing for the homeless and food for the hungry
 The decriminalization of abortion and birth control, and their mass distribution
 The mass distribution of hormones and instructions for HRT
 Municipal wireless internet
 Open borders
 Abolition of the police
 Abolition of state surveillance
 Industrial democracy
 Mutual banking
 A UBI equal to the minimum wage

Epilogue

I know you’re out there. I can feel you now. I know that you’re afraid... you’re afraid of us. You’re afraid of change. I don’t know the future. I didn’t come here to tell you how this is going to end. I came here to tell you how it’s going to begin. I’m going to hang up this phone, and then I’m going to show these people what you don’t want them to see. I’m going to show them a world without you. A world without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries. A world where anything is possible. Where we go from there is a choice I leave to you.

NEO
The Matrix
 THE WACHOWSKI SISTERS

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